Ninth Annual — 
Inter-Callegiate Debates 

HSN ee: an oh can tee: ys 

: en aii Griangular ee League 


© Compulsary Arhitratinn nf 
Tar Bisputes ant Interstate Railroads 


| Barimouth Callene 
Broun Uninersity 
Williams Callege 


i sh PROPOSITION FOR DEBATE 
; RESOLVED: neu “THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD 


UIRE COMPULSORY ARBITRATION OF LA- 
Was poet BOR DISPUTES ON INTERSTATE RAILROADS. | 


ely The G, WW. Wilson Company | 
- White Plains, N, Y., and Nem Pork City 


Compulsory Arbitration of 
Labor Disputes on Interstate Railroads 


Daramorth-browne Walliams Debates 
1914 


NEW ENGLAND DEBATES - 


Dartmouth College 


Brown University 
Williams College 


The Courts and Social Reform 
The "Recall of Judicial Decisions," as proposed by Ex- 
President Roosevelt, is reported as debated in 1913. 
Edited by Edward C. Mabie and Leonard D. White. 
Price $1.00, postpaid. 


Compulsory Arbitration of Labor Disputes on Inter- 


state Railroads. 
"Resolved: That the Federal government should require 
compulsory arbitration of labor disputes on interstate rail- 
roads" was debated in 1914 and is here reported verbatim. 
Edited by Edward C. Mabie and Leonard D. White for 
the Department of Public Speaking at Dartmouth College. 
Price $1.25, postpaid. 


Published by 
THE H. W. WILSON COMPANY 
White Plains, N. Y., and New York City 


Compulsory Arbitration of 
Labor Disputes on Interstate Railroads 


Constructive and Rebuttal Speeches 


in the 
New England Triangular League Debates 
March 12, 1914 


By the Representatives of 


Dartmouth College 
Brown University 


Williams College 


Edited by 
Edward C. Mabie and Leonard D. White 
for the Department of Public Speaking 
Dartmouth College 


The H. W. Wilson Company 
White Plains, N. Y., and New York City 
1914 


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PREFACE 


This edition of the New England Debates held on March 
12, 1914, continues the policy begun last year of providing 
specimen material for the use of students of debate and argu- 
mentation. Several changes in arrangement have been made 
with the purpose of better adapting the report to use in the 
class room. In order that the student may follow more easily 
the cases presented by the teams in the main speeches, these 
speeches on each side, Affirmative and Negative, have been 
grouped together instead of in the order in which they were 
delivered. The rebuttal speeches, however, in which much 
depends upon the successful handling of contingencies which 
demand quick judgment, firm decision, and strategy, it has 
been thought desirable to arrange in the order in which they 
were delivered, alternating Negative and Affirmative. 

To illustrate team work in debating, and to point out the 
difference between the model forensic with its Introduction, 
Discussion, and Conclusion, and the case as presented by a 
team of debaters, Part I has been arranged with sub-titles to 
indicate places where it has been necessary to intersperse re- 
futation, summaries, and introductory matter through the 
body of the Discussion. Parts II and III have not been 
treated in this way, the intention being to allow the student 
to separate this material for himself. 

For convenience in reference the debates have been di- 
vided into sections, each section, as far as possible, dealing 
with one argument or bit of introductory material, refutation, 
or summary. The Index has been arranged with a view 
to further aiding cross reference. The Bibliography does not 
attempt to give all the available material on the subject but 
simply to give some of the better references. 

Acknowledgments are due to the members of the Depart- 
ment of Public Speaking of Dartmouth College for many 
suggestions and to the Dartmouth debaters. 

A summary giving the personnel of the teams, and the 
results of the 1914 debates, and the standing of the colleges 
in the league follows. 


Edward C. Mabie, 
Leonard D. White. 


Hanover, N. H., April, 1914. 


NEW ENGLAND TRIANGULAR LEAGUE 
DEBATES a 


Marcy 12, 1914- 


Pico NNEC Or STREAMS “AND STANDING OF 
COLEEGES 


DARTMOUTH, Affirmative 
Captain Carl Plummer Merryman, Bangor, Maine 
John Alford Hanna, Auburn, Nebraska 
Lyman Ray Jordan, Joliet, Illinois 
Alternate Earl Cranston, Denver, Colorado 
a he tha 
WILLIAMS, Negative 
Captain Edward Erksine Porter, Brooklyn, New York 
John Howard Lawson, New York City 
Arthur Newton Pack, Lakewood, New Jersey 
Alternate John Valentine, Chicago, Illinois 
Williamstown, Massachusetts 
Won by Dartmouth, two to one. 


WILLIAMS, Affirmative 
Captain Walter Mills Hinkle, New York City 
John Nestell Leonard, New York City 
Robert Noble Golding, New York City 
Alternate Bruce Messer Smith, Pittsfield, Massa- 
chusetts 
BROWN, Negative 
Captain Nahum Morrill, Chicago, Illinois 
Roland Hazard McLaughlin, Chicago, Illinois 
Frederick Hartwell Greene, Newton, Massachusetts 
Alternate Ismar Baruch, New London, Connecticut 
Providence, Rhode Island 
Won by Brown, two to one. 


Vill RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


BROWN, Affirmative 
Captain James Joseph McGovern, Providence, Rhode Island 
James Vincent Giblin, Fall River, Massachusetts 
Samuel Henry Workman, Providence, Rhode Island 
Alternate William Arthur Needham, Providence, 
Rhode Island 


See 


DARTMOUTH, Negative 
Captain Chester Bradley Jordan Jr., Lancaster, New 
Hampshire 
Leonard Dupee White, Acton, Massachusetts 
Frederick Pitkin Cranston, Denver, Colorado 
Alternate Pulaski King Cook, Chicago, Illinois 
Hanover, New Hampshire 
Won by Dartmouth unanimously. 


STANDING OF THE COLLEGES. 


Debates won in League, 1905-1914: 


Brown e- on eee 13 
Dartmothee seen 10 
Williams cee 4 
Brown-Dartmouth Series, 1898-1914: 
Browntises ee eee 9 
Dartntouth#.... se a 
Dartmouth-Williams Series, 1896-1914: 
Dartmoutha.. aoe 13 


Wilhiotist.ctmer et 6 


CONTENTS 


BIBLIOGRAPHY : 


BSG TAD OCSMBAIHs SE LICIS.«:, «4. «seta asehel tha clas cgs, Soa eeny sls xi 
ae CSOT 3, gc 27a. ah Gaye's ees cto ds tatsit oe nis n egayshate x1 
modecerande oriers.in Cases; Arpitrated 4. . tos ec’ <0 6 oro Xii 
Petree tet CUiiert sme tos. Meee ote ait aa cc on ee 3 xiii 
TReGEOCICH (Sumner ems SOR ares oS aramid Nog as oats DE soe a Bs XV 


Part I, DARTMOUTH, AFFIRMATIVE, VERSUS WILLIAMS, NEGATIVE: 


Dt RS eee ULE IACI VC fe te vee ELAtiTia i oars eters alee Rote ete wo wa ae I 
pi Caytl A EU IAL Gy Lact Ree) CLCAM ss. foie e Go here's « cre stalere’s 14 5 
lier eer ia tive, Gee bert vila siete ve oe ce evil sne aes = 

Peat COAL V Gain Nie PACK), cetse ee God ares © Loerie wees 12 
BECunUmI Co AtlVems |i kis La WSO. cect siete or ties ce cee? 16 
PaniruM Nemalivem te Mes POTteh en. «cs heer ats nc dees oe ice 20 
Pe LAL Gee ae en Ee et OOS Stns ges seetah erect cae shee ake cy 24 


Part IJ, WILLIAMS, AFFIRMATIVE, VERSUS BRown, NEGATIVE: 


iter iit iri axtrue be Nas Goldings... cnaeatuat aces és nese 37 
Peconemasucmativem |atNw Lconatd: . deur a teense cae ous 4I 
Peed AMTINATIVE OV Mer Llinkles: wa.) ee dete swe roe 44 
Purste  COUTIVEse UT, F1.  GTECHG nabs ooh fons sec ob ces bos 49 
Prconde Negative: Ry ieMaclLaughlinis... .s.+.cccek ees 53 
Pere COALYV Cae NCP OLLI Eo rnc ices acke soca, eae ees 57 


ernie (Gee Sh ce oN Ae aes cs Sos S Oe. Gales oe vs 63 


oe CONTENTS 


Part IIJ, Brown, AFFIRMATIVE, VERSUS DARTMOUTH, NEGATIVE: 
First Affirmative, S. H. Workman 
Second Affirmative, Jz V.~Gibiitite..... 0 oes 
Third ‘Affirmative, J. J. McGovern: .3) (2.5... 3. see 
First (Negative, L. D. Wihiter#232..5. 2. 2.40. oe 
Second Negative, FE: P.-Cranstotiec.e oes ernie. 2 ce eee 
Third ‘Negative, C: B: Jordan; Jue .e ees ae eee 
Rebuttals : 


SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY ON COMPULSORY 
ARBITRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES 
ON INTERSTATE RAILROADS 


BIBLIOGRAPHIES AND BRIEFS. 


Adams, Thomas Sewall and Sumner, Helen L. LABOR 
PROBLEMS. New York, 1913. “Supplementary Read- 
ings’ appended to Chs. VI and VIII. 

Beman, Lamar T. SELECTED ARTICLES ON COMPUL- 
SORY ARBITRATION OF INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES. 
(Debaters’ Handbook Series) Minneapolis, I9II. pp. xxili- 
xIviil. 

Carlton, Frank Tracy. HISTORY AND PROBLEMS OF 
ORGANIZED LABOR. Boston, 1911. “References for 
Further Reading” appended to Chs. VI, VII, IX, and 
XVIII. 

Library of Congress) SELECT LIST OF REFERENCES 
ON INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATION. Washington, D. 
©. .1903:; 

Books. 


Adams, Thomas Sewall and Sumner, Helen L. LABOR 
PROBEEMS@ New York, 1013. ‘Cho -VIv-viIl, VIIL 

Bolen, G. L. GETTING A LIVING. New York, 1903. Ch. 
XXVIII. 

Broadhead, Henry. STATE REGULATION OF LABOR 
AND LABOR DISPUTES IN NEW ZEALAND. Lon- 
don, 1908. 

Carlton, Frank Tracy. THE HISTORY AND PROBLEMS 
OFS ORGANIZED: LABOR}: Chicago, 1911. Chs: VI, 
eb e EX, MV ATT: 

Clark, Victor S. THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN AUSTRAL- 
ASIA. New York, 1906. Chs. VII-X, pp. 138-245. 

Commons, John R. LABOR AND ADMINISTRATION, 
New York, 1913. Chs. VIII, XII, XXI, XXII. 


is 


Xii RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


Commons, John R. TRADE UNIONISM AND LABOR 
PROBLEMS. Boston, 1900. 

Ely, Richard T. EVOLUTION OF INDUSTRIAL SOCI- 
ETY. New. York, 1903. Pt. 11) Ch. X> pps 74=s000 

Ely, Richard T. THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMER- 
ICA. New York, 1905. pp. 1-6, 34-60. 

Gilman, Nicholas P. METHODS OF INDUSTRIAL PEACE. 
Boston, 1904. Ch. XV, pp. 401-408. “The Case’ for Legal 
Regulation.” 

Le Rossignol, James E. and Stewart, William D. STATE 
SOCIALISM IN NEW ZEALAND. New York, Igt!o. 
Lloyd, Henry D. COUNTRY WITHOUT STRIKES. New 

York, 1900. 

Lowell, Josephine Shaw. INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATION 
AND CONCILIATION. New York, 1893. 

Mitchell, John. ORGANIZED LABOR. American Bible 
House, 1903. Ch. XXXVIII, pp. 337-3096. 

Parsons, Frank. THE STORY OF NEW ZEALAND. Phil- 
adelphia, 1904. 

Reeves, W. Pember. STATE EXPERIMENTS IN AUS- 
TRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. London, 1902. Vol. 
Leppe (50-181 

Stimson, Frederic Jessup. HANDBOOK OF THE LABOR 
LAW OF THE UNITED-STATES.. New YorkiSoo. 

Webb, Beatrice and Sidney. HISTORY OF TRADE UNION- 
ISM. New ed. New York, Iog11. 


‘AAWARDS AND BRIEFS IN CASES ARBITRATED. 


Brief on Behalf of the Railroads. Arbitration between the 
Eastern Railroads and the Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Engineers in re Engineers’ Wages. Pursuant to Arbitra- 
tion Agreement dated April 30, 1912. 

Supplemental Statement on Behalf of the Railroads. Arbitra- 
tion between the Eastern Railroads and the Brotherhood 
of Locomotive Engineers in re Engineers’ Wages. Pur- 
suant to Arbitration Agreement dated April 30, 1912. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY Xili 


Report of the Board of Arbitration, in the Matter of the Con- 
troversy between the Eastern Railroads and the Brother- 
hood of Locomotive Engineers. November 2, 1912. Pub- 
lished under the direction of the Secretary of the Board, 
2023 G Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 


Brief on Behalf of the Railroads. Arbitration between the 
Eastern Railroads and the Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Firemen and Enginemen in re Firemen’s Wages. Pur- 
suant to Arbitration Agreement dated February 18, 1913. 


Briefs on Behalf of the Railroads. Arbitration between the 
Eastern Railroads and the Order of Railway Conductors 
and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen in re Con- 
ductors’ and Trainmen’s Wages. Pursuant to Arbitration 
Agreement dated July 26, 1913. 


Reply Brief on Behalf of the Railroads. Arbitration between 
the Eastern Railroads and the Order of Railway Con- 
ductors and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen in re 
Conductors’ and Trainmen’s Wages. Pursuant to Arbitra- 
tion Agreement dated July 26, 1913. 

Award. Arbitration between the Eastern Railroads and Or- 
der of Railway Conductors and the Brotherhood of Rail- 
road Trainmen. Submitted to Arbitration under the Act 
of July 15, 1913. By Agreement dated July 26,1913. Award 
dated November Io, 1913. Law Reporting Company, I15 
Broadway, New York City. 


GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS. 


Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor. Department of Commerce 
and Labor. Issued every other month, Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D. C. 

No. 20 Conditions of Railway Labor in Europe, by Walter 
E. Weyl, Ph. D. 

No. 28 Voluntary Arbitration and Conciliation in Great 
Britain, by J. B. McPherson. 

No. 37 Railway Employees in the United States, by Sam- 
uel McCune Lindsay, Ph. D. 


XIV RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


No. 40 Working of Compulsory Conciliation and Arbitra- 
tion Laws in New Zealand and Victoria, by 
Adna F. Weber. 
No. 46 Report of the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission. 
No. 49 Labor Conditions in New Zealand, by Victor S. 
Clarke teal): 
No. 53 Wages and Cost of Living. 
No. 60 Government Industrial Arbitration. 
No. 76 The Canadian Industrial Disputes Investigation 
Act: of 1007; by. Victor omlarkaeP he D: 
No. 86 The Canadian Industrial Disputes Investigation 
Act of) 1007, by *Victer 5.) alk ee ee 
No. 98 Mediation and Arbitration of Railway Disputes in 
the United States. 
Canadian Industrial Disputes Act of 1907. 
Conciliation and Arbitration in Great Britain. 
Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Whole Number 
133. Conciliation and Arbitration Series; No. 1. “Report 
of the Industrial Council of the British Board of Trade 
on Its Inquiry into Industrial Agreements.” 

Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. “Mediation and 
Arbitration Laws of the United States.” July 15, 1913. 
Committee on Interstate Commerce of the United States Sen- 

ate. Report on the Newlands Bill, Providing for Mediation, 

Conciliation, and Arbitration in Controversies between 

Railway Employers and Their Employees. Senate Report 

No. 72, 63d Congress, 1st Session. Ordered printed July 

10, 1913. 

Congressional Record: 

Investigation of Controversies Affecting Interstate Com- 
merce. Speech of Rufus Hardy of Texas, in House, Dec. 
Io, 1908. (In Congressional Record of Dec. 16, vol. 43, 


no. 9, PP. 293 to 295.) 
Opposes bill as tending to establish compulsory arbitration. 
Same. Speech of Wm. Richardson of Ala., in House, Dec. 
10, 1908. (In Congressional Record of Dec. 11, vol. 43, 


no. 5, pp. 133 to 136.) 
Opposes bill as tending to establish compulsory arbitration. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY XV 


Same. Speech of Gordon Russell of Tex., in House, Dec. 
10, 1908. (In Congressional Record of Dec. 14, vol. 43, 


no. 7, pp. 177 to 182.) 


Favoring passage of bill, and denying its tendency to establish 
compulsory arbitration. 


Same. Speech of Chas. E. Townsend of Mich., in House, 
Dec. 10, 1908. (In Congressional Record, vol. 43, no. 4, 


pp. 115 to 118.) 


Mr. Adamson, Mr. Richardson. and others discussed the terms 
of the bill, opposing its passage as an attempt to establish compul- 
sory ees in labor disputes. A letter from Samuel Gompers 
is included. 


Industrial Commission: 
Reports, vol. 17. Reports on Labor Organizations, Labor 
Disputes, and Arbitration, and on Railway Labor. 1901. 
Map, 3 tables. 


Contents.—Summary and general discussion.—National labor 
organizations in United States.—Collective bargaining, conciliation, 
and arbitration.—Laws and court decisions as to labor combinations. 
—Statistics of strikes and lockouts in United States and foreign 
countries.—Railway labor in United States. 


PERIODICALS. 


Acland, F. A. The Canadian Industrial Disputes Investiga- 
tion Act. Annals of the American Academy. 36: 419-37. 
Sept. I9QI0. 

Clark, J. B. Is Authoritative Arbitration Inevitable? Politi- 
cal Science Quarterly. 17: 553-67. Dec. 1902. 

Clark, V.S. Present Status of Labor Legislation in Australia 
and New Zealand. Annals of the American Academy. 33: 
440-7. Mar. 1909. 

Cunningham, W. J. Locomotive Engineers’ Arbitration. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics. 27: 263-94. Feb. 1913. 

Doyle, C. L. Compulsory Arbitration in the United States. 


Annals of the American Academy. 36: 302-10. Sept. 19I0. 


(Vol. 36, No. 2 is devoted to the study of prevention of strikes 
and contains much relevant material.) 


Edinburgh Review. 219:195-211. ' Jan. 1914. Compulsory 
Settlement of Industrial Disputes. 

Eldershaw and Older. Industrial Arbitration in Australia. 
Annals of the American Academy. 37: 203-21. Jan. IQII. 


Xvi RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


Eliot, Charles W. The Canadian Act. McClure’s. 30: 149-56. 
Dec. 1907. 

Eliot, Charles W. The Best Way to Prevent Industrial War- 
fare. McClure’s. 33:515-9. Sept. 1909. : 

Feely, J. J. The Right to Strike; Its Limitations. North 
American Review. 191:644-51. May, 1910. 

Ferris, E. E. MacKenzie King and the Canadian Labor 
Troubles. Outlook. 96: 507-13. Oct. 1910. 

Harrison, S. M. Nine Years of the Anthracite Conciliation 
Board: SubVey. 265143-5iw Deo 

Heinstock, H. The German Courts for the Arbitration of 
Industrial Disputes. Annals of the American Academy. 
36: 445-52. Sept. I9Io. 

Hobson, J. A. Compulsory Arbitration: a Half Way House 
to Socialism. North American Review. 175:597-606. Nov. 
1902. 

Independent. 69:1467-8. Dec. i910. Compulsory Arbitration 
in France. 

Independent. 75:182. July, 1913. The Amended Erdman 
Act. 

Journal of Political Economy. 21:959-61. Dec. 1913. Im- 
portant Award between the Railroads and their Em- 
ployees. 

Kennaday, P. Settlement and Prevention of Industrial Dis- 
putes in New Zealand. Annals of the American Academy. 
36: 438-44. Sept. I910. 

King, W. L. M. How Canada Prevents Strikes. World’s 
Work. 26: 438-44. Sept. 1913. 

Kranskopf, J. The Necessity of Industrial Arbitration. An- 
nals of the American Academy. 36: 311-20. Sept. I9gI0. 
Leiserson, W. M. Arbitration Amendment in New Zealand. 

American Political Science Review. 3: 209-10. May, 1909. 

LeRossignol and Stewart. Compulsory Arbitration in New 
Zealand. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 24: 660-712. 
Aug. IQIO. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY XVii 


Lewis, T. L. Settlement of Disputes among the Mine Work- 
ers. Annals of the American Academy. 36: 333-9. Sept. 
1910. 

Literary Digest. 46:978. May, 1913. What the Railway Fire- 
men Win. 

Literary Digest. 47:121. July, 1913. New Knots in the 
Railroad Tangle. 

Literary Digest. 47:990. Nov. 1913. Six Million Dollars for 
the Railroad Men. 

Marks, M. M. Canadian Industrial Disputes Act. Annals 
of the American Academy. 44:1-9. Nov. 1912. 

Nation. 66: 436-7. June, 1898. Railroad Labor Arbitration. 

Nation. 95:500-1. Nov. 1912. Railway Wage Award. 

Outlook. 72: 235-6. Oct. 1902. Compulsory Arbitration of 
Labor Disputes. 

Outlook. 88:567. March, 1908. Conciliation the Remedy. 

Outlook. 89:967. Aug. 1908. Canadian Pacific Strike. 

Outlook. 95:854-5. Aug. 1910. End of the Grand Trunk 
Strike. 

Outlook. 97:247-9. Dec. 1911. M. Briand’s Plan. 

Outlook. 102: 752-7. Dec. 1912. Railway Arbitration—a Re- 
view. 

Outlook. 103: 463-4. March, 1913. A Strike Averted. 

Outlook. 104: 10-1. May, 1913. The Firemen’s Award. 

Review of Reviews. 46:367. Sept. 1912. Doubtful Efficacy 
of the Australian Remedy for Strikes. 

Review of Reviews. 48:144-6. Aug. 1913. Threatened Rail- 
road Strike. 

Stewart, E. Canadian Industrial Disputes Act. Survey. 28: 
399-403. June, 1912. 

Sumner, M. B. Railroad Men and the English Conciliation 
Boards. Survey. 27: 1118-21. June, 1912. 

Survey. 29:743-6. March, 1913. Staving off the Firemen’s 
Strike. 

Survey. 30:429. June, 1913. Bill to End Railroad Strikes. 

Survey. 30:537. July, 1913. The Fast Changing Face of the 
Railroad Tangle. 


XV1li RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


Taylor, G. Engineer’s Strike Averted. Survey. 25:615. Jan. 
7, LOT 

Tregear, E. Compulsory Arbitration under Storm-Sails in 
New Zealand. Arena. 40: 137-41. Sept. 1908. 

Tregear, E. Has Compulsory Arbitration Failed? Indepen- 
dent. 72: 885-7. April, 1912. 

Triggs, O. L. How Strikes Are Settled in New Zealand. 
Outlook. 90: 828-32. Dec. 1908. 

Van Cleave, J. W. The Work of Employer’s Associations in 
the Settlement of Labor Disputes. Annals of the Ameri- 
can Academy. 36: 373-80. Sept. I9I0. 

Waine, F. J. The Trade Agreement in the Coal Industry. 
Annals of the American Academy. 36: 340-8. Sept. 1910. 

Wheeler, E. P. Canadian Investigation of Labor Disputes. 
Outlook. 83: 271-3. June, 1906. 

Willets, G. Power of the Railroad Brotherhoods. World’s 
Work. 25:676-9. April, 1913. 


PART I 
DARTMOUTH VERSUS WILLIAMS 


Won BY DARTMOUTH 


Resolved: That the Federal government should require 
compulsory arbitration of labor disputes on interstate rail- 
roads. 


First AFFIRMATIVE 
John Alford Hanna, Dartmouth 


Introduction 
81. Unions Have Great Power. 


One June morning a Delaware & Hudson freight car 
jumped the track and bumped along over the ties for three 
miles before the accident was discovered. The engineer 
and conductor, being old offenders, were discharged. The 
unions demanded their reinstatement. The roads refused 
and offered to arbitrate. ‘Nothing to arbitrate,” said the 
unions. Seven weeks ago, on January 26, the union officers 
gave the strike order. In a few hours business on the Dela- 
ware & Hudson was at a standstill. The government medi- 
ator arrived, clothed in his newly acquired powers. “Give 
it up,” he told the railroad officials, “The unions control the 
situation.” The men were reinstated and the strike was over. 
The Delaware & Hudson strike was not very serious, but it 
was significant. For the sake of their own power the unions 
were ready to stop the operation of an entire railway system. 
Whatever the pretext, they would be able to do the same 
thing for any railway system or for all railway systems. 
These monopolistic labor organizations, irresponsible, have 
at their power every individual whose welfare depends upon 
the continuous operation of the railways. 


7 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


The Delaware & Hudson strike brought vividly to many 
Eastern people the significance of the question of the even- 
ing: “Resoived, that the Federal government should require 
compulsory arbitration of labor disputes on interstate rail- 
roads.” The affirmative will discuss this question primarily 
from the point of view of the public. The first speaker will 
do two things: first, he will describe the present methods of 
settling disputes and contrast these with compulsory arbitra- 
tion; and second, he will point out those conditions in the 
railroad business which render compulsory arbitration im- 
perative. 


§2. Mediation Explained 


It is well to recall at the outset the precise significance of 
the much used terms, mediation, voluntary arbitration, and 
compulsory arbitration. Let us assume that the brotherhoods 
of locomotive engineers on the Eastern railway systems join 
in a concerted movement and make certain demands which 
are refused. The government mediators, hoping to avert 
a strike, offer their services, which are accepted. On the ap- 
pointed day the representatives of the roads meet at the 
Waldorf-Astoria, the committee of the brotherhoods at the. 
Broadway Central. The government mediator runs back and 
forth between hotels bearing proposition and counter propo- 
sition until an agreement is reached or a disagreement cer- 
tain. This process is called mediation. 


§3. Arbitration Explained 


Suppose no agreement is reached. The next step is arbi- 
tration. Under the Newlands Act, or amended Erdman Act, 
the board may consist of three or six members. If of six, 
the unions choose two partisans, the roads two partisans, 
and these choose two more partisans, one for each side. 
In case the four cannot agree, the government mediators 
complete the personnel of the board. The arbitration board 
once organized, each side submits its brief, witnesses are 
called and arguments considered. Neither party is required 
to arbitrate. The board is a temporary organization. In the 


DARTMOUTH VERSUS WILLIAMS 3 


short time at its disposal the members cannot hope to be- 
come sufficiently expert to render an unqualified judgment 
upon all points. The public cannot have a majority, and it 
may not even be represented. The sole effort of the arbitra- 
tors is to bring the parties together by compromise and 
avert a strike. The unions ask for more than they dare hope 
to obtain, the railroads offer as near nothing as possible, and 
then the arbitrators split the difference. Patchworks of 
compromise and jobbery, these so-called arbitral awards, 
these postponements of actual settlements,—these consti- 
tute the sole basis of the relations between labor and capital 
today. There has been but one board in the whole history of 
industrial arbitration which does not correspond to our 
description. This, the arbitration board which averted the 
engineers’ strike in 1912, was not organized under any stat- 
ute. It was composed of seven members, and five of these 
represented the public. It was appointed by Chief Justice 
White of the Supreme Court of the United States. Its chair- 
man was Charles R. Van Hise, distinguished economist, pres- 
ident of the University of Wisconsin. Its membership in- 
cluded Oscar Straus, former Secretary of Commerce and 
Labor, Albert Shaw, Frederick Judson, Otto Eidlitz, Daniel 
Willard of the Baltimore and Ohio, and P. H. Morrissey, 
representing the Engineers. The board conducted hearings 
for two weeks, studied the situation for seven months and 
made the only serious effort in the history of railroad arbitra- 
tion to render an equitable award, based upon the actual 
merits of the particular controversy. But the board went 
further. Six men of this group of intelligent leaders of the 
nation signed a statement condemning voluntary arbitration 
and favoring a plan of compulsory arbitration. 


§4. Compulsory Arbitration Proposed 


We stand for the Van Hise platform. We favor a board 
of arbitration similar in organization to the Interstate Com- 
merce Commission. Our board would be a permanent body 
of five members which would maintain a staff of expert in- 


4 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


vestigators, statisticians, and mediators. In case of a dis- 
pute the employers and employees would appear before this 
board, precisely as the shippers and their representatives now 
appear before the Interstate Commerce Commission. The 
board, being a permanent body of experts, with a large body 
of facts obtained by scientific investigation, could render 
an equitable award based upon the actual merits of the par- 
ticular controversy. The award would have the force of law 
until reversed. 
Discussion 


- §5. Welfare of Public Threatened 


Why do we favor the substitution of this method of sci- 
entific investigation and judicial determination for the awk- 
ward hotel-chasing one of mediation? Primarily, because 
we believe the public has the paramount interest in every 
railway labor controversy. Railroad train service in the 
United States is dominated by four affiliated brotherhoods— 
engineers, conductors, trainmen and firemen. Gilson Willets, 
former editor of Current Literature, writing in the World’s 
Work for April, 1913, says that these four organizations in- 
clude 95 per cent of the railroad crews of the country. These 
organizations have insurance funds aggregating over 
$300,000,000 and they maintain regular strike funds. The 
president of the conductors states that his organization has 
an emergency relief fund of $2,000,000. The brotherhoods 
on Eastern railroads have forced increases in wages amount- 
ing to over 50 per cent in the last fifteen years. Since these 
organizations are not under public control, what is to pre- 
vent them from using their tremendous power either to 
force strikes or to force unjust settlements as alternatives 
for strikes? The present situation is tense to the breaking 
point. Can the roads long go on increasing wages? What would 
happen today if the roads refused a demand for increased 
wages? What would happen if the roads refused to grant 
away all control over discipline? Any one of four brother- 
hoods has the power to make the people of New York go 
hungry within a week. Of such an important commodity as 


DARTMOUTH VERSUS WILLIAMS 5 


milk cities have usually not more than a day’s supply. The 
great industries depend upon the railroads daily for their 
materials. If a general strike occured in the eastern United 
States, millions of people would feel the pinch of want, and 
the disaster would fall most heavily upon those least able to 
bear it. If a general strike occurred in the eastern United 
States, any one of four railway brotherhoods, constituting 
in all but one three-hundredth of the population of the United 


States, could bring about all this havoc, all this upheaval, all 
this misery. 


SECOND AFFIRMATIVE 
Lyman Ray Jordan, Dartmouth 
Discussion (Continued) 
§6. Refutation and Introductory Summary 


It is unfortunate that the gentlemen of the Negative have 
failed to grasp the true problem which we are seeking to 
solve this evening. It is not the number of strikes nor the 
size of the strikes that have taken place on interstate rail- 
roads that cause us to advocate compulsory arbitration, but 
it is the manner in which the strikes have been prevented. 
It is the unwholesome and dangerous condition which has 
arisen from the unscientific and fundamentally unjust meth- 
ods of making awards at present that demands compulsory 
arbitration. My colleague, the first speaker of the Affirma- 
tive, has shown you the manner in which strikes are prevent- 
ed at present, and has demonstrated to you that the very 
methods pursued preclude the possibility of an award be- 
ing based upon justice. He has quoted the statement of 
the Van Hise Board, to the effect that voluntary arbitra- 
tion under the Erdman Act always consists of a splitting 
of the differences, a compromise. 


§7. Higher Rates or Strike Result of Dangerous Cycle 


Now my colleague has shown you the tremendous power 
which the railroad labor organizations have acquired under 


6 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


this protective policy. He has demonstrated that inasmuch 
as the judges cannot make an award based upon justice, the 
question uppermost in their minds is not what wage in- 
crease is just, but what wage increase is necessary 
to prevent the labor organizations from striking. Now 
it is evident that there is a condition developing 
here that necessitates closer study, to see what is really 
needed. Let us study this condition for a few moments. 
In the first place, we are confronted by the development 
of a very dangerous cycle. The engineers demanded a raise 
in wages because the conductors had received one, and then 
the firemen demanded another raise, in turn basing their 
claim on the increase given to the engineers. Then the 
conductors demanded another raise to offset that given to 
the firemen. At present the engineers are contemplating 
another demand for wage increase. Thus we see, ladies and 
gentlemen, that at present demands and grants work in a 
dangerous cycle, which offers no likelihood of ever being 
completed. Under the Newlands Act an attempt was made 
to inaugurate another cycle. The conductors, having se- 
cured their wage increase, united with the railroads in de- 
manding of the Interstate Commerce Commission a raise 
in rates, expecting that if the raise was given they would 
then be able to demand another wage increase. Fortu- 
nately in this case the Interstate Commerce Commission re- 
fused the rate increase, but what assurance have we that 
in the future the Interstate Commerce Commission will be 
able to withstand the demands of the railroads and the labor 
organizations? 

The situation then is this: The railroads are placed 
between the rate limit as set by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission and the ever rising wage scale as set by the 
successive boards of arbitration, with the result that their prof- 
its are declining. Are we to expect that the railroads are going 
to stand this burden alone? Certainly not. They are shifting the 
burden upon the public in poorer service rendered. Now we can 
see what the problem is that we are facing today. We are 


DARTMOUTH VERSUS WILLIAMS 7 


beginning to see what has been the result of this “peace- 
at-any-price” policy, but we do not realize the very enormity 
of the danger until we follow it to the logical outcome and _ 
see what would inevitably happen if this policy were con- 
tinued. If wages are continually raised, there is going to 
come a time when the railroads will be crushed so much that 
the Interstate Commerce Commission will have to raise the 
rates, and thus place the burden upon the public, or the 
railroads will have to refuse absolutely the demands of the 
brotherhoods, and a strike will be inevitable. That is, either 
the public will have to submit to the dictates of the labor- 
ers and assume the burden of increasing their wages, or 
a strike will occur. 


§8. Strike is Inevitable 


Now, if the first of these alternatives is chosen, it is evi- 
dent that it will be merely a weak postponement of the true 
crisis. For, suppose the Interstate Commerce Commission 
does raise the rates, it is evident that these railroad labor 
organizations are going right on demanding increased wages, 
and the cycle is going right on until another climax is 
reached. Wages will be raised and rates will go up. That 
cannot go on forever; there must be a limit somewhere. 
When that limit is reached a strike will occur. Once the 
arbitration boards refuse the demands of the labor organiza- 
tions a strike is inevitable. Now, if anyone doubts this, 
let him consider the action of the labor leaders. Chief 
Stone said that not one of the brotherhoods invested any 
of their enormous insurance funds in railroad securities. 
Consider the action of Chief Stone in 1910 when he was 
seeking a raise in wages for the engineers. He came to the 
managers of 52 Eastern roads and said to them, “If you don’t 
agree to the wage increase which we demand * * * not a wheel 
will turn east of Chicago, and at the end of a week New 
York will not have a pound of meat. I suggest that you 
reconsider your decision.” When the managers recon- 
sidered and again refused, Chief Stone secured the strike 


8 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


vote and came back and said, “If you don’t grant us the 
wage increase I demand I will call out 30,000 men and 
not a wheel will turn east of Chicago, and New York will 
starve to death.” The railroads submitted. That was all 
they could do. That was the way that strike was prevent- 
ed. Does this seem like consideration for the public? This 
strike did not last long, but it is eloquent in what it speaks 
of the extent to which these brotherhoods are willing to 
go to secure their demands. Why didn’t that strike con- 
tinue? Simply because the railroads surrendered to the 
labor organizations. 


89. Compulsory Arbitration Necessary 


Gentlemen, the time has come that these brotherhoods 
gamble with the welfare of the public in seeking to gain their 
own personal ends, and it is time that the public should 
step in and say to them, “Hereafter awards will be based 
upon justice, and both parties will be required to accept 
these just awards.” It is because of this condition that 
no other plan than compulsory arbitration can remedy the 
situation. These labor organizations have grown so tre- 
mendous in power that we must have a law that will say to 
them: “You must accept a just award. No longer will 
your demands be acceded to at the expense of the entire 
public.” 


Tuirp AFFIRMATIVE. 
Carl Plummer Merryman, Dartmouth 
Discussion (Continued) 


S10. Refutation and Introductory Summary 


The previous speaker for the negative has told you that 
because compulsory arbitration has not worked in New 
Zealand and in Australia, therefore it will not work in the 
United States. This analogy presents a pretty puzzle, and 
the puzzle is to find the analogy. In Australia and New 
Zealand compulsory arbitration includes all labor, in all 


DARTMOUTH VERSUS WILLIAMS 9 


industries, as well in the cotton manufacturing industry as 
in the railroad industry. In the second place, if the gen- 
tlemen tried to draw an analogy between the power of the 
government of an island in the antarctic seas and the power 
of the government of the United States, he has got an an- 
alogy which is worthless. 

We ,have shown you that the present system, becatise 
of the compromise which is entailed, is continually 
bringing an injustice upon the public; that because of the 
power of the labor unions they have been able in the past 
to force their demands upon the railroads and upon the 
public, and have given no guarantee that such demands and 
such awards are based upon the grounds of justice and 
equity. 

S11. Compulsory Arbitration is Practicable 


Is compulsory arbitration practicable? In the first place 
our plan includes a permanent board of five men, subject 
to impeachment by the national Congress. These men shall 
sit and act in all labor disputes arising upon interstate rail- 
roads, and their awards shall be final. Contrast this, if 
you will, with the present system. Under the present sys- 
tem, a strike vote is taken. After two or three weeks of 
hotel chasing and dickering trying to patch things up in so- 
called mediation, the parties find that they cannot agree, 
and they spend four or five more weeks in trying to get 
an arbitration board, which, after it is- composed accord- 
ing to the present law has two men representing the ex- 
treme demands of labor, two men representing the mini- 
mum concessions of the railroads, and two men who are sup- 
posed to represent the public. Well now, what can that 
board do? The only thing that it can do is to compromise 
and to attempt to conciliate these two parties making extreme 
demands. Is there any guarantee of justice in such a meth- 
od of settling strikes? 

In the second place, we propose that this board shall be 
appointed by the President of the United States, and if our 


10 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


experience with appointments to the Interstate Commerce 
Commission and to the Federal courts may be taken as a 
criterion, we can effectively do away with the possibility 
of politics entering into the decisions rendered. 

In the third place, we absolutely forbid strikes on in- 
terstate railroads. Now, the power to strike having been 
taken away from the union, our board of permanent experts 
is left free to consider the case upon its individual merits. 
Contrast this, if you will, with the present system. A strike 
vote is taken by one of the large labor bodies. When that 
strike vote is taken and the strike is imminent, the parties 
agree to arbitration, and the arbitration board is appointed. 
Now the board knows that the reason it is sitting on that 
case is because a strike vote has been taken, and that a 
strike is legal; therefore they know that they must above 
all other things avert that strike. They go to work, find out 
how much it is necessary to concede to the laborers in 
order to keep them at work, concede it, and labor goes back 
to work. Is there any guarantee that such arbitrary de- 
crees are just? Mind you, all that time the burden is 
being shifted upon the public. We find if something is 
not done a strike under the Newlands plan or under the 
present system of voluntary arbitration is inevitable. 


§12. Compulsory Arbitration Can Be Enforced 


The Negative have said that compulsory arbitration can- 
not be enforced, and if it could it is not practicable. They 
say laborers will not work under compulsion, that you can- 
not prevent these men going on strike if they want to. Con- 
trast this if you will with the statement made by the first 
gentleman of the negative, who said labor does not strike, 
because they appreciate that a strike is seldom success- 
ful. Then why assume that our proposition is not enforc- 
ible How is it enforcible? In the first place, compul- 
sory arbitration is constitutional under the agreement to this 
question as debated this evening. Being constitutional, 


DARTMOUTH VERSUS WILLIAMS II 


what would we do if under our plan the laborers took a 
strike vote? First, an injunction would be placed wpon the 
employees as individuals, enjoining them from leaving work 
in a body. This has already been done. The precedent for 
this is found in the case of the Farmers Loan and Trust Co. 
vs. The Northern Pacific Railroad (60 Fed. Rep., 803). The 
funds of the union would be attached, thus leaving no avail- 
able strike fund. The precedent for this is found in the 
Danbury Hatters case, in which the court ruled that ‘the 
funds of a labor union are subject to attachment at the order 
of the court. In the third place, disobedience of an in- 
junction is punishable as contempt of court, and contempt, 
of course, is punishable by a fine or jail sentence. Now, 
suppose a strike vote taken, an injunction placed upon the 
individuals enjoining them from leaving work, the funds of 
the union attached, thus leaving no available strike fund, 
the leaders of the union arrested for conspiracy, these things 
backed up by the federal courts, the federal courts backed by 
the power of the federal government:—do you believe that 
railroad labor would strike? 


Conclusion 
$13 


Our plan then is enforcible. Laborers will not strike if 
we have compulsory arbitration because they, as well as 
we, realize that when the federal government has said, “You 
shall do this,” we will do it. Our plan is practicable. We 
secure a permanent board of experts whose business shall 
be scientific investigation. We forbid strikes. Having taken 
away the dictatorial power of the unions, we leave the board 
free to consider each case according to its individual merits. 
Then, because the present system of postponing and com- 
promising to avert strikes and to settle disputes is unjust; 
because the burden of this injustice in every case is even- 
tually shifted to the public; because in the last analysis this 
must lead to suffering and calamities, inasmuch as the pub- 


12 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


lic is vitally concerned: we must curb the excessive powers 
of these railroad labor unions and make them amenable to 
courts of justice. We believe that a law requiring com- 
pulsory arbitration is the only measure that will ac- 
complish this result. 


First NEGATIVE 


Arthur Newton Pack, Williams 
Introduction 


§14. Compulsory Arbitration Defined 

It will be my first duty to make clear to you the stand 
taken by the Negative in this question. It is agreed that 
compulsory arbitration shall consist of investigation of the 
dispute, award, and compulsory enforcement of that award. 
Now investigation and award involve no new principle, for 
they do not take away the final right to strike. But com- 
pulsory arbitration depends for success upon the compulsory 
enforcement of the award which does away with the right 
to strike. Let me illustrate. The. Affirmative have maintained 
for compulsory arbitration an advantage supposedly peculiar 
to it, that it will guarantee that strikes will not occur. This 
guarantee must be due in the last analysis to the compulsory 
enforcement of the award, for in this way alone does com- 
pulsory arbitration differ from methods of arbitration which 
may not be classed as compulsory. 

The question resolves itself into two distinct issues: 
First, is compulsory arbitration absolutely necessary to pre- 
vent strikes; and second, is it the best and most practicable 
method? 

Discussion 


§15. Compulsory. Arbitration Unnecessary 


We all agree that should a serious railroad strike occur in 
this country the results would be fearful, but the question 
is, how are we to prevent such a strike? The Affirmative 


DARTMOUTH VERSUS WILLIAMS 13 


have brought forward a proposition for compulsory arbitra- 
tion, one that is new and untried in this country. We of the 
Negative maintain first of all that compulsory arbitration is 
unnecessary. In order to prove the necessity for compulsory 
arbitration the Affirmative must show that it is the only 
method to prevent strikes, for in the last analysis there are 
only two general methods of preventing strikes: namely, 
compulsory arbitration, which takes away the final right to 
strike by compulsory enforcement of the award, and all 
other methods of arbitration which do not take away the 
final right to strike. Experience in our country has shown 
no need for compulsory arbitration, for we have not had a 
single serious railroad strike in this country since 1894. 
The statistics of the United States Bureau of Labor show 
that every railway labor dispute which seriously threatened 
the interests of the public has been settled either by con- 
ciliation directly between the parties themselves or by vol- 
untary arbitration. The Federal Erdman Act was passed in 
1898 to encourage arbitration through mediation, and under 
this act between 1905 and IgI2, 35 cases were settled by con- 
ciliation and 8 cases were arbitrated. Among these cases 
were the most serious and the most important disputes 
which have ever arisen in this country. In March, 1907, one 
single dispute involved 38 different railroads, with a total 
mileage of 105,500 miles, and employing 42,500 conductors 
and trainmen. In March, 1910, a single dispute involved 52 
railroads with an approximate mileage of 110,000. In Decem- 
ber, I910, one dispute involved 62 Western railroads, with an 
approximate mileage of 150,000. Now can we expect that any 
more important and more serious cases than these will ever 
arise? In each one of these cases a serious strike was effec- 
tively and permanently prevented by voluntary arbitration. 


§16. Engineers Case in 1912 


Now we come to the important case of 1912, which my 
opponent has mentioned, the dispute between the American 


14 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and 52 Eastern rail- 
roads, involving a railroad mileage which is 25.1 per cent. of 
the total mileage of this country. For a time a strike ap- 
peared to threaten because of a weakness in the working 
out of the details of the Erdman Act, but the principle of 
voluntary arbitration stood successfully the hardest and 
most difficult test possible to be imagined, and established 
itself once and for all as a strike preventative whose power 
can never be doubted. Could there be any stiffer test for 
any method of arbitration than these wholesale cases? The 
award of a railroad arbitration board in this country has 
never been disobeyed. To be sure the parties to the dispute 
have not always accepted, the award with the best grace, but 
the very fact that they have yielded shows that the legal 
enforcement of the award by compulsory arbitration is un- 
necessary. 


§17. Both Railroads and Unions Seek to Avoid Strikes 


There is a further reason for the absence of strikes and 
the willingness of men to abide by the decision of the 
arbitration board. The work of railroad men requires a high 
degree of training and education, and because of their better 
education they realize that strikes are a very uncertain 
method of attempting to gain their just rights; that strikes 
are almost never successful; and further, they can appreciate 
the fact that strikes involve hardships and suffering for the 
strikers themselves. Samuel Gompers has stated that the 
railroad unions wish to avoid strikes. On the other hand 
the railroad companies do not want strikes, and will do 
everything in their power to prevent strikes, for strikes 
mean to them not only destruction of property, but also a 
tremendous loss of prestige in the eyes, of the public. We 
therefore have two tendencies towards a peaceful settle- 
ment. There is a force here acting upon both sides, a force 
making the parties willing to abide by the decision of an 
arbitration board without legal enforcement. 


DARTMOUTH VERSUS WILLIAMS 15 
‘\ 


§18. Compulsory Investigation and Voluntary Arbitration 


We have seen that.a great majority of the railroad dis- 
putes in our country have been settled by conciliation or by 
voluntary arbitration without resorting to compulsory en- 
forcement of the award. In the analysis we have seen that 
we have not had a single serious railroad strike in this 
country since 1894. The Affirmative are then basing their 
supposed need for compulsory arbitration upon the excep- 
tional case, and they maintain that compulsory arbitration is 
necessary to reach these exceptional cases. Is this true? 
Let us look into the statistics of these exceptional cases. 
In August, 1907, there was a strike on the Colorado & 
Southern involving 200 men. It was settled within two 
weeks by voluntary arbitration. In July, 1899, there was a 
strike on the Huntington & Broad Top Mountain Railroad, 
mileage 70, number of employees 95. In November, 1909, 
the switchmen on the Chicago Terminal Railroad struck, 
but arbitration only failed because the strike order was 
issued before mediation proceedings could be begun. Here 
we see the relative unimportance of these cases where strikes 
occurred, as compared with the tremendous importance of 
the disputes which were settled by voluntary arbitration. 
We see another thing, that most of those disputes were due 
to rash or hasty action by the parties concerned. How, then, 
are we to prevent these rashly called strikes? Do we need 
compulsory arbitration? What we need is to make the 
parties to the dispute take time to consider; what we need 
is to give time to public opinion to organize itself, as it has 
heretofore so successfully. We know that there is a tendency 
on both sides towards a peaceful settlement. Let us give this 
tendency time to show itself. John Mitchell has said, “I have 
never seen a strike which could not have been avoided if 
the men had met in conference before the strike was 
started.” What we need is not compulsory arbitration, but , 
compulsory investigation, and merely temporarily legalize 
the strikes during the time of investigation, We give arbi- 


16 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


tration a chance, and when we consider that arbitration 
once entered into has never failed, that it has never needed 
a legal enforcement of the award, we cannot but feel con- 
fident that it will not fail here. We conclude that compulsory 
arbitration is not the only method of preventing strikes on 
interstate railroads. We can accomplish this same thing by 
voluntary arbitration and compulsory investigation. Compul- 
sory arbitration is therefore unnecessary. 


SECOND NEGATIVE 


John Howard Lawson, Williams 
Discussion (Continued) 


S19. Compulsory Arbitration Not Practicable. Experience in 
Australasia 


As the second speaker for the Negative this evening, I 
shall prove to you that compulsory arbitration is not prac- 
ticable. The Affirmative have told us that railway strikes are 
dangerous; that the interest of the public demands that 
such strikes be prevented. We of the Negative maintain that 
is not the issue in this debate. The issue is not whether 
strikes are good or bad, or whether the interest of the public 
demands that they be averted. The question is whether com- 
pulsory arbitration is necessary, and is the most practical 
and the most efficient means of preventing such strikes. My 
colleague has shown you that compulsory arbitration 
is not necessary. I shall show you that such arbitration is 
not practicable. In the first place, compulsory arbitration is 
not practicable because it has not worked in the only districts 
in which it has been tried. In Australasia, where it has been 
in force in New Zealand since 1894, and in parts of Australia 
since 1900, compulsory arbitration has not succeeded in its 
avowed purpose, which is and must be to prevent strikes. 
Strikes have occurred in both these countries. In New 


DARTMOUTH VERSUS WILLIAMS 17 


Zealand, where compulsory arbitration has had time to show 
its defects, because it has been in force longest in this 
occurred since 1894. New Zealand and Australia are ideal 
places for the testing out of such a scheme as compulsory 
arbitration. New Zealand is a country smaller in area than 
Colorado, with a population of 800,000, or less than one per 
cent. of the United States. Australia, while it is large in area, 
is small in population. Both of these countries are new 
countries; their institutions and their employments are new; 
they are not complicated, as are the great industries and 
organizations of the United States. Moreover, the industries 
in which compulsory arbitration has been tried in Australia 
and New Zealand are industries which are particularly 
suited to such a scheme, because they are small; they are not 
complex, as in this country. The industries are small in 
Australia and therefore favorable to the institution of com- 
pulsory arbitration, and yet compulsory arbitration has not 
proved successful. 


§20. Cannot Be Enforced Against Labor 


In the second place, it is not practicable because it could 
not be enforced against the workmen. In the great slaughter- 
men’s strike in New Zealand in 1906 the men struck and 
were fined $5.00 each for aiding and abetting an illegal strike. 
The greater part of this amount was never collected. J. Ram- 
say Macdonald, in an article in the Contemporary Review, 
March, 1908, says that: “The Slaughtermen’s strike shows 
how impossible it is to enforce penalties on thousands of 
workmen. It is impossible to fine and imprison them.” The 
New Zealand Department of Labor Report, 1907, admits 
that the department has been unable to collect the greater 
part of this amount. What are we to do if the men strike 
upon..one of the railroads of the United States? If we fine 
them and the men refuse to pay their fines, the fines cannot 
be collected. We cannot obtain substitute labor, because 
substitute labor on railroads cannot be obtained. Railway 
labor is labor which requires long experience, years of ex- 


18 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


country, fifteen strikes of real and vital importance have 
perience for its satisfactory performance. We cannot get 
substitute firemen, or conductors or telegraphers, and the 
other workers upon a great railroad system at a moment’s 
notice; therefore if the men refuse to pay their fines, we 
cannot force them to pay. Suppose we attempted to collect 
fines—the men would refuse to pay and would strike a 
second time and so on indefinitely. The state and federal 
prisons could not hold all those who would refuse to pay 
the fines. Compulsory arbitration therefore could not be en- 
forced unless the men would submit to such a decision with- 
out coercive action. Our labor unions are thoroughly op- 
posed to compulsory arbitration. Whether rightly or wrongly, 
they believe such arbitration is an infringement of their 
rights, and they would not submit to such arbitration unless 
there was some adequate means for its enforcement, and 
there being no such means, strikes would necessarily result. 


§21. Lack of Efficiency Would Result 


In the third place, even granted that compulsory arbitra- 
tion could be enforced against the workers, it would not be 
practicable, because it would cause inefficiency. Our railways 
would be inefficient, because the laborers would be ineffici- 
. ent; and this would be so because the men would be forced 
to work, and involuntary labor is always inefficient labor. 
If you tell a man that he must work whether he will or no, 
he is bound to object to the decree, and in proportion as he 
does not like the decree his work will be inefficient. In 
this way inefficiency will result from the policy of forcing 
men to work. The Affirmative will reply that the laborers 
would not be unwilling to work if the decrees were just, but 
decrees of compulsory arbitration boards, or any decrees 
in labor matters, cannot be based upon abstract justice. 
Labor conditions are too complex to permit any knowledge 
of what the abstract justice in a case is. The Affirmative has 
told us that voluntary arbitration decrees are based upon 
compromise, but they have not told us why compulsory ar- 


+ 


DARTMOUTH VERSUS WILLIAMS 19 


bitration decrees should be based upon justice. No board 
has or can make decrees which are based upon abstract 
justice. James Edward LeRossignol, in his book, State Social- 
ism in New Zealand, on page 238 says, “So great are the 
difficulties in the way of discovering the principles of justice 
for the determination of wages, that one of the most dis- 
tinguished of the past presidents of the arbitration court 
stated that no such principles exist. * * * These and other 
complications prevent the creation of a body of legal princi- 
ples defining and explaining the nature of fair and reason- 
able wages.” ; 

But let us suppose that the decision of an arbitration 
board were just. Even so the laborers would not consent to 
such arbitration, because American labor objects to com- 
pulsory arbitration. In this connection John Mitchell in 
Organized Labor says: “There is a deep-seated distrust 
among workingmen as to the fairness and impartiality of the 
judiciary,” and this is spoken in direct relation to com- 
pulsory arbitration. It is necessary for the public welfare 
that railway service be as efficient as possible. The general 
manager of the Pennsylvania Railroad says, “Safety in rail- 
road operation is not a question of safeguards—the ultimate 
aim of the safety work is to develop in each employee a 
sense of personal responsibility.” So you see by compulsory 
arbitration we would absolutely destroy this personal re- 
sponsibility by forcing our workmen to work whether they 
will or no. 


§22. Summary 


Compulsory arbitration is not practicable because in the 
first place it has not succeeded where it has been tried; in 
the second place, no means can be suggested by which it 
could be enforced; and in the third place, it would create 
lack of efficiency in railroad operation because the laborers 
would be forced to work against their own will and desires. 


20 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


Tuirp NEGATIVE 
Edward Erksine Porter, Williams 


Discussion (Continued) 


§23. Refutation and Introductory Summary 


The last speaker for the Affirmative in his last few sen- 
tences said, “We forbid strikes.” They forbid” strikes "im 
Australia, and in Australia from 1906 to 1908 there were 23 
strikes. They say the analogy is not a true one, because the 
government is not as strong in Australia and the industries 
are simpler. Granted that the analogy is not a true one, 
there remains with the Affirmative, since compulsory arbitra- 
tion has failed in the one place where it has been tried, a 
very great burden to prove that it will not fail in the United 
States. 

The Affirmative in their discussion this evening have taken 
up but one side of compulsory arbitration; that is, the side 
of justice; they have told you the wonderful results they 
are going to secure by having a permanent board of sta- 
tisticians. The Negative has already shown you that com- 
pulsory arbitration is unnecessary; that compulsory arbitra- 
tion will fail in practice. There are two sides to this story 
of the results of compulsory arbitration. It remains for me 
to show that the theory of compulsory arbitration cannot 
stand the test of experience, and also what will be the in- 
evitable results of compulsory arbitration if established. 


§24. Would Do Away With Voluntary Arbitration and 
Conciliation 


In the first place, compulsory arbitration will extend to 
all disputes and will do away with conciliation and voluntary 
arbitration. The compulsory arbitration board must stand 
as a board of appeal from the conciliation and voluntary 
arbitration boards, and any disputes not settled by the latter 
will be brought before the compulsory arbitration board. Is 
it not only reasonable, but natural, that if one party or the 


DARTMOUTH VERSUS WILLIAMS 21 


other to a dispute is not entirely satisfied with the result, 
and if that party thought it could gain anything more, it 
should bring the dispute before the compulsory arbitration 
board? If this is the natural result of compulsory arbitration, 
the history of it ought to prove the contention. Listen then 
to facts from Australia. From 1894 to 1901, fifty-one cases 
were settled by boards of conciliation and voluntary arbitra- 
tion, and one hundred by boards for compulsory arbitration. 
From 1902 to 1905, twenty cases were settled by boards of 
conciliation and voluntary arbitration, and one hundred and 
sixty-three by boards for compulsory arbitration. From 
1905 to 1907, only two cases were settled by boards of con- 
ciliation and voluntary arbitration; all the rest were settled 
by boards for compulsory arbitration. Compulsory arbitra- 
tion if established will sweep away conciliation and voluntary 
arbitration, which, have settled satisfactorily so many dis- 
putes in the past. It will vitally affect not only extreme 
cases, but will extend its direct influence to every dispute 
which could or would arise. 


§25. Will Increase Dissatisfaction 


What are some of the consequences of compulsory arbitra- 
tion? First, compulsory arbitration will increase dissatis- 
faction. Why? The awards of a compulsory arbitration 
board, since they are handed down by a body sitting in judg- 
ment to ascertain the facts of the case, are court-like and 
judicial-appearing awards. They will unavoidably leave one 
side with the pride of having won and the other with the 
sting of having lost. Will not that alone increase dissatis- 
faction? Again, compulsory arbitration will accentuate the 
sharp feeling between labor and capital. In establishing com- 
pulsory arbitration, you are in fact placing a third body 
between labor and capital, because you believe they have ir- 
reconcilable causes for dispute and you must force them to 
be reconciled. The fact remains that in placing a body be- 
tween labor and capital which is based on the difference 
between labor and capital, you must in theory and practice 


22 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


divide them into sharply opposing forces. Let me give you 
facts again from Australia to prove the contention. Mr. 
Broadhead, once a member of the Canterbury Conciliation 
Board, but at present Secretary of the Employers’ Associa- 
tion, says, “It is a matter for regret that the relations be- 
tween the employers and workers have been less cordial 
than they were previous to the coming into operation of the 
Act. Indeed, in the majority of cases, both sides occupy 
hostile camps. The one party is ever suspicious of the other.” 
General Babington, late Commander of the New Zealand 
forces, in his report to Parliament in 1906, said: “The less 
cordial relation which apparently now exists between em- 
ployer and employee is, compared to a few years ago, a 
serious menace.” Protests against compulsory arbitration 
awards increased, until, in 1906, there were twenty-three 
strikes against compulsory arbitration awards. If compulsory 
arbitration will increase dissatisfaction, in all common sense 
should the government require it to settle disputes? 


§26. Will Increase Disputes 


Second, compulsory arbitration will increase disputes. I 
have already shown you that it will increase dissatisfaction, 
and as the result of dissatisfaction, disputes will necessarily 
increase, will they not? But independent of increased dis- 
satisfaction, compulsory arbitration will increase opportunity 
for the creation of disputes. The facts will prove this con- 
tention. In Australasia, Mr. Broadhead, whom I have al- 
ready quoted, says, “Nearly ail the disputes which have 
arisen since the Act came into operation would never have 
been heard of but for the readiness of the workers’ unions 
in taking advantage of the means for creating them. * * * 
The number of awards made under the Act from its in- 
ception to the 31st of May, 1907, was 546, or an average of 
seven awards to each trade affected.” Again I ask, if com- 
pulsory arbitration will increase disputes, in all common 
sense, should the government require it to settle disputes? 


DARTMOUTH VERSUS WILLIAMS 23 


§27. Will Drive Labor into Politics 


Lastly, compulsory arbitration will drive labor into poli- 
tics and syndicalism. Take away this sole defense of the 
unions, the right to strike, and that must be the result. The 
labor unions of the United States have up to the present 
time refused to enter politics or recognize syndicalism, al- 
though pressed to do so by agitators from other countries. 
If you take away their only defense, they must enter politics 
to protect themselves, to have at least partial control of 
the board which is going to entirely control them. What is 
-the attitude of labor? Listen to the words of a labor leader. 
Samuel Gompers says, “A labor union is worthless if you 
take its only weapons away from it. With all their weapons, 
organized laborers are none too strong in this fight. Com- 
pulsory courts could not enforce their decrees, except the 
state would reestablish slavery. And to abolish slavery even 
revolution would be justifiable.’ What has been the result 
in Australia? Look at the great syndicalistic strike in 
Australia last October, a direct result of compulsory ‘arbitra- 
tion. 

§28. Summary 


It is not my province to point out what would be the re- 
sults if labor were driven into politics or syndicalism. It 
might mean constitutional as well as industrial changes; it 
would surely mean a revolution in the dominant interests 
of the nation. But it is for me to point out what results you 
must be prepared to meet, what consequences you must be 
willing to accept, if you maintain that the Federal government 
should require compulsory arbitration of labor disputes on 
interstate railroads. If compulsory arbitration will drive 
out conciliation and voluntary arbitration; if compulsory 
arbitration will increase dissatisfaction; if compulsory arbi- 
tration will increase disputes; if compulsory arbitration will 
drive labor into politics or syndicalism—and mind you it 
has where it has been tried—can compulsory arbitration last, 
can it stand the test of experience, is it worth while? 


24 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


First NEGATIVE REBUTTAL 
Arthur Newton Pack, Williams 
§29 

The Affirmative has again mentioned the dispute of 1912 
between the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and the 
Eastern railroads. The representatives of the Brotherhood 
of Engineers went to the managers of the roads and said, 
“You have got to yield to our demands or else we will call 
a strike.” But the Affirmative forgets that the railroads did 
not yield to the demands; it forgets that the dispute was 
settled by voluntary arbitration. The railroads did not 
need compulsory arbitration to protect them against their 
employees. The award did not grant to the railroad em- 
ployees their demands. I quote from Mr. P. H. Morrissey, 
representing the engineers on that board. He expressed dis- 
sent from the findings of the board, which shows that the 
findings of the board were not fully in accordance with what - 
the railroad unions demanded. He says, “But there is no 
question that the engineers will faithfully abide by the 
award.” Was anything further necessary? 


§30 

My opponent has also brought up the case of this strike 
on the Delaware & Hudson Railroad a few months ago. The 
unions maintained that the employees were discharged un- 
justly. Let us look into the causes of this accident. This 
accident was due not to any act on the part of the men, but 
to carelessness on the part of the railroad when they replaced 
their old equipment. The public demands that when a 
strike occurs the blame shall be fixed upon some one, and 
the railway, in order to save its own face, had to accuse the 
men. Is it necessary, then, to have compulsory arbitration 
to protect the railroad from the demands of its employees? 
When the railroad has tried to take from the employees 
their rights, the employees have got their rights back again 
without compulsory arbitration. It is not necessary to 
protect the employees. 


DARTMOUTH VERSUS WILLIAMS 25 


§31 


This brings us to the question of the right of the public 
to interfere. How far does the right of the public to inter- 
fere in disputes of this kind extend? As long as railroads 
are privately owned corporations, as long as we do not have 
government ownership of railroads, the right of the public 
to interfere is limited by that degree to which the interest 
and welfare of the public are concerned. The public de- 
sires to be protected from the evils and inconveniences which 
a strike would cause. If we can prevent strikes by volun- 
tary arbitration, the public has no right to interfere further 
in those disputes. If voluntary arbitration fails, then the 
public may take steps to make an investigation; but until 
it is shown that compulsory investigation will not prevent 
strikes, the public has no right to go further in a privately 
owned and privately conducted business. We do not deny 
the right of the public to protect itself, but we do say that 
the right of the public shall be limited to that degree to which 
the interests of the public are directly concerned. Lastly, 
the public has no right to interfere to the extent of demand- 
ing compulsory arbitration unless the public is absolutely 
sure that compulsory arbitration will not bring worse evils 
than the existing evils of strikes. 


First AFFIRMATIVE REBUTTAL 


John Alford Hanna, Dartmouth 


$32 


The closing speaker for the Negative wishes to have de- 
fined the precise interests of the public. The public has a 
paramount interest in every railroad labor dispute, not only 
with reference to the prevention of strikes, but with refer- 
ence to the way strikes are settled. The public pays the 
bills; the public pays the increased wages; the public pays in 


26 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


poorer service. If the Pennsylvania cannot put steel coaches 
on because it is forced to pay railroad labor’s unjust de- 
mands; if the public cannot have safety on the New Haven 
or other roads because the unions insist upon unfair rules— 
isn’t the public concerned? The public is concerned in other 
interests besides the mere settlement of strikes. 


$33 


The last speaker has referred to the engineers’ strike. 
Mr. Morrissey was the only one of the seven—he is a labor 
union man—who dissented from the opinion of the board. 
This board studied the question for seven months. and de- 
cided that voluntary arbitration was an insufficient protec- 
tion to the public; that the public’s interests were paramount; 
that we are not only to be concerned with labor and capital, 
but with both labor and capital combined. This board of 
arbitration which averted this strike decided that it was not 
really competent because it did not have an opportunity to 
collect the facts, so it condemned voluntary arbitration. We 
take the opinion of those six men, headed by President Van 
Hise, who represented the public and the railroads. 


§34 


The opposition have based much of their case upon the 
alleged nonenforcement of compulsory arbitration in New 
Zealand and Australia. The Negative failed to suggest that 
in New Zealand the law is so framed that not only does it 
include all labor, but that it gives the privilege to any union 
of withdrawing from the provisions of the arbitration act, 
so that if any union wishes to go on a strike and do it 
legally, all they have to do is to withdraw from responsi- 
bility under the law. More than that, the law has been im- 
proved in Australia, not only in some states of Australia, 
but in the Commonwealth of Australia, where they have in- 
terstate disputes. Isn’t it significant that if that compulsory 
arbitration law away off there has been such a failure—and 
it was passed in 1894 and has been amended from time to 


DARTMOUTH VERSUS WILLIAMS 27 


time—isn’t it significant that it has never been repealed in 
New Zealand? Isn’t it significant that Australia, which has 
an opportunity of observing its effects, first in the states 
and now: in the commonwealth, adopted not only the prin- 
ciples of the compulsory arbitration scheme in Australia, 
but has not given the privilege to the unions of withdrawing 
from under the operation of the act? It is significant, too, 
that since the Commonwealth of Australia was organized 
it is extremely difficult to find any suggestions of interstate 
railroad disputes in Australia that have not been settled 
under the compulsory arbitration act. 

More than that, if we are going to bring in foreign ex- 
amples, we would like to call the attention of the Negative 
to that report that was submitted to the English Parliament 
by the British Board of Trade in January, 1912. This re- 
port dealt with the methods of settling strikes on railways 
and the attitude of different government organizations to- 
wards strikes on railroads. It was discovered that four 
European states, Great Britain, Holland, Denmark and 
Austria, although they did not have compulsory arbitration 
with reference to general industries, yet absolutely prohibited 
strikes upon railroads; and Denmark had a compulsory ar- 
bitration scheme that was almost identical with the com- 
‘pulsory arbitration plan recommended by the Van Hise 
board. Denmark is just about as large as New Zealand, 
and the scheme has worked perfectly in Denmark. 


$35 


Let us consider a moment the enforcement of compulsory 
arbitration with reference to the United States. We want 
to call the attention of the opposition to the fact that John 
Mitchell, on page 238 of his book Organized Labor—and John 
Mitchell is no friend of compulsory arbitration—John 
Mitchell admits that compulsory arbitration might be en- 
forced, could be enforced with reference to labor disputes 
on interstate railways. 


28 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 
SECOND NEGATIVE REBUTTAL 


John Howard Lawson, Williams 


$36 


I shall take up only two of the Affirmative arguments in 
my rebuttal. In the first place, they have said that com- 
pulsory arbitration would be practical; and in the second 
place, they have said that the awards of a compulsory arbitra- 
tion board would be more equitable than those of a volun- 
tary arbitration board. In regard to the first; »lheyshave 
said that compulsory arbitration could be enforced by in- 
junction and by taking the funds of the railroad unions 
if they did not abide by the decision. If their funds are 
taken they will collect new funds. There is a case on rec- 
ord of the coal strike, where a fund of $2,645,324 was col- 
lected in six weeks. What would prevent the railroad unions 
from collecting such a fund, if it were necessary to do so? 
We do not maintain that strikes upon railroads are imminent 
and that they are likely to occur under any conditions—we 
are simply saying that they are more likely to occur under 
compulsory arbitration than under voluntary arbitration. 
The United States government has even been unable to con- 
trol its own post office employees, with whom its connection 
is much closer than would be that with privately owned 
railroads. The United States government has. endeavored 
to control the employees in its post office in the matter of 
the formation of unions, and three such unions have been 
formed in direct opposition to the will of the government— 
the National Association of Letter Carriers, the National As- 
sociation of Post Office Clerks and the Brotherhood of Rail- 
way Postal Clerks. The government has been unable to 
prevent them. The government has been unable to pre- 
vent strikes except at the point of the bayonet and by 
enforced military service, both entirely foreign to American 
principles. 


DARTMOUTH VERSUS WILLIAMS 29 


§37 


Let us take up the matter of equity in railroad cases. 
They say that the decisions of voluntary boards are com- 
promises. Whether a board is compulsory or voluntary, the 
principle behind its deliberations is the same. The principle 
is to avert a strike, nothing more nor less. Moreover, the 
Affirmative has maintained that the voluntary boards now 
in existence have not decided equitably—that they have de- 
cided according to compromise. The Negative has replied 
that decisions in labor cases are not matters of abstract 
justice. In regard to the deliberations of the present boards 
and the justice of their awards, an editorial in the Engineering 
Magazine indicates that there was no unfairness. The details 
of the personnel and time of meeting of the voluntary arbi- 
tration boards can be satisfactorily arranged, and avoid the 
complicated and unnecessary machinery of a compulsory 
arbitration board. The Affirmative has said that the rail- 
roads must be protected from the demands of their em- 
ployees, but we challenge them to give a single instance 
where employees have made claims which have been shown 
to be unjust. Laborers have made no effort even to inter- 
fere with the decisions of the boards. 


SECOND AFFIRMATIVE REBUTTAL 
Lyman Ray Jordan, Dartmouth 


§38 


The gentlemen of the Negative have attempted to demon- 
strate that the present system is just, and have challenged 
us to show that it is unjust. Now it would seem sufficient 
proof when it has been demonstrated that the methods under 
which the present boards of arbitration work preclude the 
possibility of arriving at a just decision. It would seem that 
that would be sufficient proof, but when we can quote the 
members of these boards as saying that they have been un- 
able, under the conditions, to make an award based upon 
justice, surely these members of the board ought to know 


30 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


what they have been able to do better than the gentlemen 
of the Negative. When the members of an arbitration board 
say that they realize that the decision which they are hand- 
ing down is not all that it might be, is not based on justice, 
because they are handicapped under the present system, be- 
cause they are not a permanent board and have no facilities, 
have not studied the matter completely, and have not suffi- 
cient time—if these men say that they are unable to make 
a just award, surely there would seem to be at least some 
ground for reasonable doubt as to the justice of the methods 
which are employed at present. 


$39 


The gentlemen ask us why under our plan we would have 
no more disputes. Every arbitration is to settle a dispute. 
If under the present system a strike vote has been taken, 
these arbitration boards know from past experience that if 
the demands of the railroad labor organizations are not con- 
ceded, they will go out on strike. They know that their 
duty to the public is to prevent that strike with as little cost 
to the public as possible. They say, “How much of the pub- 
lic’s money can we give these laborers and keep them quiet?” 
That is the extent of their ability under the present condi- 
tions, as the arbitrators themselves have said. Under our 
plan a strike is against the law. You have a permanent 
board, made up of experts, for studying railroad cases, and 
they can sit down and say, “Just how much do these labor 
organizations deserve, what is a just wage increase?” The 
arbitrators need not have a fear that a strike will take place, 
because they know that is against the law. They will be 
able to make a just decision under those circumstances. 


§40 

The gentlemen have said that compulsory arbitration. 
is a terrible thing, because it will do away with conciliation. 
That is just what we are advocating it for. We have shown 
that conciliation is unjust, letting the labor organizations 
grow at the expense of the entire public. The awards have 


DARTMOUTH VERSUS WILLIAMS 31 


acted as temporary sedatives. We want awards based on 
justice and a board free to decide cases on merits, and being 
permanent, be able to take everything into consideration. 
Do you realize the ridiculous position in which the gentle- 
men of the Negative have placed themselves? They have not 
attempted to defend the present method, they have not at- 
tempted to show another remedy, and yet they say, “Your 
board is going to increase the friction between capital and 
labor; it is going to make the labor unions angry.” Why? 
Because it is going to be based on justice. Isn’t that an 
assumption that their present plan is unjust? Why is our 
plan going to make the labor unions angry any more than 
the present plan does? If the Negative are unable to show 
that our plan is not based upon justice, when they admit that 
our plan will stir the unions up, do they not admit that the 
unions are unwilling to accept a just award? The labor. 
unions did not get all they wanted. Of course not. What 
man in a lawsuit ever did get all he wanted? Their policy 
is to aim for Io00 per cent. more than they expect to get, then 
kick at what they do get. They always make another pro- 
test. We say, gentlemen, that under the present system 
conditions are leading inevitably to a strike, because of the 
unwholesome and dangerous condition which is being de- 
veloped by humoring the unions and by conceding their 
demands. When the time comes that we refuse their de- 
mands, then we will have strikes. We have placed in the 
government’s hands the means of preventing strikes. We 
would make strikes illegal, and make these awards just. 
The Negative say conditions are all right now; we are 
keeping the unions quiet. They would let events run on 
and conciliate until there comes a strike, and then say, 
“What are we going to do?” 


32 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


THIRD NEGATIVE REBUTTAL 
Edward Erksine Porter, Williams 


S41 


The last speaker has mentioned time and again the great 
principle which they are upholding, abstract justice. Abstract 
justice is a very fine thing, but if the Affirmative wish to 
prove that compulsory arbitration is something that the gov- 
ernment should require, they must prove, not in theory, 
but in practice, that the government can enforce its awards, 
else their ideals of abstract justice are absolutely worthless. 
The speaker declared that the unions do not want justice; 
that is, he misquotes our arguments to say that the unions 
do not want justice. If they do not want justice, then if 
you give them justice they will strike and you have got to 
provide against it. In other words, ladies and gentlemen, 
compulsory arbitration depends in the last analysis not on 
this ideal justice which the Affirmative uphold, but on the 
question whether you can enforce the award. The Affirma- 
tive have yet to prove that you can enforce the award under 
compulsory arbitration. I would like to mention the fact 
that the challenge which the Negative offered to the Affirma- 
ative was not quite what the last Affirmative speaker said. 
The challenge was to show one case where employees have 
made demands that employers could not meet. The Affirm- 
ative speaker did not answer that challenge. 


$42 


The last gentleman from the Affirmative has attacked the 
Erdman Act on various grounds. We are not debating to- 
night whether the Erdman Act is the best act; we are not 
debating that the Federal government should require the Erd- 
man Act in settling labor disputes. We are debating whether 
the Federal government should require compulsory arbitra- 
tion, and the burden is not on the Negative to show that 
the Erdman Act or any act is the act which should be put 
in operation. We admit that the Erdman Act is not the 


DARTMOUTH VERSUS WILLIAMS 33 


best act. But in this debate it is for the Negative to show 
that compulsory arbitration should not be required. If we 
show that the Erdman Act has accomplished certain things, 
we are going beyond the question’s requirements, we are 
assuming a burden of proof, but the burden is not upon us 
to prove that that act is perfect, or any act is perfect. Our 
sole contention is that compulsory arbitration should not be 
required. 


§43. Rebuttal Summary 


The last Affirmative speaker also declared, we do not want 
conciliation. Is this a turning down, is this an overthrowing 
of the greatest and the only way of preserving industrial 
peace? Does he mean that we want a third body to inter- 
vene in every dispute that comes up? Do we want to keep 
labor and capital absolutely apart? Do we want to keep 
them from meeting in friendship? That is conciliation, meet- 
ing together, each offering and giving up something to the 
other. Is that what he wants to stop and overturn? The 
Negative tonight has endeavored to attack all sides of com- 
pulsory arbitration, not limiting itself to the fair or unfair, 
as the Affirmative have done, but taking up all sides of com- 
pulsory arbitration. We have shown that the small number 
of strikes could have been settled without compulsory arbi- 
tration. We have contended that compulsory arbitration 
could not prevent strikes. Even though the Affirmative prove 
that it is just, we have maintained that compulsory arbi- 
tration could not prevent strikes, that it would not be efficient 
in settling labor disputes, and that is what it must accom- 
plish. Lastly, we have maintained that compulsory arbitra- 
tion, if it could be established, could not stand the test of 
experience; that there would be unfavorable results from it 
which would outweigh its advantages. We should and must 
look into three fundamental propositions. We must be 
absolutely certain that this system, new and untried, which 
is going to absolutely upset the conditions under which our 
railways operate, I say, we must be absolutely certain that 


34 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


this system is necessary. Second, we must be absolutely 
certain that this system will work if it is tried. It has not 
worked where it has been tried. We must be absolutely 
certain that it will work. And last, we must be certain that 
it will not raise new and worse evils, worse than the evils 
which it is established to prevent. 


THIRD AFFIRMATIVE REBUTTAL 


Carl Plummer Merryman, Dartmouth 


$44 


The last speech given by the gentleman of the Nega- 
tive was a banquet for the ears and arest for the mind. Head- 
mitted that the present system does not guarantee jus- 
tice; he says, ‘““We do not care whether it does or not; it does 
prevent strikes.” They have gone so far as to assume that 
the Affirmative can base their contention for compulsory 
arbitration upon the fact that a few strikes have occurred. 
Now at the outset we informed the Negative that that was 
not the basis of the discussion this evening; we informed them 
that the present system of dickering, hotel-chasing, patchwork 
compromise and the injustice that it entailed was the condi- 
tion that we were trying to overcome. We have shown that 
with the rates fixed by the Interstate Commerce Commis- 
sion; and with labor’s ever-increasing demands, the burden 
is shifted to the public. We have shown that under their plan 
a strike is inevitable. We have asked them what they would 
do when this strike came, and they have refused to meet 
our questions. Now, the Negative have admitted that 
we might possibly get justice under the system that we 
would establish—and we will get justice. Why? In the first 
place, the dictatorial power of the labor monopoly will be 
removed. In the second place, we will give you a perma- 
nent board of arbitrators. When a dispute is referred to 
them, they will say to the engineers, “Your power is the 
same as the switchmen’s power. If your demands are just 


DARTMOUTH VERSUS WILLIAMS 35 


and equitable you will get them; if they are unjust, the pub- 
lic insist that you will not force it to pay the extra bur- 
den.” The switchmen since 1896 have received an increase 
of one and two-tenths per cent. In that same time the 
Brotherhood of Engineers has received an increase of fifty 
and three-tenths per cent. That is the so-called justice of 
the present system. Now, our system will do justice. When 
the switchman asks for a raise, we will tell him, your power 
is just the same as the engineers’. Your financial power 
is not so great as theirs, but your rights are as good. Our 
system will guarantee justice to the public, to the employees 
and to the employers. 


845 


But can compulsory arbitration be enforced? That is 
the issue upon which the discussion hinges tonight, can it 
be enforced? The Negative say it has never been en- 
forced in Australia, that the government has not had power 
to enforce it. Now, supposing that they have not. Down 
there in the antarctic seas, a little British dependency may 
not be able to enforce compulsory arbitration on the em- 
ployees. But when we discuss the Federal government of 
the United States—I submit to you that 95,000,000 of people 
can compel 300,000 men on interstate railroads in the United 
States to accept a just award. Why won’t the men go on 
strike? First, laborers realize that seldom is a strike suc- 
cessful. Second, because they know that the courts can 
enforce their mandates under our plan, arid if they did go 
on strike they would starve. Under our plan going on 
strike would get them nothing. Everybody has got to work 
—judges, lawyers, legislators—why doesn’t everybody strike? 
First, because they have got to earn a living; and, second, 
because they realize that the power of the government of 
the United States can enforce and will enforce the laws. 


36 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


§46. Rebuttal Summary 


Then because the present system is doing an injustice 
to the employees, because it is doing an injustice to the em- 
ployers, because it is shifting a burden upon the public:— 
because the present system does not contain one element 
of justice, we submit that the public should step in, curb 
the excessive dictatorial powers of the labor monopoly. 
The public should say to labor, ‘“You can have justice but 
you can have no more strikes; the engineers with their two 
million dollars can have no more than the switchmen; if 
you get a three per cent increase it will be because it is 
just, not because of your power.” Then we will have pro- 
vided a means which will guarantee justice to all parties 
concerned, which will insure industrial peace, and which 
will aid and assist capital and labor and the general wel- 
fare. 


PART II 
WILLIAMS VERSUS BROWN 


Won spy BROWN 


Resolved: That the Federal Government should require com- 
pulsory arbitration of labor disputes on interstate railroads. 
roads. i 


First AFFIRMATIVE 
Robert Noble Golding, Williams 


847. Public Demands that Strikes Be Prevented and Legat 
Means Must Be Provided to this End 


The appalling results of a railroad strike upon the very 
life of this nation are so apparent to all upon first thought, 
that I need not dwell upon them at length. With the in- 
terruption of railroad traffic, food and fuel become scarce 
and expensive; and, throughout the entire region affected 
by the strike, the whole people feels the pinch of want. Then 
that becomes privation, starvation. The anthracite strike 
of 1902 was deemed so serious as to make imperative the 
intervention of the President of the United States; but the 
stoppage of the supply of anthracite coal is not nearly so 
serious as would be the stoppage of railroad traffic, for in 
emergencies soft coal can take the place of hard, but under 
modern conditions nothing can take the place of the rail- 
roads. The peculiar relation of the railroads to the pub- 
lic is due to this one fact: nothing can take their place. Be- 
cause of this peculiar relation, because of the vital impor- 
tance of the railroad to the public, under conditions of great 
inconvenience—let alone starvation—the public would inter- 
fere by every means in its power to break the strike. Con- 


38 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


sider what happened in that great general strike of 1913 
in New Zealand. The whole public stepped in and ran 
street-cars and trains, loaded ships, and broke the strike. 
In the great American strikes of 1877, 1886 and 1894, as soon 
as violence afforded an excuse, troops were sent, blanket 
injunctions were issued, in one case even Gatling guns 
were used, but in every instance the strike was broken. 

In 1910 a strike was called on all the French railroads 
On the very day the strike was called, the government, un- 
der the law, called the strikers to a three months military 
training,—the training to consist of maintaining the rail- 
roads in normal working order. If the strikers had not 
obeyed, they would have been liable to punishment under 
the law. Realizing this, they did obey, and the strike was 
over in six days. In discussion, later, in the French High 
Court of Justice, the principle recommended by Monsieur 
Briand to the ministry was accepted, that public servants 
must be required to discharge their duties regularly and 
without interruption. That is the principle we are support- 
ing tonight, in regard to interstate railroads; public servants 
must be required to discharge their duties regularly and 
without interruption; and that principle necessarily includes 
compulsory arbitration for disputes are bound to occur, 
and some means must be found to settle them without 
allowing a strike to break out. Monsieur Briand also said, 
in part, “If the government had not found in the law that 
which enabled it to maintain most of its railroads, if, in a 
word, the government had found it necessary to’ resort 
to illegality, it would have done so. The welfare of the 
public is the supreme law; the instinct of the public to live 
is far superior to any right to strike; and the public 
will not suffer merely to give a comparative few that right 
to strike.” 

The public has stepped in in the past and broken strikes 
when public welfare was in danger, and the public always 
will step in when necessary to protect itself, when lives 


WILLIAMS VERSUS BROWN 39 


are in danger. It is much better to get a legal means where- 
by the public can interfere and break strikes than to leave 
the preservation of public peace to accident and caprice, 
or the good or bad humor of the contestants; for if the 
strike is not settled, the public will interfere by force, in- 
junctions or any other means at hand. 


§48. Voluntary Arbitration Does not Prevent Strikes 


Realizing this, various schemes are tried, such as volun- 
tary arbitration; but voluntary arbitration will not prevent 
strikes where one of the parties will not arbitrate or where 
one of the parties will not abide by the decision. In those 
cases there will be strikes, with all their appalling conse- 
quences. Consider how voluntary arbitration has worked 
in Canada in railroad disputes. In 1910 the Grand Trunk 
Railroad refused to accept the award, and there was a strike. 
Only after enforced government intervention was the strike 
settled. In t910, the employees of the Canadian Northern 
Railroad refused to accept the award, and struck. In IgQII, 
again, the Grand Trunk Railroad refused to accept the 
award, and again the men struck. Here are plainly seen 
the inherent defects of voluntary arbitration. It will not 
work where one of the parties will not arbitrate, and it 
will not work where one of the parties will not abide by 
the decision. These defects are here; they are an inherent 
part of voluntary arbitration; and the time has come when 
we must free ourselves from those defects; and to do that 
we need compulsory arbitration, which is nothing more 
than arbitration by law. 


§49. Railroads Crushed Between Rate Limit and Increasing 
Wages 


Let me call to your attention several facts about rail- 
roads, and point out the great and ever-present danger that 
confronts us. Railroad employees, although among the 
highest-paid workmen of the United States, are yet demand- 
ing more and more of their employers in shorter hours 


40 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


and higher wages. Railroad rates of transportation are now 
just about as high as the public will stand. For several 
years the railroads have been trying to get the Interstate 
Commerce Commission to allow them to raise their rates, 
but, because of the effect upon the public, the Interstate 
Commerce Commission will not allow them to do so. In 
fact, instead of an increase in rates, a decrease is not im- 
probable, because of the imminent competition of the Pan- 
ama Canal. In view of these facts the time is approach- 
ing, and approaching fast, when the railroads can grant no 
further increase in wages and still make a legitimate in- 
come. Let me read from Mr. Noyes in American Railroad 
Rates, page 30. “If the rate from Chicago, added to the 
price there, fixes the price of a bushel of wheat in New 
York at a dollar, a wheat-grower in the South-West, who 
can get eighty cents a bushel for his wheat by shipment 
to Europe by way of Galveston, cannot afford to pay more 
than twenty cents a bushel to ship to New York.” That 
means: the wheat-grower now sends his wheat to Europe 
by way of New York; but if the rate between Chicago and 
New York be raised, it will exceed that twenty-cent limit, 
and he will send it by way of Galveston. 

Let us now take a hypothetical case, which in view of 
the threatened strike of 1912 seems very reasonable. Sup- 
pose the employees of a railroad between Chicago and New 
York demand higher wages. The railroads cannot grant 
that demand unless they can induce the Interstate Com- 
merce Commission to allow them to raise their rates. If 
they succeed in this, the rise in rates will exceed that twenty 
cents a bushel limit. Because of this the shipper will send 
his wheat to Europe by way of Galveston. As a result, 
the income from the freighting of that wheat, not to men- 
tion other commodities, would be lost to the railroads, and 
because of this loss the railroads would be unable to pay 
the increase in wages. The situation here would be very 
dangerous for employees, for employers, and for the pub- 


WILLIAMS VERSUS BROWN 41 


lic. This fact stands forth vividly: Until this situation, 
and the complicated problems arising from it, are well on 
a way to a settlement, the public must have some legal means 
whereby it can interfere and prevent a strike. Voluntary 
arbitration is not adequate to deal with this situation, for 
voluntary arbitration will not prevent a strike where one 
of the parties will not arbitrate, and where one of the 
parties will not abide by the decision. Some legal means 
of interference is needed to protect the public; and that 


SECOND AFFIRMATIVE 
John Nestell Leonard, Williams 
§50. Railroads Must Submit to Public Regulation 


As the second speaker of the affirmative tonight, it will 
be my duty to show that the idea of compulsion in railway 
matters is neither new nor radical. Until the year 1887 the 
public of the United States was oppressed by railway cor- 
porations, by means of unfair rates and by the discrimin- 
ations between shippers. To protect the public from these 
corporations, Congress, in 1887, passed the act which created 
the Interstate Commerce Commission. That act infringed 
the right of private ownership, and put the property of 
private individuals under the control of the public; but it 
was necessary for the public so to regulate railroad cor- 
porations because of the vital effect of a railroad upon the 
the community in which it operates. The railroad, as a 
common-carrier of goods, is in a partnership with every 
producer and with every consumer in a community. And in 
support of the right of the people, through their legisla- 
tures, to control railroad corporations, allow me to quote 
a decision of former Chief Justice Waite of the Supreme 
Court of these United States. It is found in the case of 
Munn vs. Illinois (94 U. S., 113). “Property. does become 
clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to 
make it a public consequence, and affect the community 


42 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


at large. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a 
use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants 
to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to 
be controlled by the public for the common good to the ex- 
tent of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw 
his grant at any time by discontinuing the use, but so long 
as he maintains the use he mugt submit to the control.” 
Thus a corporation operating a railroad is neither forced 
into the railroad business, nor when it has once entered 
the railroad business is it compelled to remain in that busi- 
ness; but so long as it does remain in the railroad business, 
it must recognize the right of the public to control its acts. 


§51. Public Should Exercise Control over Employees Also 


At the present time, however, although the employer or 
the railroad corporation is under the control of the public, 
the railway employees are uncontrolled and their acts not 
regulated. The employees upon a railroad are just as much 
public servants as are the railroad corporations; and, as 
such, they should be just as much under the control of the 
public as are the railroad corporations. Now, the employees 
are irresponsible public servants. Therefore, the next logic- 
al step forward in the control of railways by the public 
is, to bring the railway employees under the public con- 
trol. The public must control the railway employees for 
its Own preservation and protection, for irresponsibility in 
public servants in a country of free and democratic institu- 
tions is vicious in the extreme; it is the subordination of the 
welfare of the nation as a whole to the dictates of one par- 
ticular group, which because of the importance of its ser- 
vice has the public at its mercy. Furthermore, it is unfair 
and contrary to our American concepts of justice, that one 
class of public servants upon a railroad should be controlled, 
while the other class is allowed to remain uncontrolled and 
irresponsible. It is a great injustice to the railway employ- 
er that he should be under the control of the people, while 
his employees are allowed to remain uncontrolled. Here, 


WILLIAMS VERSUS BROWN 43 


then, is a situation which we of the Affirmative believe can 
be protected only by taking the next logical step forward 
in the extension of public control of railroads, the adoption 
of compulsory arbitration. 


§52. Right to Strike Must be Surrendered 


The plan of compulsory arbitration does involve the 
surrender of the right to strike. It means that in this par- 
ticular industry the worker must in the interests of the en- 
tire people, give up his right to strike. But by no means 
does this mean any fearful sort of slavery. Just as the 
railroad corporation may at any time withdraw from the 
railroad business, so the railway employee may withdraw 
from the railroad business when he objects to public con- 
trol, and seek employment where he is absolutely free. 
But so long as he remains in the railroad business he must 
be prepared to recognize the right of the public to his con- 
tinued service. The railroad strike, against which com- 
pulsory arbitration is directed, is concerted action on the part 
of employees who leave their jobs not with the idea of 
seeking employment elsewhere, but with the idea of re- 
turning to their jobs when they have forced their employ- 
ers to agree to their condition. By no means do we of the 
Affirmative believe that compulsory arbitration should be ex- 
tended to any other form of industry. We recognize that in 
other forms of industry there are certain fundamental eco- 
nomic laws which must be allowed to work themselves out 
in order to establish a sound industrial basis; but we do be- 
lieve that the operation, and continued operation, of the 
railroads, is so vital to the needs of the nation as a whole, 
that the right to strike must be taken away. In support 
of the contention that railroads under all circumstances must 
be kept in continued operation, allow me to quote another 
case from our Supreme Court. In the case, Kneeland vs. 
The American Loan Company (136 U. S., 89) it was de- 
cided by the Supreme Court of the United States that the 
receiver of the bankrupt Wabash Railroad be empowered 


44 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


to borrow money to keep that railroad in operation, making 
such loan a lien having claims prior to first mortgage bonds, 
because the Court recognized the necessity to the com- 
munity of keeping the railroad in operation. Thus it is 
recognized as an established principle that the railroad 
must under all circumstances be kept a going concern. 


$53 


In closing, then, let me show the difference between 
compulsory arbitration and any other method of settling 
disputes. Under any other method of settlement, the right 
to strike is retained by the worker. Under compulsory ar- 
bitration, the right to strike is taken away. Under any 
other form of settlement, the right of one particular part 
of the community, the railway employees, is placed above 
the welfare of the country as a whole; and under compul- 
sory arbitration, the welfare of the whole nation is placed 
above any particular right of any small part of the nation. 
We of the Affirmative believe tonight that in such cases the 
public welfare is the supreme law; that any right which 
gives to one small section of employees the unlimited priv- 
ilege of inflicting starvation, death and disaster upon the 
people of these United States, is a right too dangerous to 
be permitted to exist. ) 


TuirpD AFFIRMATIVE.. 


Walter Mills Hinkle, Williams 
$54 


I will leave for the time being the proof that we need 
compulsory arbitration, in order that the first speaker on the 
Affirmative may bring that up in rebuttal and show where 
voluntary arbitration has failed, even where it has been bet- 
ter and more successfully applied than in the United States, 
thereby showing that we not only need compulsory arbi- 


WILLIAMS VERSUS BROWN 45 


tration, but must have that as a means whereby the gov- 
ernment can step in when necessary and settle a dispute. 


§55. Labor Leaders Admit Necessity of Compulsory Arbitration 
‘ in Railroad Industry 


Now as to the attitude of labor on compulsory arbitra- 
tion, my opponent has told you that labor is bitterly antag- 
onistic to compulsory arbitration, and that the adoption of 
this measure would necessarily drive labor and capital into 
two antagonistic camps, making them even more hostile 
toward each other than they are at present. He has quoted 
Mr. Gompers, saying that labor under all circumstances will 
oppose any compulsory arbitration law. In the first place, 
we wish to point out that we are not advocating compulsory 
arbitration over all industries, but merely over railway ser- 
vice, because of the peculiar relation that railway service has 
to the American public—a relation which no other industry 
has, a relation which is so vital that the railways must al- 
ways be kept in operation. Mr. John Mitchell, who is as 
well authorized to speak for labor as Mr. Samuel Gompers, 
states in his book, Organized Labor, on page 345, “While for 
the states of the American Republic a general compulsory 
arbitration law is not practicable, there are particular in- 
stances in which compulsion might possibly prove beneficial. 
In the case of railroads engaged in interstate traffic it might 
become necessary for the Federal government to compel such 
railroads to arbitrate differences with their workmen.” In 
other words, Mr. Mitchell, who in this book attacks the 
general principle of compulsory arbitration, makes the dis- 
tinct exception in favor of railways because of their vital 
importance to the community at large. 


§56. Comparison of Voluntary and Compulsory Arbitration 
Plans as to Method 


Now I wish to take up two different phases of the work- 
ing of compulsory arbitration as opposed to voluntary arbi- 


46 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


tration, I wish to make a comparison at two points. These 
two distinctions are, first, regarding method of procedure, 
and, second, regarding practical operation. 

In the first place, what is the basis upon which the ar- 
biters in a voluntary arbitration court act? They are the 
playthings of expediency; their main idea is but to keep 
the traffic open, and they must see to it that no break shall 
occur in railway operation. For this reason they generally 
have not enough time to make adequate investigation of 
the facts concerned in the dispute, and they must make an 
award which is merely a conciliation or compromise, a split- 
ting of the difference, in which the stronger party will in- 
evitably get the greater part of the award. I do not state 
this upon theory, but quote to you from the report of Mr. 
Martin A. Knapp, presiding judge of the United States Com- 
merce Court, in the Atlantic Monthly, volume 104, page 302, 
in which he says: “We have little to do with the merits 
of a case, our business being merely to keep the traffic 
open.” 

In other words, they are so bound up by demands of expe- 
diency that they are unable to make an award based upon 
the principles of equity and justice. Not only this, for 
voluntary arbitration means that the stronger will inevitably 
obtain the greater part of the award. This is taken from 
Mr. Mitchell. He says: “Voluntary arbitration, while in 
many cases a vast improvement over striking, and prefer- 
able to it, is often neither more or less than the victory of 
the stronger over the weaker party to the contest.” That 
is to say, the decision is frequently given to the side that 
would have won, and in proportion to what it would have 
won, had the issue been submitted not to arbitration but been 
fought out to the end through a strike or a lockout. In 
other words, voluntary arbitration does not mean that an 
award is based upon the principles of equity and justice, 
but rather upon the.mere principle of expediency. 

Consider what the arbitration board said in its report— 
the board which settled the dispute in I912, in a case of 


WILLIAMS VERSUS BROWN 47 


mediation: “There is no attempt on the part of the me- 
diators to make a judicial decision wholly on the basis of 
equity and justice. The primary purpose is to bring the 
parties together and avert a strike.” This is accomplished 
by splitting differences, and a case may be adjusted without 
adequate investigation of the facts involved. Feeling in 
advance that a mediation or arbitration will result in giving 
only part of what they ask, the men make maximum de- 
mands regarding compensation, rules of service, etc., with 
the expectation that these demands will not be fully granted. 
Upon the other hand, the railway officers, appreciating the 
tendency of mediators and arbiters to split differences, 
make only minimum concessions or none at all. What 
is this, ladies and gentlemen, but the accentuating of 
the differences between labor and capital, each side tak- 
ing an absolute and positive stand, making the most 
demands possible or making the fewest concessions pos- 
sible. 

Consider the action of a board under compulsory arbi- 
tration. Under compulsory arbitration, in which the arbi- 
ters know that the decision will be enforced by legal means, 
they are able to take time to make an adequate investiga- 
tion of the facts concerned. Further than that, they are 
able to make an award based upon equity and justice, de- 
pendent upon the circumstances of the industry at a given 
time; at the same time bearing in mind that in a case of 
industrial crisis, or hard times, the employee should not 
suffer the whole burden, as happened in the spring of Ig1I2 
in the Pullman works, but that each side should take a just. 
share of the burden; that the employers must forego part: 
of their dividends and part of their earnings in case of in- 
dustrial depression. Here, then, we have the difference be- 
tween voluntary and compulsory arbitration; the one is 
based upon expediency with a purpose merely to keep the 
traffic open, the other is based upon equity and justice with 
the purpose of giving a decision based upon the facts in 
the case with due investigation. 


48 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


§57. Comparison as to Actual Operation 


Now let me turn to the difference between these two ways 
of settling labor disputes when in actual operation. 
What does voluntary arbitration mean? According to my 
opponents, it means the possible settlement of disputes with 
the reserving of the right to strike to the employees on a 
railroad if they do not care to accept the decision. This 
means that in any case when workers feel that they have 
secured what they demand, then they have the right to 
strike without any intervention by the government except 
in cases of violence or interference with the United States 
mails. This is a condition against which we of the Affirma- 
tive believe some law must be provided in order that the 
government may be given power to interfere and keep the 
railroads in continuous operation. 

Compulsory arbitration, on the other hand, is not that 
fearful thing so terribly pictured by the Negative, under 
which the workers would be in a form of perpetual slavery, 
or perpetual warfare against the government; rather, it 
means the giving to the government of the legal means 
whereby it can step in and see to it that the public is as- 
sured of continued and uninterrupted service of the rail- 
ways. Consider what happened in the great strikes that 
we have had in America already. Need I repeat that in 
every strike we have had, in the strike of 1877, in the strike 
of 1886, in the strike of 1894, when violence afforded a pre- 
text the government stepped in with every power at its 
command, troops, judicial power, injunctions, everything, 
no matter what, so long as that strike might be crushed 
and trafic be kept going; with the result that the workers not 
only did not get what they wanted, but came back into a state 
far worse than that which they left when they struck, 
Starved and beaten, they went back to the shops they had 
left. Compulsory arbitration, however, gives to the gov- 
ernment the legal means whereby it can step in and say to 
the strikers and employees: If you strike, we will take 


WILLIAMS VERSUS BROWN 49 


every means in the possession of this government to see 
to it that railway operation is continued; we will take 
measures beforehand to keep railways in continued opera- 
tion; and we will see to it that the safety of the public is 
not dependent upon the wishes of any group of irresponsible 
employees. 


First NEGATIVE 


Frederick Hartwell Greene, Brown 


§58. Compulsory Arbitration Unnecessary. Number of Strikes 
Is Decreasing 


The first speaker of the Affirmative has contended, it I 
understand him correctly, that the rights of the public should 
be protected. We agree; and the rights of the public are 
now being protected by voluntary arbitration. The Affirm- 
ative cannot show any pressing need for changing from vol- 
untary arbitration in order to protect the rights of the public. 
They cannot show any pressing need for compulsory arbitra- 
tion, in the first place, because we have but few strikes on 
railroads in the United States. This country has always 
maintained, on the whole, railway industrial peace; traffic 
is not being interfered with by railway strikes. According 
to the statistics compiled by the Interstate Commerce Com- 
mission, we have had few strikes from 1881 to 1905; and 
since 1905 the mileage annually affected by strikes has de- 
creased one-half. But strikes are becoming less frequent, 
and that we have had no great railway strike, similar in pro- 
portion to the Chicago strike of 1894, since that year, is due 
to the fact that we have voluntary arbitration which can 
satisfactorily settle such disputes as arise. In a word, com- 
pulsory arbitration is unnecessary. The Affirmative cannot 
show any pressing need for importing this radical, socialistic 
and un-American system from Australia, and imposing it upon 
the American people, in order to guarantee the rights of 
the public. Voluntary arbitration is satisfactorily settling 
such disputes as arise. 


50 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


§59. Voluntary Arbitration under Erdman Act Is Successful 


Our first provision providing for voluntary arbitration was 
made by the Erdman Act. Shortly after its passage, the 
Erdman Act was not well known, and was littis used. 
Both railway employers and employees have now become 
more familiar with the provisions of the Erdman Act, and 
certainly make more use of it. In 1906 it was used five 
times; in 1909, nine times; in I9I0, sixteen times; and so on 
until by the end of 1912 the Erdman Act had been used 
in no less than sixty disputes, disputes of every possible 
kind that could arise between railway employers and em- 
ployees, from a few cases, involving a single road employing 
less than one hundred men, to cases, on the other hand, of 
exceptional magnitude, involving in a single case some forty 
thousand men and over one hundred miles of track. In all, 
the Erdman Act has prevented 163,000 men from striking. 
Serious disputes in regard to wages and conditions of labor 
have been frequent. Two or three instances on Southern 
roads involved the race question, where strikes of a very 
grave nature were threatened. There were two or three 
instances involving counterclaims over jurisdiction on the 
part of different organizations. All these cases the Erdman 
Act has met with marked success, for no less than fifty-three 
strikes of portentous consequence have been entirely averted; 
and, although Section 4 provides for further appeal to the 
Circuit Courts of our country in case an award is unsatis- 
factory, such an appeal has been made in only one case, and 
this case was one of the earliest controversies that arose 
under the act, and even here the matter was not settled in 
the Circuit Courts of our country, but was teferred back to 
the railroads for final solution. The Erdman Act has been 
successful in that no award has ever been repudiated by 
either side. The awards have been acceptable and lived up 
to admirably by both sides. Neither side has ever refused 
to accept an award of an arbitration court provided for by 


WILLIAMS VERSUS BROWN 51 


the Erdman Act. Such has been the success of voluntary 
arbitration under the Erdman Act; it has protected the rights 


of the public, and has satisfactorily settled disputes that 
have arisen. 


S60. The Newlands Act 


Now, voluntary methods of arbitration are further 
strengthened by the Newlands Act. The Newlands Act, 
passed in July, 1913, makes the following provisions: First, 
for a court of six arbiters, thereby doing away with: any 
objection certain railways had to submitting their cases to a 
board comprised of only three men; second, for a permanent 
board of conciliation and mediation, with a chairman who 
gives his sole attention to railway affairs. Voluntary arbi- 
tration which satisfactorily settles disputes, as provided for 
in the Newlands measure, has the thorough support of both 
railway employers and employees. When the measure was 
being considered, President Wilson deemed it advisable to 
call in conference representatives of both railway employers 
and employees. There met, on June 2oth, 1913, twenty lead- 
ers in the White House. This group included such men as 
President Ray of the Pennsylvania Railroad, President Wil- 
lard of the Baltimore & Ohio, and President Garrettson 
of the Order of Railway’ Conductors. All these men ex- 
pressed themselves as entirely satisfied with the Newlands 
measure, and hoped that it soon would become a law. They 
also said that they were directly opposed to compulsory arbi- 
tration. They said that they would never accept it. It is 
this fact, that both railway employers and employees thor- 
oughly support voluntary arbitration, as provided for in the 
Newlands measure, that makes its adherents feel optimistic 
as to its results. And the expectations of those who favor 
voluntary arbitration in this country are being more than 
realized, for no less than eight disputes already have been 
satisfactorily settled under voluntary arbitration as provided 
for in the Newlands measure. These cases include two dis- 
putes in Eastern territory with the conductors and trainmen, 


52 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


also a dispute with the trainmen and conductors of the Chi- 
cago, Western Indiana and Belt lines, also a dispute in- 
volving the electric service of the Southern Pacific Atlantic 
System. When the Newlands measure was being considered, 
there was a strike on the Atlantic System of the Southern 
Pacific; but when the Newlands bill became a law this strike 
was stopped immediately. Two cases involving the con- 
ductors and trainmen on the Queen and Crescent lines have 
been settled, as well as cases on the Burlington Railroad; 
and at the present time there is a movement for a complete 
revision of the Western territory schedule. All these various 
cases have been settled under the Newlands measure since 
July, 1913. Thus voluntary arbitration is protecting the 
rights of the public, protecting the rights of the people in 
the United States, first, until 1912, by the Erdman Act, and 
now voluntary methods are being further strengthened by 
the Newlands Act, which does away with all objections aris- 
ing to the Erdman Act. This has the thorough support of 
both railway employers and employees, and has since 1913 
settled no less than eight disputes. 


S61 


The Affirmative cannot show any pressing need for bring- 
ing in this radical scheme from Australia to settle the railway 
strikes in this country; in the first place, because we ‘have 
no serious railway strikes in this country; and, second, be- 
cause voluntary arbitration is satisfactorily settling such dis- 
putes as arise. Now, by accepting compulsory arbitration, 
which the Affirmative advocate this evening, we would not 
only be doing away with these measures which are satis- 
factorily settling disputes in the United States at the present 
time, but we would subject our country to fearful, terrible, 
malignant industrial strife. We would stimulate still greater 
disputes between railway employers and employees by ac- 
cepting compulsory arbitration, as my colleague will point 
out. 


WILLIAMS VERSUS BROWN 53 


SECOND NEGATIVE. 
Roland Hazard MacLaughlin, Brown 


§62 


The last speaker on the Affirmative has told you that 
we must have compulsory arbitration in the United States 
in order to properly safeguard the interests of the public. 
He has said that it is essential that we adopt some form 
of compulsory arbitration in order that we may keep the 
employees upon our railroads from holding in their hands the 
welfare of the public. The first speaker on the Negative 
has, I think, thoroughly demonstrated to you the fact that 
under our present legislation the public is sufficiently safe- 
guarded. He has shown you that under the Erdman Act 
we have enjoyed an unusual industrial peace, and that that 
act is proving every year more efficient in settling those 
disputes which necessarily must arise between capital and 
labor. 


§63. Compulsory Arbitration Will Cause Industrial War 


There is one fundamental question which must be an- 
swered tonight in deciding whether or not we should have 
compulsory arbitration, namely: Which system will best 
secure and maintain industrial peace-upon our railroads? The 
Affirmative must show that compulsory arbitration will do 
more to secure harmony between the employer and the em- 
ployee than voluntary arbitration has done or bids fair to do. 
They have absolutely failed to show that there is any real 
necessity for the adoption of any further legislation. We 
-heartily agree with them in regard to the disastrous results 
which a large strike brings upon the public; but the Affirm- 
ative must show that there is adequate need for the adoption 
of further legislation to provide for the settlement of such 
strikes as may arise. When we have a system of legislation 
which is proving every year more efficient in settling those 
disputes which arise, why should we even think of setting 
‘it aside? And, above all, why should we think of discarding 


54 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


it to take up a plan which, instead of promoting industrial 
peace, will be the direct cause of industrial war? For we 
believe that the inevitable result of compulsory arbitration 
would be fierce, enduring industrial war. The labor element 
of the United States is so violently opposed to any such plan 
that they will never allow it to go into active operation. The 
strength and the nature of this opposition is not difficult to 
show. It has been manifested from the first moment that 
compulsory arbitration was suggested for this country, and 
it has increased in intensity ever since. It is not that the 
workman rejects arbitration. The workman is fully as 
desirous of industrial peace as are the public, as are every 
one of the men of the nation. But what he does object to 
is the compulsory element, and that is the element which he 
will never accept. 

In a labor publication called The Railroad Trainmen, the 
following about this labor opposition is very well stated: 
“We believe in arbitration. We believe it is a sensible 
method of settling industrial disputes, but we do not pro- 
pose, nor do we believe that the railroads or their employees 
would submit to, any proposition which takes out of their 
hands at any time their absolute right to dispose of their own 
difficulties.” Thus some labor leaders who so heartily in- 
dorsed the Newlands voluntary arbitration act at the White 
House conference, as my colleague has told you, have sug- 
gested that they will do all in their power to keep a bill pro- 
viding for compulsory arbitration from going into effect. The 
workman feels that compulsory arbitration is an attempt to 
rob him of his industrial freedom. For years he has been striv- 
ing to organize in such a way that he may in a measure con- 
trol his own affairs; and now, just as he has reached the 
point where he is virtually independent, legislation is pro- 
posed with an intent to rob him of that hard-earned power. 


864. Labor’s Violent Opposition 


President Gompers, of the National Federation of Labor, 
a man who is probably in as good a position as anyone 
in this country to tell of the intentions and the opinions of 


WILLIAMS VERSUS BROWN 55 


labor, said at an industrial conference not long ago in Chi- 
cago, “Compulsory arbitration? Not if the workmen of 
America know it.” They feel it would be fatal to their inter- 
ests; they feel toward it a natural and a violent hatred, and 
their opposition will be desperate and enduring. 

In the Railroad Library for 1911, I find an editorial taken 
from the publication quoted a moment ago, The Railroad 
Trainmen; and, underlined in heavy black ink, that it may 
not be overlooked or misinterpreted, appears this threat, not 
couched in delicate terms—but all the more effective for 
that reason: “Though the Interstate Commerce Commis- 
sion has been empowered by law to do certain things to the 
railroads, it may take it for granted right now that if it ever 
attempts to do as much to the railroad employees, there will 
surely be things doing in ‘legislative circles.” That is a 
definite, direct declaration of war against compulsory arbi- 
tration, a declaration to take effect the moment a law pro- 
viding for such a plan is passed by Congress; and the 
moment Congress passed such a law every one of the great 
labor unions of America will go out on a concerted uni- 
versal strike. The commerce and industry of the whole 
country would be absolutely paralyzed; and that public, 
whom the gentlemen of the Affirmative are so eager to 
protect, would be subjected to untold suffering and the loss 
of millions of dollars—this because Congress had passed 
a law providing for compulsory arbitration in the face of 
the most violent opposition of the party most vitally con- 
cerned. 


§65. Breach Between Labor and Capital Would Be Widened 


But let us assume for a moment, purely for’ the sake of 
argument, that for some unforeseen reason the opposition of 
the labor element did not take this exact form; that for 
some inexplicable reason they should change their course 
and actually allow a court of arbitration to start upon its 
brief career. Would that court of arbitration secure peace? 
On the other hand, we would find that it would prove a 
powerful stimulus to continual controversy and needless 


56 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


strikes. Instead of bringing capital and labor nearer to- 
gether, it would absolutely widen the breach between those 
two already antagonistic elements; for labor does not look 
upon a court of arbitration as an agent of peace, but as an 
instrument of oppression. The workman knows that hard 
times must come, when little commerce would be carried 
on; and he knows that that is the time when the employer 
will attempt to reduce his wages; if the railroad can show 
the court that its profits are small or negligible, and little 
business is being done by it, the decision of that arbitration 
court will be in favor of the employer and against the em- 
ployee. The workman’s wage will be reduced at a time 
when he can least afford it, when the necessities of life are 
most expensive, and he needs every cent he is getting at 
that time for the support of his family. Can the workman 
regard this as a court of justice? He feels that in time of 
need the employer will have a powerful ally in the form of 
the arbitration court to help him snatch the bread from the 
lips of the workman’s children; and in times of prosperity 
the workman will retaliate by the same means and extort 
from the employer every possible cent; for under com- 
pulsory arbitration the workman may at any: time demand 
higher pay, shorter hours, or any other concession, and draw 
the employer into court. His wages may be high enough; 
his hours may be entirely reasonable; but if the railroad, 
is making large profits, the decision may be in the work- 
man’s favor. Under these conditions he has everything to 
gain and nothing to lose; for if the railroad is making large 
profits, even if the workman’s wages are not increased they 
surely will not be decreased. 

Thus under this plan which the gentlemen of the Affirm- 
ative are proposing tonight the employer and the employee 
live constantly in fear that each with the other is going to 
use the arbitration court against him; each must keep con- 
stantly on the alert, using every method of political strategy 
known in the attempt to obtain a court favorable to his cause, 
a court which will decide in his favor in case of strike. In- 
stead of bringing capital and labor into a more cordial rela- 


WILLIAMS VERSUS BROWN 57 


tionship, into a state of better understanding, a court of com- 
pulsory arbitration would be used by each as a weapon in a 
constant struggle, which would mean the lining up of the 
forces of labor against those of capital in an endless battle, 
with the arbitration court as the theatre of hostilities, until 
that court would be swamped with that business and the 
whole country absolutely paralyzed with continual, endless, 
needless strikes. 


§66 


Gentlemen, we have now a system of voluntary arbitra- 
tion, which is proving every year more effective in settling 
those few disputes which must arise between capital and 
labor; yet the gentlemen of the Affirmative would have us 
discard this efficient plan which has already proved itself 
adequate for meeting all demands, and take up a system 
which is definitely opposed by the labor and capital of this 
country, because they realize that instead of bringing in- 
dustrial peace it will inevitably mean industrial war. We 
have this decision before us: Which will we have, voluntary 
peace, or compulsory war? 


THIRD NEGATIVE. 


Nahum Morrill, Brown 
§67. Voluntary Reconciliations of Labor and Capital 


If I understand the gentleman who immediately preceded 
me correctly, he claims that boards of voluntary arbitration, 
boards such as are provided for under the Erdman and 
the Newlands acts, are inefficient in reconciling capital and 
labor in settling such disputes as arise. If that be his sole 
quarrel with us, we can have very little difficulty in clearing 
up the trouble, for what can be more efficient than a board 
that is created to settle each dispute as it arises, a board com- 
posed of representatives of capital, of representatives of 
labor, and of representatives of the public, each of whom 
is thoroughly acquainted with the point of view of the differ- 


58 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


ent elements to the dispute, each of whom is thoroughly 
acquainted with the ins and outs of the railroad business? 
That is the composition of the boards that are provided for 
under the Erdman and the Newlands acts. But the great- 
est proof of the efficiency of such boards in dealing with 
such industrial disputes as arise in our railroads is, the fact 
that we have enjoyed unparallelled industrial peace upon 
our railroads since 1894; and the Affirmative has not disputed 
that statement; they have not yet shown any cause why there 
should be a change in existing legislation because there are 
strikes. He has told you that there were certain strikes upon 
railroads in 1877, in 1886 and in 1894, but these have nothing 
to do with showing the inefficiency of voluntary arbitration, 
because they occurred before the passage of the Erdman 
Act, which was the first measure of the national government 
designed to secure arbitration in industrial disputes on rail- 
roads. The fact is, we have had industrial peace since the 
adoption of the Erdman Act. I appeal to you, ladies, and 
gentlemen, to see if you can recall where there have been 
any great strikes upon our railroads which have tied up 
traffic for any considerable amount of time, any strikes which 
have resulted in causing hardship to any section of the 
country. 

The Negative has already pointed out to you, this even- 
ing, how efficient this Erdman Act is; we have shown how 
each year it has handled more and more disputes, how each 
year it has averted more and more strikes. We have further 
shown that compulsory arbitration would in itself tend to 


pave the way for greater industrial strife than has existed 
heretofore. 


868. Awards Cannot Be Enforced | 


Now, it is my contention that the difficulties in the way 
of enforcing the awards of boards of arbitration, under com- 
pulsory arbitration, are so great as to render the system un- 
desirable. At the very start, I think we will all agree, 
that the award of any arbitrating tribunal, to be of any value 
whatsoever, must be accepted by both parties to the dispute. 


WILLIAMS VERSUS BROWN 59 


Voluntary arbitration is secured by the agreement of both 
employers and employees to abide by that decision, before 
the matter at issue is referred to arbitration; and that is why 
voluntary arbitration is so efficient. Now, there are many 
disputes in which neither party desires to arbitrate; both ' 
prefer to deal directly with one another; but, under com- 
pulsory arbitration, they must arbitrate, no matter whether 
they wish to or not. Now, let us see how such a scheme 
as that would work in actual practice. If the unionists, for 
example, were unwilling to arbitrate, and were forced to do 
so by the government, it would be a foregone conclusion that 
unless the award of the arbitrating board were almost en- 
tirely in their favor they would refuse to accept it. The 
gentlemen of the Affirmative will, of course, say, in that lies 
the beauty of their scheme, that the government can then 
intervene and compel the worker to accept these provisions 
and work under them. But how can any government com- 
pel five thousand or ten thousand or twenty thousand, or 
perhaps a hundred thousand men, scattered over different 
parts of the country, to work against their will? If this 
is to be done by use of physical force, if the government 
is to make use of its military forces to secure this enforce- 
ment—and we do not believe that it can be done—the result 
is the creation of a situation of.forced labor, which results 
in the creation of a condition of involuntary labor; and, in 
principle, involuntary labor of such a type does not differ in 
the least from chattel slavery, from servitude, because that 
labor is obtained against the will of the worker. 

The effects of compulsory labor are bad. If a man is 
unwilling to work, and is coerced into doing so by some 
force stronger than he, his greatest efficiency is not secured; 
and this is a grave consideration in dealing with so delicate 
an organism as our transportation industry. To it are in- 
trusted daily the lives and safety of thousands and thousands 
of persons; to our railroads are intrusted daily millions and 
millions of dollars worth of property. With the transporta- 
tion industry, more than with any other industry, efficiency 
is secured through the hearty cooperation and good will of 


60 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


the workers; but if those men be forced to work against 
their will, if they do not wish to work and are compelled 
to do so, their greatest efficiency will not be secured. In- 
stead of seeking to render faithful and efficient service, they 
. will seek to impair the efficiency of the railroads in every 
conceivable manner; they will practice every known form 
of sabotage; freight will be destroyed in transit; rails will 
be torn up; it is even conceivable that trains might be 
wrecked; a situation would be created that would be danger- 
ous alike to the railroads and to the safety of the public. 
We cannot permit the adoption of a system of arbitration 
which would pave the way for bad and inefficient railroad 
management; we cannot permit our railroads to be crippled 
to such a great degree. But unless these awards are to be 
enforced by the strong arm of the government—which they 
would not be, because no government would attempt to com- 
pel men to work against their will—they are not going to be 
enforced. 


§69. Compulsory Arbitration Failed in Foreign Countries 
New Zealand 


If the enforcement of compulsory arbitration is to be 
allowed to rest entirely upon the good faith of both parties, 
it will not be enforced. This statement is borne out by an 
examination of the workings of compulsory arbitration in 
those countries in which it has been tried. Those countries 
in which it had its first trial are Australia and New Zealand. 
In 1908 all New Zealand was convulsed with a severe strike 
among the miners and the slaughtermen, which lasted for 
weeks, and was suppressed only with the greatest of diffi- 
culty. The gentlemen on the Affirmative will say that.that 
is not a strike upon railroads, but it is a fair example of what 
would happen upon our railroads were this scheme to be 
adopted, because in it we have the same element present 
that would be present in our railroad disputes, compulsion, 
the attempt to make men work against their will. Another 
strike occurred in New Zealand in 1913, which I am greatly 


WILLIAMS VERSUS BROWN 61 


indebted to the gentleman from Williams for mentioning. 
He has told you how it was necessary for the people of New 
Zealand to rise up and take care of the management of tram- 
ways, and to operate railroads. Is that the sort of a system 
that we desire to see imposed upon the American people? 
Do we want to impose upon ourselves a system which will 
result in interruptions of service, in a necessity for calling 
out every individual citizen to operate our railroads? We 
cannot permit the adoption of such a system in the United 
States. 


§70. Experience in Australia 


In Australia also compulsory arbitration has been a fail- 
ure. In no industry has its failure been better exemplified 
than in the transportation industry. In 1903, in Victoria, 
upon the state railroads of that province, eight months after 
the enactment of a compulsory arbitration act, there oc- 
curred a very violent strike, a strike which raged for days, 
a strike which interrupted the service upon those railroads. 
It was suppressed by use of the military forces of the 
province, and the demands of the workers were yielded to in 
almost every particular. This was followed by the adoption 
of legislation making a strike in an industry affected with 
public interest a penal offense. Nevertheless, last summer, 
upon that very same system of railways in Victoria, there 
occurred another strike, and serious trouble was averted only 
through yielding almost entirely to the demands of the 
workers. 

In 1912 almost all business in the Province of New South 
Wales was paralyzed with a general strike, originating be- 
cause of some slight grievance upon the part of the em- 
ployees on the street railways of the city of Brisbane, which 
rapidly assumed gigantic proportions. Workers in every 
branch of industry were called out with the avowed intention 
of causing a cessation of all labor, and in no industry was the 
trouble more acute than in the transportation industry. 


62 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


In all our history of labor disputes in the United States, 
with our great anthracite coal strike, and with many others, 
we have never yet had an example of a general strike affect- 
ing every worker in the country. That strike that occurred 
in New South Wales was one of the most violent labor 
wars that the world has ever seen, a war that was waged 
under this alleged cure to effect industrial peace, com- 
pulsory arbitration. 


§71 

These are only some of the most glaring examples of 
strikes in Australia and New Zealand. There are many 
others. In 1912 alone there were ninety-two strikes in 
Australia under this system. Such figures as these shriek 
aloud that this alleged cure to effect industrial peace is no 
cure, that men cannot be compelled to work against their will. 
The gentleman of the Affirmative tells you that the work- 
ers will accept these decisions. But how are they going to 
do so? He has not told you how the government intends 
to enforce these awards. He durst not tell you that it in- 
tends to do it by attempting to send forty or fifty thousand 
men to jail—and that is what would happen if there were a 
strike upon one of our railroads. He dares not tell you 
that the government would attempt to imprison great mul- 
titudes of men. It cannot be done by any system of. fines, 
because the fines cannot be collected if forty or fifty thousand 
men who are fined refuse to pay. Now I call upon the 
gentlemen of the Affirmative, right here and now, to outline 
some scheme whereby he expects to enforce the awards of 
these compulsory arbitration boards. In a word, then, the 
system of compulsory arbitration presents two inherent de- 
fects: If the awards are to be enforced, which we do not 
admit can be done, the result is the creation of a system of 
involuntary labor, which is bad for everyone; it is bad for 
the employers and the employees; and if the awards are 
not enforced, it would be better to have no law upon the 
statute books. 


WILLIAMS VERSUS BROWN 63 


First NEGATIVE REBUTTAL. 
Frederick Hartwell Greene, Brown 


§72 


The preceding speaker on the Negative has pointed out 
to you some difficulties in the way of enforcing awards of 
compulsory arbitration boards. Men will not and cannot 
be made to work against their will. How are you going to 
make a hundred thousand men, or five hundred thousand men, 
work if they do not wish to? Or, even how are you going 
to maintain efficient service? Wrecks will follow and tracks 
will frequently be torn up. But, furthermore, the Negative 
have pointed out that compulsory arbitration, instead of 
promoting greater industrial peace, would stimulate further 
industrial strife, would increase disputes between railway 
employers and employees. 


§73 


Aside from the consideration of the defects of compulsory 
arbitration, this evening the Negative has pointed out that 
there is no pressing need for compulsory arbitration in order 
to settle railway industrial disputes. The Affirmative must 
show some urgent necessity for accepting compulsory arbi- 
tration. They have pointed out to us very well the terrible 
situation we would be in in case we had great railway strikes; 
disaster and even death would follow, fuel and food supplies 
would be cut off; but they haven’t brought it home to the 
United States, and shown us that there is urgent necessity 
because we are having such strikes; they haven’t pointed out 
a single strike that has tied up the service in the United 
States. They have pointed out strikes in other countries. 
For example: in France they said there was a great strike 
in I910; but that is not the United States. Furthermore, 
they have pointed out that voluntary arbitration has failed 
in Canada. We do not admit for a minute that voluntary 
arbitration has failed in Canada, for with only six cases out 
of sixty-one it cannot in any sense be considered a failure. 


64 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


But even if we admitted that voluntary arbitration had been 
a failure in Canada, what has that to do with the United 
States? They haven’t shown that voluntary arbitration in 
the United States has not been a success. They have pointed 
out certain strikes occurring in 1877, 1886 and 1894. All 
these disturbances occurred before we had any measure on 
our statute books providing for efficient voluntary arbitra- 
tion. 


874 


But such a peace in this country has not been maintained 
easily. We have had certain severe tests already, testing 
voluntary arbitration. For example, under the Erdman Act, 
providing for voluntary arbitration, on December 17th, 1910, 
there was a dispute involving no less than 24,600 men. If 
we had not had efficient voluntary arbitration at this time, 
we would have had a serious strike threatening the people 
and bringing disaster and death; but at that time we did have 
voluntary arbitration, and, so, such a disaster was entirely 
averted. We might go on and enumerate innumerable cases 
in which there have been disputes arising covering thousands 
of men, but all these have been satisfactorily settled by vol- 
untary arbitration. I challenge the affirmative to show us 
a serious strike that has tied up the traffic of this country 
which voluntary arbitration has not satisfactorily settled. 
They have pointed out-that voluntary arbitration is not ade- 
quate because certain parties refuse to arbitrate—it is sug- 
gested by one party, and then the other party refuses to com- 
ply. Under voluntary arbitration, as provided by the Erd- 
man Act, only four cases happened out of sixty. Fifty-three 
is the total number which were entirely averted; 163,000 men 
were prevented from striking. If we had not had efficient 
means at that time, this country would have been subjected 
to great industrial strife; but voluntary arbitration has sat- 
isfactorily maintained the rights of the public, has guaran- 
teed and protected the people in America from great in- 
dustrial strife; and I challenge the Affirmative to show us 
any pressing urgent necessity for importing this radical, 


WILLIAMS VERSUS BROWN 65 


socialistic and un-American scheme from the antipodes, and 
imposing it upon the American people in order to do away 
with industrial strife. 


First AFFIRMATIVE REBUTTAL. 
Robert Noble Golding, Williams 
875 

In beginning the rebuttal tonight, I would like to read 
an extract from the report of the board of arbiters 
that settled the dispute in 1912. This is found on page 108, 
“Finally, it is the belief of the board that in the last analysis 
the only solution [that is, the solution of a dispute], un- 
less we are to rely solely upon the restraining power of 
public opinion, is to qualify the principle of free contract 
in railway service.” Whatis that but compulsory arbitration? 


And that statement was made by a voluntary arbitration 
board. 


$76 


There has been some mention tonight of the strike of 
1913 in New Zealand. I would like to call the attention of 
the gentlemen of the Negative to the fact that that was a 
general strike—not only a railroad strike. And here is an 
extract found in the New York Evening Post of January 
30th 1914: “Last October consideration was really against 
the world’s first compulsory arbitration act. English and 
Australian agitators, beginning in 1910, took advantage of a 
new labor immigration to form a federation of labor, which 
_ slowly induced almost all the unions to withdraw their regis- 
tration under the act. New Zealand being cut off by sea from 
a ready importation of workmen, the agitators thought a 
general strike would inevitably reduce her to subjection.” 
Did the strike succeed? For about three weeks it did; and 
then the public exercised their inevitable right to Interfere, 
and they broke that strike. 


66 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


§77 


The gentlemen of the Negative have claimed that we can 
show no reason why compulsory arbitration should not be 
brought to this country, because we have not had any 
strikes to settle here. Of course I cannot prove to you that 
we have had strikes here; of course we have not had strikes: 
but the possibility is there, that we are going to have 
strikes. Canada has strikes, and Canada has voluntary ar- 
bitration. It had three strikes that I quoted; and of the past 
disputes there were eleven per cent. of the railroad disputes 
not settled; in 1907 there were four per cent.; in 1908, four 
per cent.; in 1910, it jumps to eight per cent.; and in Iori it 
goes up to thirteen per cent. In Great Britain, under volun- 
tary arbitration, there were ninety-seven disputes, and 
twenty-five not settled. This is found in the United States 
Report of the Bureau of Labor, Number 98. Then there was 
the great railroad strike of Great Britain. In 1911, after a 
peace in railway disputes lasting almost fifty years, we had 
a strike in Great Britain. Are we to consider that we are 
so favored by heaven that we are not going to have strikes, 
when after fifty years Great Britain had one? Let me read 
from John Mitchell: “The danger of a strike in the case of 
the public utilities has been gradually lessened by the Ar- 
bitration Act—by the Erdman Act—but has not ceased to 
exist. It must not be supposed that trade agreements will 
prevent any strikes.” 


§78 


Voluntary arbitration has tried to prevent strikes. The 
avowed purpose of voluntary arbitration, we are told by 
the gentlemen of the Negative, is to prevent strikes. But in 
seeking to attain this avowed purpose, under voluntary arbi- 
tration there are two cases where that purpose cannot be at- 
tained: where one of the parties will not arbitrate, or where 
one of the parties will not abide by the decision. In com- 
pulsory arbitration we offer a legal means of interference. 


WILLIAMS VERSUS BROWN 67 


We do not say that for all eternity it will guarantee us 
against strikes. If every single employee of the railroads of 
the United States, and all her dependencies, went out on a 
strike, and took up arms, that would not be a strike; that 
would be a revolution. But the fact remains that with this 
legal means of interference the government will not have 
to wait until injury has been committed to property, until 
innocent people have been shot as happened in some of 
those strikes back in 1877 and 1886; it will be able to take 
steps to settle the dispute before violence occurs. Why not 
give the government a chance to step in before the strike 
has come off, before the strikers have committed violence, 
or before irresponsible hoodlums of the street come in and 
commit violence, as they did in the Pullman strike, and 
then throw the blame on the strikers? We need this legal 
means of interference. We of the Affirmative do not guar- 
antee that it will stop all strikes, as I said before; but argu- 
ing logically from the fact that the government has stopped 
strikes when it has stepped in, it will be able to prevent 
strikes if it steps in before the strikes take place. 


SECOND NEGATIVE REBUTTAL. 
Roland Hazard MacLaughlin, Brown 


§79 


The last speaker of the Affirmative has just admitted 
that under our present system of voluntary arbitration we 
have not had strikes. If we have not had strikes under our 
present system of arbitration, why in heaven’s name should 
we lay it aside? What is the sense of stirring up industrial 
war when at present we are enjoying peace, as the gentle- 
man of the Affirmative has just admitted? In my construc- 
tive argument I endeavored to show you that compulsory 
arbitration, from its very nature, is a breeder of industrial 
disputes. The gentleman quoted John Mitchell as saying that 


68 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


at present voluntary arbitration has not proved absolutely 
successful. At the same time, John Mitchell stated in that 
book, which I have on the table, that compulsory arbitration 
will never be accepted by the people of the United States, 
that they are not ready for it, and that it would not be suc- 
cessful. Gentlemen, the Negative have based their case tonight 
upon the fact that we do not need compulsory arbitration to 
safeguard the rights of our public. As the first speaker upon 
the Negative has shown, and as the Affirmative have admit- 
ted, there are at present no strikes. We are enjoying a re- 
markable industrial peace; and our system of arbitration is 
every year proving more efficient in settling what few dis- 
putes arise. 
§80 

What is more, we find that the adoption of compulsory 
arbitration, instead of continuing this peace, instead of safe- 
guarding the rights of the public, would only serve to abso- 
lutely obviate the possibility of seeing to it that those 
strikes did not occur. The workman feels that in times of 
financial depression the arbitration court is going to be 
used against him by the employer. The employer knows 
that in times of prosperity, when he is making a great 
deal of money, the employee realizes that at that time he 
has an admirable opportunity to strike for an increase of 
wages. Even if the arbitration court attempted to be per- 
fectly just when every case was brought before it in that 
way, it could not fail, if the profits of the railroad were 
large, to give the workmen an increase in wages. On the 
other hand, in times of financial depression, when there 
is little commerce carried on, and the railroad profits are very 
small, the arbitration court could not help reducing the 
wages of the workman. The workman will not regard this 
as a court of justice. In short, both the employer and the 
employee, when they bring these disputes to be arbitrated, 
the one in a time of prosperity, the other in a time of de- 


WILLIAMS VERSUS BROWN — 69 


pression, are sure to feel that the decision of that court is 
unjust and unfair. Each one of them, in consequence, must 
constantly be endeavoring to gain a court which will give 
him the decision. Each one of them must constantly use 
that arbitration court, not as a method of securing peace, 
but to defend himself and defeat the other. It will not do 
for either capital or labor, with such a court in existence, 
to disregard the fact that that court is in existence. Each 
of those elements must at all times be doing everything in 
its power to get the attitude of that court in such a way 
that it will grant their party the decision in case of strike. 
The instituting of a court of compulsory arbitration would 
mean that we would make politicians of our laboring element; 
we would induce the leaders of one million seven hundred 
thousand laborers into politics; we would force their rep- 
resentatives into politics, With a motive which is as power- 
ful as any possibly could be, they would be forced constantly 
to keep on the alert to keep that court from being used 
against them, because they know that in times of depression 
it would be used in that way, and they must constantly use 
that court at every possible opportunity against the em- 
ployer to defend themselves from the results of the use of 
that court by the employer in times of depression. 


$81 


Thus, by adopting compulsory arbitration instead of hav- 
ing conditions. of industrial peace that we are having 
at the present time, and the gentleman of the Affirmative 
has just told you that we are having no strikes at present, 
we will increase the possibility of strikes which he tells you 
exists today. Instead of continuing our present industrial 
peace, we will have continual needless dispute, which cannot 
be settled by the decisions of a court of arbitration, be- 
cause those decisions cannot be enforced by the government 
except by exercise of military force. From giving effect to 
these decisions by force, there would result a condition of 


70 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


enforced labor, which, as my colleague has shown you, is 
dangerous alike to the property of the public and the prop- 
erty of the railroad. 


SECOND AFFIRMATIVE REBUTTAL 


John Nestell Leonard, Williams 


§82 


In the first place, I wish to discuss the point that my op- 
ponent has just raised, that labor under compulsory arbi- 
tration will enter politics. The laboring classes of all of our 
European countries at the present time have labor parties. 
The laborers of New Zealand and of Australia and of Canada 
have labor parties. They are entering into politics more and 
more. Yet we fail to see how this entrance of labor into 
politics is fraught with any harm to those countries. It has 
not brought any great constitutional changes, or any up- 
heaval of government, in any European country. Now, the 
entrance of labor into politics in this country would perhaps 
bring labor politics out into the open. At the present time 
labor politics are conducted in secret, but nevertheless labor 
has influence in politics. In the last election in New York 
State, when Judge Werner was running for supreme court 
justice, he was defeated by a scant few hundred votes be- 
cause of the laboring men not coming out into the open, 
under a particular ticket, party or emblem; they voted 
against him because of his decision. declaring workmen’s 
compensation laws to be unconstitutional some years ago. 
Would it not be much better for our laboring men to come 
out openly into politics, under a party emblem, than as now to 
remain hidden in politics without any fundamental platform 
or precepts, without any party leaders, or without any party 
doctrine? And is not our American way of settling disputes | 
rather at the polls by the ballot than with the strike? 


WILLIAMS VERSUS BROWN 71 


§83 


Now I shall pass to the argument of the third speaker 
of the Negative who made a point of the increase of dis- 
putes in New Zealand and Australia under compulsory arbi- 
tration. Compulsory arbitration was first worked out in 
New Zealand; and, as it was first worked out in that country, 
it was of necessity an experiment. As my opponents have 
shown you, it was entirely new. As an experiment, the 
first few years of the law’s operation, the wording of the law 
prevented it from being forcibly carried out. But allow 
me to quote from Mr. Victor S. Clark in the Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, in March 
T1909, On page 221, in which he speaks of labor legislation 
in New Zealand. He is speaking here of an amendment to 
the New Zealand law, which was passed in 1909, a date 
much later than any date of strikes which have been quoted 
by our opponents in this debate so far; he is speaking of a 
radical and new amendment to the New Zealand law which 
tended to make that law easier and better to enforce. 

Mr. Clark says: “In New Zealand, a new law that went 
into effect last October [1909] requires disputes to -be 
heard before conciliation councils before they can be ap- 
pealed to the arbitration court. Thus, the general tendency 
is to combine the better features of the New Zealand and 
the Victoria methods of dealing with terms of employment, 
taking from each what experience has shown to be most 
useful.” 

In other words, the New Zealand law of the last few years 
takes into consideration the best effects of voluntary arbitra- 
tion, by providing that disputes should first come up before 
voluntary wage boards for settlement; and if settlement fails 
in those boards, not that a strike shall ensue, as under vol- 
untary arbitration in its pure sense, but that then they 
should go up to a board of compulsory arbitration for ad- 
justment. In other words, compulsory arbitration in New 
Zealand at the present time does not do away with any 


72 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


voluntary form of conciliation, mediation or arbitration; 
but, first, it provides that if voluntary arbitration is unsuc- 
cessful then compulsory arbitration will be used. This new 
law in New Zealand gives the people a legal right to inter- 
fere. The people exercised their legal means to interfere 
in the strike of 1913. The strike was broken, and broken at 
once, because before any violence was committed, before 
the country was subjected to any starvation, hardship or 
disaster, the people, by their legal means of compulsory ar- 
bitration, immediately stepped in and settled the dispute. 


§84 


My opponents have stated that strikes are on the in- 
crease under compulsory arbitration. Allow me to say that 
strikes throughout the entire world are on the increase, 
under whatever law providing for settlement of dispute 
exists. In England, we had a railroad strike, last year, under 
a system of voluntary wage boards. In France, last year 
there was a great railroad strike under voluntary arbitration. 
In Canada, in the last few years we have had strikes under 
voluntary arbitration. In the United States, the number of 
disputes coming up under the Erdman Act has increased. 
I know that the disputes coming up under the act have in- 
creased because the act is becoming wider known; but the 
fact remains, all over the world, in Italy, in England, in 
France, Canada, the United States, whatever country you 
will, economic influences are producing more and more dis- 
putes. 


TuHirD NEGATIVE REBUTTAL 
Nahum Morrill, Brown 


§85 


The speaker who has preceded me has told you that the 
acts in New Zealand have recently been amended, and that 
now they are living under a different form of compulsory 


WILLIAMS VERSUS BROWN 73 


arbitration than that which existed heretofore. Now, we 
do not admit that the former compulsory arbitration act is 
different; but if it gives the gentleman any satisfaction, we 
will assume for the sake of argument that it is different, and 
consider simply the workings of the New Zealand law since 
the year 1908. The legislation of 1908 followed right after 
that very serious strike among the slaughter-men and min- 
ers. In the year 1911 there were twelve strikes in New Zeal- 
and; in the year 1912, fourteen; in 1913 occurred that deadly, 
insidious industrial war, whose consequences have been 
pointed out, far more eloquently than I can do so,/ by the 
gentleman from Williams, the strike, in which you may re- 
member, as he told you, the populace rose up’ and en masse 
operated the street-cars and every other branch of industry. 
Is that the sort of system we want in this country? Only 
last week the newspapers were filled with a strike that was 
occurring upon a railroad that runs out of the city of Dune- 
din; and I noticed in. the Boston Transcript, last Saturday, 
another strike in the city of Wellington. They have failed 
to preserve industrial peace in New Zealand under this 
system of compulsory arbitration. 

In Australia the system is similar; but in one year alone 
there were ninety-two strikes. Because the men cannot be 
forced to work against their will, compulsory arbitration 
falls down. 

But legal regulation is not limited to Australia and New 
Zealand. It has been attempted in certain European coun- 
tries. In Spain, striking is prohibited unless a notice that 
employees intend to strike is given twelve days in advance. 
Nevertheless, that rule has been twice disregarded since 
being put on the statute books of 1912. Italy and Roumania 
have attempted to prohibit strikes by law: but the only 
reason that they are able to secure even the semblance of 
enforcement is by attempting to prevent their employees 
from joining labor unions. Nevertheless, last year in both 
countries there were strikes, and their laborers, without 


74 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


any organization, have risen up en masse. In fact, you may 
remember, Italy has just recovered from a very severe strike 
upon its railroads. 


§86 


The same thing is true wherever compulsory arbitration 
has been tried. It has been tried right here in the United 
States. The State of Maine has attempted to prohibit strik- 
ing in industries which are public utilities. It is a very dras- 
tic law. The law was passed in 1912. In 1913, a year after its 
adoption, a very severe strike broke out upon the Bangor & 
Aroostook Railroad, in which the men were out for about 
three weeks. That shows how effective legislation for pre- 
venting strikes is. If men think they have a grievance, no 
matter whether they have it or not, if they believe they have 
that grievance, they are going to take whatever means they 
consider right to enforce their demands. They are going to 
strike if they feel they have a grievance justifying it; and 
nothing that the gentlemen of the Affirmative have said has 
disproved that statement. These men will strike, and no 
government can prevent them from doing so. 

Let us see what would be the far-reaching consequences 
if there should be a great strike upon our railroads. The 
New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad is right close 
at hand. It has about fifty thousand employees. Suppose 
those fifty thousand men, and they are all more or less 
closely affiliated, should go out on a strike. Would not that 
mean chaos? Would not that mean the tying up of the en- 
tire business of New England? That is what would happen 
under compulsory arbitration if an attempt were to be made 
to force men to work under conditions not acceptable 
to them. It would take an army of 250,000 men, at the very 
least, to make those men work against their will. 


§87 


Now, these difficulties are not present under voluntary 
arbitration. The biggest proof of that is that voluntary ar- 


WILLIAMS VERSUS BROWN 75 


bitration has been successful, the fact that there have been 
no strikes under it since the Erdman Act was passed in 1808. 
The gentleman tells us strikes are upon the increase. Strikes 
are not upon the increase. Disputes that are handled by the 
Erdman Act are, because as soon as a dispute now arises 
the very first step that is taken by the employers and em- 
ployees is to get in touch with the Commissioner of Media- 
tion at Washington and secure the appointment of an arbi- 
tration board. As my colleague pointed out, no less than sixty 
strikes have been averted recently because the Erdman 
measure has been invoked, and no less than 163,000 men 
have been prevented from striking. The gentlemen should 
at least show some need for the adoption of their scheme; 
_there isn’t any; we are enjoying industrial peace; there have 
been no great strikes upon our railroads since the Chicago 
strike of 1894, none since 1898 when the Erdman Act went 
into effect. That is the biggest proof that can be adduced in 
support of the contention that there is no need for changing 
existing legislation, that the Erdman Act is successful. 


§88 


In conclusion, the Negative have pointed out to you 
that compulsory arbitration would in itself pave the way 
for widespread industrial war, with all its destruction and 
practices of sabotage upon our-railroads. We have gone on 
to show you that compulsory arbitration is practically non- 
enforcible unless the workers will give it their hearty co- 
operation. Why should we burden ourselves with a system 
that is proving iniquitous, and from which we would soon 
seek to be rid? The principal fact of the matter is that 
there is no need for compulsory arbitration; its impotency 
has been demonstrated. We have at the present time effi- 
cient legislation. Why should we change it? Compulsory arbi- 
tration is unjust; it paves the way for greater industrial 
strife; and there is no need for its adoption. Why should we 
take it? Why should we turn industrial peace, now existing 
in the United States, into industrial war? 


76 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


THIRD AFFIRMATIVE REBUTTAL 
Walter Mills Hinkle, Williams 
§89 


Allow me to point out that the failure of compulsory arbi- 
tration, which has been so vividly portrayed by the Negative 
tonight, is,a failure which has extended over every form 
and type of industry in that one country in which it has 
been tried, Australasia. As the Affirmative has already 
stated, we do not believe that compulsory arbitration can be 
extended over every form of industry, because the only 
sound basis, economically, for the operation of industries 
of the ordinary kind, is, to allow the sound economic laws 
to work themselves out as they will through the opera- 
tion of free contract as we have it in private property and 
private ownership. But with respect to railways, the in- 
terest of the public is so supreme that some means must be 
given to the government legally to step in when a strike 
occurs, and tell the disputants that for the sake of the pub- 
lic welfare they shall not strike. That means is what we 
wish to provide only in this one case of interstate rail- 
ways. 


§90 


In reference to the strikes of 1877, 1886 and 1894, of 
course they broke out before the introduction of the Erd- 
man Voluntary Arbitration Act; and we will further admit, 
because we cannot deny, that there has been no strike since 
the introduction of that act. But because we have had in- 
dustrial peace in the past, is that any reason why we shall 
have it in the future for all time? 

Allow me to refer once more to the strike 68 Great 
Britain in 1911, which tied up every single railway except 
one, the Southwestern Railway of Great Britain, a strike 
which occurred in spite of the best voluntary arbitration 
law ever existing in any country, and a strike which oc- 


WILLIAMS VERSUS BROWN 77 


curred, mind you, after fifty years of industrial peace with- 
out one strike. Because we have not had those strikes 
in the past twenty-four years is no reason why we shall 
have no strike in the future. The very fact that disputes 
are increasing all over the world, owing to the hard strug- 
gle that is going on, shows that the government should 
take some means when it now has the opportunity to step 
in and prevent strikes in such an important industry as 
railways. 
S91 

Furthermore, the Negative has maintained that we should 
prescribe some definite means for preventing strikes. We 
are not here as legislators and law-makers; and it is not for 
us to show some definite means whereby it can be done. We 
are arguing upon a principle. But let me show the difference 
between compulsion under the law, the mere making legal 
of the efforts of the government, and compulsion as it is 
exerted by economic pressure. We have mentioned the 
strikes of 1894, 1886 and 1877, because they show to a re- 
markable degree what will happen to employees on railways 
if they strike, the absolute necessity of keeping the railways 
‘in operation, and the results of an attempt to stop their 
operation. In those cases, after violence, destruction of 
property and death of individuals had afforded a pretext, 
the government stepped in with a mere handful of troops, 
the very procedure under the government being enough, 
and the strikers were whipped and beaten. This was un- 
fortunate for them and unfortunate for the public, because 
in both of those cases voluntary arbitration was not put 
into practice; and the trouble would have been averted had 
arbitration been compulsory. In the Pullman strike of 1804 
they attempted to secure voluntary arbitration, but failed. 
What would my opponents say to this? Here are two kinds 
of compulsion, the compulsion of the government, which 
merely means the right of the government to interfere legal- 
ly, and that compulsion which says, “If you do not go back 


78 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


willingly, you will go back starving, having lost everything 
that you had, back into a position worse than that which you 
left.” 

Let me show what the legal means, or the power of the 
government to step in, means. It means that if a strike 
should break out, the government can immediately concen- 
trate every power at its command; it means that the gov- 
ernment, the agent of the people who wish to see that their 
railroads will be kept in operation, can step in with every 
legal means at its command and prevent a strike, or break 
a strike immediately, and guarantee that there will be opera- 
tion of the railways. Again, before a strike can break out, 
when it is merely threatened, the very fact that the gov- 
ernment can step in, the very fact that every means at its 
command can be used right away and concentrated at the 
point of greatest danger, will be the greatest preventive 
in the world for averting a strike. 


§92 


It has been argued that if compulsory arbitration is en- 
forced, we will have inefficient service. Were railway wrecks 
increased by the breaking of the strikes that we have men- 
tioned in America? I think not. I think that the railway 
wrecks that happened after 1894 were not due to inefficiency 
of service, but due to the fact that strikers were compelled 
to go back not by law, but merely through pressure brought 
by unfeeling employers. 


$93 


Here, then, lies the difference between compulsory arbi- 
tration in railway disputes and voluntary arbitration. Un- 
der voluntary arbitration, the right to strike is guaranteed 
to the workers, the right of an irresponsible body of men 
to jeopardize the public welfare, and see to it that the whole 
nation shall suffer merely that they may get the rights which 
they think are their due. Under compulsory arbitration, it 
means merely that the government shall have the legal 


WILLIAMS VERSUS BROWN 79 


means to step in and see that the railroad shall be kept in 
operation, that the railways which form so vital a part of 
the community shall not be stopped. Compare for a mo- 
ment what the railway system means to the body politic 
with what the artery system means to the human body. 
If the artery system is cut off, it means that death comes 
to the body through inability of the body to secure that 
nutriment which is necessary for its life. If the railways 
are stopped by a strike, it means that the whole people are 
deprived of food, shelter, clothing, everything that is brought 
to the public, and they must starve, and that death and 
disaster will come upon the public. Here, then, is the ques- 
tion: Which is the greater, the instinct of the public to 
live or the mere right of a certain small section of em- 
ployees to strike? 


4 ¢ ee ; 
UEP. OR Pate ‘PRaS, = 


PART II 
BROWN VERSUS DARTMOUTH 


Won By DARTMOUTH 


Resolved: That the Federal government should require 
compulsory arbitration of labor disputes on interstate rail- 
roads. 


First AFFIRMATIVE 
Samuel Henry Workman, Brown 
§94. Problem of Railroad Labor Disputes Is Vital 


Of the big transportation problems confronting the na- 
tion today, not one more vitally concerns its economic wel- 
fare than the problem of railroad labor disputes, that is, 
the problem of so regulating the activities of railroad em- 
ployees as to prevent strikes, for labor disputes on interstate 
railroads have assumed a prominence and a magnitude never 
dreamed of hitherto. Within the last few years there have 
been a number of disputes in every one of which a strike 
. vote had been taken, and in every one of which a strike would 
have paralyzed industry and brought hunger and misery 
to millions of people. 


England and France have been less fortunate. In England 
recently 220,000 railroad employees went out on strike, and 
threw the entire island into the throes of a terrible panic. 
In France, but a short time ago, a general strike of railroad 
employees was so dire in its results that martial law was 
declared, and the railroad employees were forced to re- 
sume work at the point of the bayonet. At any moment this 
country may be plunged into the chaos and disaster of a 
similar strike, for Congress has passed no legislation pow- 
erful enough to avert such a situation. 


82 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


§95. Railroad Service Necessary to Public Welfare 


We cannot overestimate the seriousness of a railroad 
strike. We all know that the railroad industry differs ma- 
terially from any other of our industries. The railroads are 
virtually engaged in public service, for upon them today we 
are dependent for the very necessaries of life. We look to 
them for our daily food supply, our fuel, our passenger, mail 
and freight service. For a factory to close for a week is of 
little consequence to the community; the work of innumer- 
able other factories goes on just the same. This is true of 
all industries which do not perform public functions. But 
for a railroad to pause in its operations means paralysis to 
the communities which it serves. Only recently New York 
was threatened with a milk and food famine because a 
snowstorm had brought transportation to a standstill for a 
few hours. Picture to yourselves, then, if you can, the suffer- 
ing that the stoppage of train service for a month would have 
caused! The vital transportation problem, then, is to deter- 
mine how to ensure the public against even a temporary ces- 
sation of railroad service. The interests of the public de- 
mand that railroad strikes be prevented at any cost. The 
necessity for such action has long been recognized by our 
government. 


§96. Present Legislation Is Inadequate 


Sixteen years ago Congress passed the Erdman Act, the 
object of which was to prevent strikes on interstate railroads, 
and in 1913, with a view to making the act more effective, the 
Newlands amendment was passed. Briefly, this act is as 
follows: it provides for a board that tries to effect a recon- 
ciliation between the parties to a dispute whenever they both 
voluntarily agree to use the act. If this process, known as 
mediation, fails, they may voluntarily resort to a board, 
called a board of arbitration, which considers the dispute 
and gives out a decision that is not binding upon the parties. 

Now we do not quarrel with the intention of the govern- 
ment in passing this measure. Indeed we feel that it was 


BROWN VERSUS DARTMOUTH 83 


a step in the right direction; but our position is that the 
Erdman Act has failed to accomplish its fundamental pur- 
pose. This purpose was to prevent strikes in interstate rail- 
roads. Well, railroad history in the past fifteen years has 
conclusively shown that this result has not been obtained. 

To begin with, the United States Bureau of Labor tells 
us that the Erdman Act has been referred to in sixty disputes 
but we find that seven of these disputes ended in strikes. 
In each of seven other disputes, after one party had applied 
for use of the act, the other party refused to do likewise, and 
the act was helpless. In four disputes the parties, after 
applying, withdrew, agreeing to recommendations made by 
mediators in previous disputes. One case of arbitration and 
two cases of mediation failed entirely. Thus, only thirty-nine 
of the sixty disputes were settled in fifteen years, or about 
two and a half per cent. In the meanwhile, the country 
was not free from railroad strikes. For example, in 1901 
there were 26, in 1902, 22, in 1903, 25. In all, between 200 
and 220 strikes took place, while the Erdman Act was settling 
only thirty-nine disputes, or, in other words, the actual 
strikes outnumbered the impending strikes five to one. The 
country, therefore, was not only burdened with this multiplic- 
ity of strikes, but in many cases suffered greatly from their 
serious consequences. 


897. Strikes Which Have Occurred 


Among the more important strikes may be mentioned the 
following: 

The Chicago switchmen’s strike, 1909, resulted in com- 
plete stoppage of business in St. Paul, St. Cloud, and Du- 
luth. 

In Minneapolis, at the end of a three-day strike twenty- 
two out of twenty-three flour mills were closed. Commis- 
sioner of Labor Neill, as mediator, attempted to prevent 
the dispute, but admitted in his report that the Erdman Act 
failed entirely, and this strike proved extremely disastrous 
to railroads, employees and public alike. 


84 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


Three Georgia Central firemen’s strikes, involving many 
race riots, completely tied up traffic for ten, twelve, and 
fourteen days respectively, and paralyzed industry in many 
sections of Georgia and Florida. 

The great Harriman System strike of I91I, involving 
almost 16,000 employees, and lasting thirteen months, meh- 
aced the welfare of 20,000,000 people served by this system. 
For forty-one days no freight could leave Memphis or New 
Orleans. Seventy-two extra police were called out in Chi- 
cago to preserve peace; in Mississippi the National Guard 
was called out. There were twelve killed and wounded in the 
several riots that took place. 

The Chicago freight handlers’ strike, involving almost 
6,000 employees, lasting five months, completely tied up busi- 
ness in Chicago for two weeks. 

A freight handlers’ strike in New York City lasted only 
three days, yet the government was compelled to condemn 
278,000 barrels of perishable food stuffs. 

The New York, Susquehanna & Western, Baltimore & 
Ohio, Illinois Pacific, Missouri Pacific, Bangor & Aroostook, 
Vermont Central, and numerous other strikes, all resulted 
in complete tie-up of traffic, with the accompanying loss 
and damage in the territory involved. 

What, then, are we to conclude from these statistics? With 
but thirty-nine cases handled by the Erdman Act in fifteen 
years, and with at the same time over two hundred strikes 
being fought out at the expense of the public, tying up our 
mills, interfering with thousands of industries, holding up 
our fuel and food stuffs, with, ina word, the actual strikes out- 
numbering the settled impending strikes five to one, we are 
forced to conclude that, despite the Erdman Act, the country 
has not been free from railroad strikes, and is liable to suffer 
from them in the future. | 


§08. Compulsory Arbitration, the Remedy 


We of the Affirmative, therefore, contend that the enact- 
ment of the most effective legislation possible for the pre- 


BROWN VERSUS DARTMOUTH 85 


vention of railroad strikes has become absolutely neces- 
sary. We propose a system of compulsory arbitration. We 
propose that there should be a board similar to the Inter- 
state Commerce Commission, and with similar powers, that 
a -decision of this board should be binding upon the parties 
to a dispute, and that violation of a decision should be punish- 
able by penalties. 

Compulsory arbitration is the next logical and necessary 
step in the legal regulation of our railroads. Twenty-five 
years ago the practices of the railroad corporations became 
so detrimental to the public welfare that the government was 
compelled to create an interstate commerce commission, but 
this commission, without any power to enforce its decisions, 
was helpless, and the railroads continued to abuse their 
unrestrained power, to grant rebates, to discriminate and 
to charge unjust rates. In 1906 the passage of the Hepburn 
Bill gave the Interstate Commerce Commission full powers 
to enforce its decisions; since that time we all know that the 
government has effectively regulated the a‘tivities of the 
railroad corporations. - 

Sixteen years ago, to prevent railroad strikes, Congress 
passed the Erdman Act. But this act, as we have seen, 
without any power to compel the parties to a dispute to arbi- 
trate and to accept a decision, has failed to prevent strikes. 
Consequently it has become necessary for the government 
to create a board like the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
and with similar powers of enforcement, to regulate the 
activities of railroad labor. Without sufficient powers this 
board will be helpless; with sufficient powers it will be in a 
position to bring the railroad brotherhoods to such a sense 
of duty and responsibility as the Interstate Commerce Com- 
mission has brought the railroad corporations to realize. 
It is only in this way, ladies and gentlemen, that we of the 
Affirmative believe the Federal government can protect the 
public from the serious consequences of strikes on the inter- 
state railroads. 


86 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


SECOND AFFIRMATIVE 


James Vincent Giblin, Brown 


S99. The Number of Strikes Again 


The speaker preceding me tells you that the Bulletin of 
Labor says there have been but seven strikes in the United 
States since 1906. These are given on page 44. But the de- 
fect in this argument is that these strikes included there are 
only the ones in which the Erdman Act was invoked. We 
have a list of 42 from 1906 to 1913 in which the Erdman Act 
was never even consulted, and the Railway Gazette shows at 
least twenty that involved 130 men, and at least twenty that 
_lasted for a week. 


§100. Compulsory Arbitration Is Necessary 


We say that there is grave necessity for introducing some 
change. If we consider a little further the conditions under 
which railroad strikes took place we shall see that such a 
change towards compulsory arbitration is the necessary solu- 
tion. According to the statement of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, railroad labor today is considered to be about 
the best paid in the United States. Despite this, railroad em- 
ployees everywhere are making unjust demands for increases 
of wages. On the New York & Susquehanna they asked for 
an increase of 25 per cent; on the Harriman System, 36 per 
cent; conductors on the Eastern railroads asked for 35 per 
cent; Chicago, 45 per cent; in the recent trainmen’s dispute 
50 per cent was asked for. It being an understood fact that 
railroad employees are making these unjust demands, strikes 
have resulted, as for example, that on the Harriman lines, 
on the Illinois Central, the Chicago and New York freight 
handlers’ strikes, and numerous others. In some cases the 
railroads have granted these unjust demands to the em- 
ployees, as on the Chicago, the Erie, and the great Eastern 
lines in the conductors’ and trainmen’s dispute of IgIOo. 
What, you ask, is the cause of this, and what the remedy? 


BROWN VERSUS DARTMOUTH 87 


The cause lies in the powerful and unchecked railroad 
brotherhoods, whose numbers extend into tens of thousands, 
and which in the last two or three years have become in- 
tolerable because they have united in the so-called “con- 
certed movement.” The employees make large demands on 
the railroad; the railroad, unable to grant these demands, re- 
fuses; the chief of the railroad brotherhoods goes to the 
men, obtains a strike vote, and announces it to the railroad; 
thousands of men leave work; the railroad realises its re- 
sponsibility to the public and the Interstate Commerce Com- 
mission, and is. unable to contemplate the stoppage of serv- 
ice, and grants the demands at last, with the result that many 
of our railroads today are facing financial stringency, be- 
cause they have not sufficient funds to meet these demands 
that. have been made upon them. 


§1o1. Labor Chiefs Have Dictatorial Power 


But a more serious. thing even than this is to be con- 
sidered. Chief Stone asked the railroads to give his men an 
increase of 17.7 per cent. This would have caused many 
roads to go into bankruptcy. When the railroads refused, 
93 per cent of the laborers voted for a strike, and left the 
carrying out of the order in the hands of Chief Stone. Here 
is a situation then where thirty millions of people depended 
on this one man’s sense of responsibility. No sooner had 
he this power than he approached the railroads of the East 
and said, “Grant this demand, or not’a wheel turns east of 
Chicago; next week New York will not have a pound of food; 
in seven days no industry will be in action; and the Eastern 
cities will be on a starvation basis.” The whole agitation 
arose, not from the desires of the engineers, but from the 
leaders. The agitation started at the top, not at the bottom. 
Counsel for the New Haven road said of Stone that he was 
“a feudal baron whose men follow him blindly.” Stone him- 
self replied, ““The door of every office is open to me because 
there are 72,000 who do follow me blindly.” Not long ago 
he said to the vice-president ofthe Erie railway, “Why are 


88 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


you railroad managers granting increase of millions of dollars 
if you cannot afford it, as you say you cannot?” The reply 
was, “We have to; the men threaten us with strikes; we are 
facing a crisis.” “Then the way for me to get a raise for 
my men is to create another crisis; and if I do not win I 
will teach the public a lesson.” 

Here is a serious situation. The fate of the railroads and 
of the public is in the hands of an irresponsible and unrea- 
soning dictator. Nor is he the only one. Garrison and 
Lee, chiefs of the Orders of Conductors and Trainmen, said, 
if certain demands were not granted they would render New 
York and the East helpless in two days. The chief of the 
Firemen said, “It is not the public’s business what we are 
doing with the railroads.” So great is the power of the 
brotherhood chiefs that not once have their wishes been 
rejected. No wonder the Erdman Act has. been a failure. 
A Western railroad president said, “We may as well face 
fifty per cent loss under the Act as 100 per cent under such 
strikes”; and another said, “We refuse to increase wages be- 
cause they are unjust and the public are unable to bear the 
burden and cannot pay.” No wonder the arbitration board, 
having made decision according to what seemed expediency 
and not sound principles, said that a compulsory wage com- 
mission, working with the Interstate Commerce Commission 
was the only just method. 


§102 


To meet the power of these brotherhoods requires an equal 
power. Today, through making these demands, they are 
causing strikes, getting large increase, and placing the pub- 
lic in a precarious position. The great power they have does 
not belong with them but with the United States govern- 
ment, to protect its people. Do we want that power in the 
hands of the United States government? Do we want to 
establish another commission like the Interstate Commerce 
Commission that will give justice and protection and equity 
to the public, the railroads, and the employees? Should one 
of these men today call a strike the entire country would 


BROWN VERSUS DARTMOUTH 890 


be thrown into a panic. They have issued their threats; 
we do not know what will come of it. Do we want the 
United States Government to step in and give us justice, or 
do we want to entrust the life, prosperity, the very existence, 
of 96,000,000 people, to these self-acknowledged irresponsible 
feudal barons of the railroad brotherhoods? 


THIRD AFFIRMATIVE 
James Joseph McGovern, Brown 
| §103 


We believe that if the trains stopped running up to Han- 
over for two or three weeks the last speaker would have 
a nightmare about getting something to eat! We have 
pointed out the indubitable fact that railroad strikes are a 
grave and growing menace to the country. We have pointed 
out several serious strikes in the last ten years which have 
shown that the railroad brotherhoods are exercising powers 
which. are incompatible with freedom, and that from these 
conditions arises the question: “Is compulsory arbitration 
better than voluntary arbitration in actual results?” We 
have no panacea to offer, but we do propose a system that 
will give justice for the three parties concerned, and be 
more effective than voluntary .arbitration. 


§104. Justice not Obtained by Voluntary Arbitration 


You cannot get justice under voluntary arbitration, be- 
cause boards are partisan, temporary, and inexperienced, be- 
cause the inexperienced arbitrators are chosen by the two 
parties and are naturally prejudiced, and because these in- 
experienced and prejudiced men are frequently able to de- 
vote only part of their time to these matters. Such voluntary 
boards, temporary, and lacking the valuable asset of experi- 
ence, are conscious that their decisions carry no weight, 
and the most capable men will not offer their services. They 
realise that if they were to give just decisions the brother- 
hoods would make complaint because they did not get more 


90 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


than justice, and naturally they have no desire to suffer the 
invective of these organizations, knowing at the same time 
that they could not otherwise maintain their own honor. 
Whether in England or in Canada or in the United States, 
this condition obtains. We contend that it is impossible for 
justice to issue from these tribunals, and shall show that 
justice has not resulted. 

But under compulsory arbitration there will be men chosen 
by the government, men who are experts in railroad affairs, 
who will be paid a reasonable salary for devoting the whole 
of their services to arbitration. In this way a commission 
will be set up like the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
From 1897 to 1906 the personnel of that Commission became 
steadily worse, because its powers were merely recommenda- 
tory, and its decisions carried no weight. When, by the Hep- 
burn Act of 1906, power was given to enforce the awards, the 
personnel improved, the railroads ceased to scoff and scorn, 
and the Commission is now one of the most respected bodies 
in the country. 

The need for a permanent board of arbitration is equally 

urgent. We intend to give our Commission the same ex- 
pert aid that the Interstate Commerce Commission has. De- 
cisions determined by this just and thorough method would 
‘not be questioned in the great majority of cases, would 
be accepted willingly and in good faith, for law is voluntary 
for the majority and compulsory only for the lawbreaker, 
and why in the name of reason would employees desire to 
reject such a proposition? Is there anything more reason- 
able to be offered them? 


§105. Compulsory Arbitration Arouses Public Opinion 


But compulsory arbitration means not only justice to the 
three parties, but also that there will be fewer strikes be- 
cause of stronger public opinion. You cannot interest the 
public with voluntary courts. But when they realize that 
the government is doing something and is interested in the 
acceptance of the awards, they begin to take over that in- 


BROWN VERSUS DARTMOUTH gl 


terest themselves. They see that it means something, that 
it is a just decree given by an impartial board, and they be- 
lieve in it and accept it. How many people here ever heard 
of the Erdman or the Hepburn Act? Perhaps you have 
heard the names, but how many people pay any attention 
to what one of the shifting boards decides? Whereas, while 
under voluntary arbitration there is not even a strong pub- 
lic opinion, under compulsory arbitration we have added to 
a powerful opinion supported by the strength of the govern- 
ment, the threat of a penalty if the decision is disregarded 
and a strike declared. It is this that we desire. 


§106. Attack Funds if Strike is Declared 


What penalty do we propose? We are not going to fine 
the individual striker, or throw him or his leaders into jail. 
We are going to strike at the arbitrary power of the brother- 
hood leaders by seizing the funds, a fixed amount for every 
employee out on a strike. It is the leaders that agitate for 
strikes, who determine whether a strike shall take place or 
not. It is they whom we shall hold responsible. The brother- 
hoods are collossal financial organizations. The I9Io report 
of Workmen’s Insurance by the Department of Labor shows 
that they have underwritten over half a billion of insurance, 
have enormous sums of money invested, and reserve funds 
of millions of dollars. Do you suppose the employee is 
going to reject a just decision and place these funds in jeop- 
ardy for nothing? All we ask is this: Does not our system 
rest on justice while yours rests on injustice? Have we 
not public opinion plus a threat to rely on, while you have 
nothing? In Austria, Germany, Italy, Holland, Belgium, 
Switzerland, Russia, Roumania, Denmark, and New Zealand, 
where railroad strikes are prohibited and disputes settled by 
commission, there have been no strikes, according to the re- 
port of the British Board of Trade, up to 1913. In England, 
France, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, the Transvaal, Canada, and 
the United States, there have been numerous serious strikes 
during the last ten years. 


92 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


§107 


In conclusion, railroad strikes must be prohibited. 
The Erdman Act is neither yielding justice nor preventing 
serious strikes; the arbitrary power of the brotherhood 
leaders must be checked. Compulsory arbitration does 
present a practicable plan, and we claim that the Federal 
government should establish sea) arbitration on in- 
terstate railroads. 


First NEGATIVE 


Leonard Dupee White, Dartmouth 
§108. Number of Strikes since 1906, 7 not 220 


I was asked this morning if there were to be moving . 
pictures this evening, and I replied that there would’ not, 
but I see I was mistaken. We have just had presented to 
us a most moving picture of the disaster that would fol- 
low a general railroad strike. I was moved, and I think 
you must have been. But let us stop for a moment, and think. 
Why should we be moved? Why should we be excited? 
Why should we be alarmed? Let us consider. 

The gentlemen of the Affirmative have told us that there 
have been 220 strikes in the last ten or fifteen years. They 
have told us that we are called upon to add compulsion to 
arbitration in order to prevent the urgent and immediate 
possibility of a general railroad strike. We want to ask 
these gentlemen about these 220 strikes. We have not 
found record of them. We want to know how many men 
were included in these strikes, how long they lasted, how 
great a territory they covered. The Bureau of Labor has 
recorded precisely seven strikes since 1906, precisely seven 
strikes. Let me say a word about these strikes. The first 
occurred on the Colorado & Southern, and involved 200 
men, and lasted one day. That is.a serious strike. The sec- 
ond was on the Huntington & Broad Top Mt. R. R., in- 
volving 95 men—truly a serious situation. The third centered 


BROWN VERSUS DARTMOUTH 93 


in the single city of St. Paul. The fourth on the Central 
Vermont, involving 180 men, a Canadian road running into 
the States. The fifth, on the Gulf and Ship Island R. R., 
involved fifty telegraphers. The sixth lasted, on one division 
of the Southern Pacific, four days. And the seventh, on the 
Delaware & Hudson, lasted for sixteen hours. There is 
every shred of evidence about the strikes that have occurred 
that can be extracted from the Bulletin of the Bureau of 
Labor. And, because fifty men ten years ago, or a hundred 
and fifty men five years ago, because twelve men out of 
every ten thousand strike every year for a period of from a 
week down to sixteen hours, we are to understand that we 
are facing the urgent necessity of compulsory arbitration to 
prevent a general strike! The information I have given you 
comes from the United States Bulletin of Labor, and we 
would like to know where the information comes from in 
regard to the 220 odd strikes. 


§109. An Analysis 


Let us look a little more closely at the proposition for 
debate tonight. We have a method of arbitration now that 
has been approved by the railroads, unanimously endorsed 
by the labor unions, passed by Congress, approved by the 
National Civic Federation, by judge Knapp, and by Charles 
P. Neill. Now the proposition is to make a change in this 
law, to add compulsion to arbitration. It seems to us of the 
Negative that the only justification for that would be that 
there should exist somewhere serious opposition to settle- 
ment by voluntary arbitration or mediation. But such op- 
position does not exist. We are getting satisfactory and just 
settlements now, and as far as we can see we shall continue 
*to get them. We of the Negative do not believe there is any 
danger of a general strike; we question whether New York 
City will ever be tied up and its food and milk supply cut off. 

Further, if it were granted that compulsion was neces- 
sary, the contention of the Negative is that you could not 
enforce it, and that even if there was some method by which 
you could do so, the sum total of the resulting condition 


04 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


would be worse than that now existing. If it becomes evi- 
dent in debate that we are now settling disputes and avoid- 
ing strikes it becomes evident that there is no necessity for 
adding compulsion to arbitration. 


§110. Present Methods Are Successful 


Strikes are of two kinds: large concerted movements in- 
volving great areas and large masses of men; and what may 
be classed as minor or incidental strikes. 

There have been six concerted movements. The first 
occurred. in 1907 and involved 42,500 men, and was settled 
by mediation. The second was on the same railroad, in- 
volved 26,000 men, and was settled by voluntary arbitration. 
The third, on the same railroad, a strike of the railroad engi- 
neers, was settled by voluntary arbitration. The strike of 
the engineers on the Eastern railroads was settled by arbitra- 
tion. The strike of the trainmen was settled by mediation. 
The strike of trainmen and conductors was settled by media- 
tion and voluntary arbitration. If the present methods are 
no longer adequate, how is it that every single concerted 
movement has been successfully handled in this way? 

Then there are the incidental disputes. There are sixty 
cases reported. Precisely seven of these come to the point 
of actual strike, the others being settled either by arbitration 
or by mediation or by the efforts of the parties themselves. 
The tremendous significance of that list of settlements can- 
not be overestimated. Every singe concerted movement, the 
most difficult of all kinds of disputes, has been settled with- 
out recourse to compulsion and without strike. The minor 
strikes, the incidental strikes, according to the Bulletin of 
Labor, have in ten years been only seven. In every singles 
case of agreement reached by mediation and voluntary arbi- 
tration the agreement has been kept; there have been no in- 
stances of violation. Why, why, why? Because an agree- 
ment reached by mediation and voluntary arbitration is made 
by the good will and good faith of both parties. Both parties 
have a hand in making the agreement and take part in mak- 


BROWN VERSUS DARTMOUTH 95 


ing the award, and both agree on their own good honor to 
keep it. 

But what is the situation under compulsory arbitra- 
tion? A third party settles the dispute and thrusts down the 
unwilling throats of labor and capital a decision that may 
be displeasing to both. You cannot enforce the decision 
unless you have good faith and good will behind, and you 
cannot get faith and good will by forcing the unwelcome 
award down the throats of the men and of the railroads. 


SECOND NEGATIVE 


Frederick Pitkin Cranston, Dartmouth 


S111. Bulletin 98 on the Number of Strikes 


There is one thing that has to be settled before this debate 
can go any further, and that is, whether there have been two 
hundred strikes or seven. We quote from the Bulletin of 
the Bureau of Labor: “Since 1906 there has been no case of 
a serious strike, or of danger of a strike, on the part of those 
classes of employees to whom this law is made applicable in 
which the provisions of this law have not been invoked.” The 
cases in which they have been invoked have been seven. 
Therefore only seven strikes have occurred. We would 
like to ask the gentlemen of the Affirmative how many of 
the disputes cited were on interstate railroads, also whether 
they would carry their point so far as to involve government 
ownership? Would they place the railroads in the hands of 
the government or not? 

The Negative has shown that there is no necessity for 
the plan of compulsory arbitration because disputes have 
been settled and strikes avoided. But there is a further 
reason why there is no necessity for compulsion. 


§112. Increase of Wages Corresponds to Increase in Cost 
of Living 
In spite of the statement of the gentlemen of the Affirm- 
ative, the decisions handed down have been just. We would 
like to ask them to point out a single case where the award 


96 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


was unjust, and show us how it was unjust. We have every 
reason to believe that the decisions have been just. By 
the last decision handed down by an arbitration board the 
wages of employees were increased seven per cent. During 
the period between the time of the previous award and the 
handing down of this one, the increase in the cost of living 
was also seven per cent. If the cost of living is taken as a 
standard by which wages should be measured that decision 
was just, because the increase in wages corresponded to the 
increase in cost of living. From 1897 to I9I1I the increase in 
the cost of living, as figured by the Bureau of Labor, was 
43.9 per cent. During the same period the increase of 
wages was 40.4 per cent, almost exactly proportionate. Is 
it just that the wages of railroad employees should corre- 
spond to the increase in cost of living, or should they cor- 
respond to something else, and if so, what? We would like 
the gentlemen of the Affirmative to tell us the standard that 
should be used to measure the increase. If on account of 
increase of wages the public is to pay higher rates, it is 
only just it should do so, because the employees are entitled 
to a wage that will enable them to maintain a fair standard 
of living. 


§113. No Danger of General Strike 


There is a further reason why there is absolutely no 
danger of any general strike in the future. The gentlemen of 
the Affirmative have pictured a terrible situation; they have 
had a nightmare, and they have seen thousands starving for 
lack of food and fuel, industries at a standstill, and babies 
dying in the streets for want of milk. Fortunately for us 
their nightmare will never be realized, and there are several 
reasons for this. In the first place, the leaders of both sides, 
both the unions and the railroads, have expressed themselves 
as willing to arbitrate under voluntary arbitration. We do 
not need compulsion to make them arbitrate. Every railroad 
brotherhood has expressed itself in favor of the Newlands 
Act, which provides for voluntary arbitration, and the rail- 


BROWN VERSUS DARTMOUTH Q7 


roads have done the same. I have the statement of W. W. 
Atterbury, vice-president of the Pennsylvania Railroad: “I 
can say for the Pennsylvania Railroad that it will be very 
glad to submit the points at issue to a board constituted as 
outlined in accordance with this proposed act.” That ‘act 
is now the law governing mediation and arbitration, and as 
far as the Pennsylvania Railroad is concerned it will be 
willing voluntarily to submit all disputes. The stand of the 
Pennsylvania was backed up by the New York Central 
Lines, Union Pacific, Burlington, Chesapeake & Ohio, Mis- 
souri, Kansas & Texas, Atlanta & West Point, Western Rail- 
way of Alabama, and the Baltimore & Ohio. These rail- 
roads have expressed themselves willing to arbitrate under 
voluntary arbitration, and the unions are willing to arbitrate 
also. Where is the need for adding compulsion when they 
are willing to arbitrate voluntarily? 

Another reason why compulsory arbitration ‘is not neces- 
sary and why there is no danger of any serious strike in 
the future, is that the railroad men are already well paid, 
as the gentlemen of the Affirmative have themselves admitted. 
It takes poverty and oppression to bring on a serious strike, 
to drive men to desperation, and surely it is a desperate meas- 
ure to tie up all the railroads in the country. Not being 
poverty-stricken do you think they will risk everything to 
gain a few more dollars when they already receive plenty? 

There is a third reason, and that is that it would be 
suicidal for them to strike in a large body, because they 
would be the first to suffer. Suppose a strike called, New 
York City cut off from its food supply, and all the tragic 
occurrences pictured in the nightmare of the gentlemen. 
Food is short, prices are rising. Who will be the first to 
suffer from this? Will it not be those people who, because 
they are not earning, have not money to pay the increased 
prices? Will it not be the railroad employees themselves? 
With nothing coming in, they could least afford to pay high 
prices. Then, indeed, babies would starve for want of milk, 


98 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


and strong men would fall prostrate in the street because 
they could not get food. Is it likely they would be willing 
to commit suicide in this way? Would the gentlemen of the 
Affirmative commit suicide if they were in their place? We 
have too much respect for their intelligence to believe that 
they would, and we have too much respect for the intelli- 
gence of the railroad employees to believe that they would. 

Then there is a fourth reason. Mediation and voluntary 
arbitration have settled every kind of dispute that could 
arise. Mediation and voluntary arbitration have settled two 
disputes involving the race question in the South. When 
we consider that one phase of that issue brought civil war 
we can see what a delicate situation it is. Yet arbitration 
has settled a problem of that nature. Mediation and arbitra- 
tion have settled without strikes disputes involving a hun- 
dred thousand men. Mediation and voluntary arbitration 
have settled’ disputes in which one-half of the territorial 
area of the United States was involved, and we believe Shey, 
will settle such disputes in the future. 


§114. Summary 


We contend that compulsory arbitration is unnecessary 
because strikes have been avoided, there having been only 
seven of any significance in ten years. We contend that the 
decisions have been just because the increase of wages has 
corresponded with the increase in the cost of living. We 
contend that there is no danger of a serious strike because 
both sides are willing to arbitrate voluntarily. The men al- 
ready receive fair wages, and would be the first to suffer 
from a serious strike. And lastly, we say there is no neces- 
sity for compulsion because voluntary arbitration and medi- 
ation have already settled every possible kind of case that 
is likely to arise in the future. 


BROWN VERSUS DARTMOUTH 99 


THIRD NEGATIVE. 


Chester Bradley Jordan, Jr., Dartmouth 


§115. Inconsistencies 


Before I go on with this debate, I wish to ask the gentle- 
men of the Affirmative if there is not an inconsistency in 
their plan of attack. As I figure out their plan, the first two 
speakers said this was going to be a critical situation because 
the awards under the present system are unjust, that there- 
fore they are received by the railroads because prejudiced 
in their favor, and that when we get just awards the railroad 
men will take them because they are just, just as he took 
them before when they were unjust. As I understand the 
argument, they are willing to take them either way; with 
justice they take them, without justice they take them. 

Then there is the argument that the decisions of the 
board of voluntary arbitration are not very valuable because 
the members of such a board are likely to be men little known 
and insignificant. We are to presume that the better a man 
is known the better man he necessarily is. Well, there is a 
little minister in my town whom we all think a very good 
man and a wise man, but not many people know anything 
about him outside of his own town. Of course everybody 
knows all about Harry K. Thaw, so I suppose he must be 
a good deal better man than our minister. There seems to 
be some inconsistency! 

The first two speakers dealt with evidence which they 
based on the report of the United States Bureau of La- 
bor. If that Bureau does not consider a strike a strike, can 
these gentlemen quote a railroad paper or their own intelli- 
gence, and say it is a strike. 

The Negative have shown that settlements have been made 
in this country, and have been just. The gentlemen of the 
Affirmative say they have been unjust because of the methods 
used to reach the settlement being unjust. But the results 
have been just, and we have proved them to be satisfactory, 


100 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


and therefore we say that settlements which are just and 
satisfactory will continue to be made so far as we know. 


§116. Compulsory Arbitration Cannot Be Enforced 


Now I call on these gentlemen of the Affirmative, from 
the terrible position where they have babies dying in the 
street and rats dying in their holes and strong men expiring 
for lack of food, from the position where they say they must 
have compulsory arbitration because of the opposition to 
the awards of a voluntary arbitration board, to show what 
they are going to do after they have established compulsory 
arbitration. When you have established compulsory arbitra- 
tion, we contend that it will fail. It has failed in Canada in 
eleven cases in five years, and in New Zealand there are five 
cases where it has failed. And why? Simply because of 
the fact that you cannot put a hundred thousand back to 
work if they do not want to yo back to work. Either you 
can take each one of them severally and individually and 
put him down in his cab, and put his hand on the throttle, 
and say, “Run your engine with discretion and intelligence,” 
and have him do it, or you can fine him and put him in prison. 
It is obvious that the first is preposterous, so they say they 
will collect the fines from the brotherhoods. Are these 
men going to pay fines willingly, these leaders of the brother- 
hoods? What is to prevent the unions from taking the usual 
recourse and becoming benevolent organizations, and shift- 
ing their funds? Then, you say, you will imprison the lead- 
ers. Does that help your strike? What happened when they 
imprisoned the labor leaders in Lawrence? The fury rose to 
frenzy, and the strike was ten times as serious as before. 
You would have to imprison every one of the hundred thou- 
sand engineers. Very good. Then your punishment has 
been awarded, and you sit back and think it is all over, till 
you look out and see an engine standing still in the yard, 
and realize that every engineer is in prison and your engines 
cannot run; and suppose you do eventually enforce your 
measure, meanwhile you are going to have just as much dis- 


BROWN VERSUS DARTMOUTH IOI 


aster and distress as if a strike had occurred. Gentlemen of 
the Affirmative, do you want such a situation as that? 

Go a little further in this realm of dreamland. Suppose 
you persuade the men to go back to their work. You realize 
that when an arbitration board hands down its award it is to 
be for a certain length of time. During that time there is 
not a man that can leave the service without giving one 
month’s notice. But what is to prevent every single engineer 
from handing in his resignation, and at the end of the month 
stepping down from his cab and leaving his engine standing 
idle, with a practically legal strike in effect and the whole 
railroad system tied up? 

So the situation is this: you have compulsory arbitration, 
you cannot enforce the awards, and if you could you would 
then get a strike. And we will show that the very attempt 
to enforce it would be suicidal for the government. Thrust 
an unsatisfactory award down the throats of a hundred thous- 
and men, or five hundred thousand men, and what would 
be the result?. Remember the power they have. Think 
what a unit they form, those hundred or five hundred 
thousand labor employees, citizens of this country, the 
great strength of these organizations with all their ramifica- 
tions, think what the results would be if that great body 
of men were at sword’s points with the government, think 
what sort of law protection you would have, what sort of 
stability the government would have. What would industrial 
safety mean with five hundred thousand dissatisfied men 
running the trains? What would social salvation mean when 
five hundred thousand laborers were at war with capital and 
the gulf widening every day? Can these gentlemen calmly 
advocate the bringing in of such an era? They do not 
realize what they are doing, or they would not do it. 


S117 


But these are dreams and nightmares. Let us turn to 
actualities. We have proved that under the present system 
settlements have been made, that they have been just, and 


102 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


that they have been satisfactory. We have predicted that 
these settlements will continue to be made, that they will 
continue to be just, and that they will continue to be satis- 
factory; therefore there is no need for change. | Further- 
more, we have shown that, even under the most imaginative 
conditions that the Affirmative have offered us, if there ever 
came a need for the use of compulsory arbitration it would 
be of no avail because it could not be enforced, for it would 
not be possiblé to put a body of men back to work by any 
of the methods that the gentlemen of the Affirmative wish 
to employ, by fine, or by imprisonment. We have proved 
that if they, by any means, known or unknown to man, could 
do this, the result would be an industrial tie-up the same 
as a strike, and in the end the very attempt would bring 
about some of the most serious evils this country has ever 
seen. So we of the Negative contend that a policy of com- 
pulsory arbitration is not needed, and that such a policy is 
a thoroughly bad and impracticable one. 


First NEGATIVE REBUTTAL 


Leonard Dupee White, Dartmouth 
$118 


The discussion has come to this point. Now let us re- 
view. Where do we stand? What are the issues? On what 
must the conclusion be based? We find there are precisely 
two points made by the Affirmative, and from these the 
Negative differs. First: Is there necessity for change? 
Second: If there is necessity for change, can the solution 
which the gentlemen of the Affirmative propose be enforced? 
Is there need for change? Can you enforce compulsory ar- 
bitration? 

In my rebuttal I will consider whether or not there is 
need for compulsory arbitration. The Affirmative tells us 
we must have it because some 200 strikes have occurred in 
fifteen years. We have asked about these strikes, but we 


BROWN VERSUS DARTMOUTH 103 


did not get a very satisfactory reply. We did not find out 
how many men were involved. They made vague statements 
about ten here and fifteen there, and so on, perhaps three 
hundred altogether. Serious? But we want to know more 
about them. The official report says nothing about them, 
and we base our evidence on the official report which states 
that from 1906 until today there have been seven strikes. 
Remember what I said about them. The Colorado & South- 
ern involved 200 men; the Huntington & Broad Top Mt. R R. 
involved 95 men; one strike centered in the single city of 
St. Paul; the Central Vermont involved 180; the Gulf, & Ship 
Island, 50 men. There was a strike of the Southern Pacific 
which lasted four days; another on the Delaware & Hudson 
lasted sixteen hours. Have we a reason here for compulsory 
arbitration? What do you think about it? It seems to me 
that is very narrow ground. 


S119 


Look on the other side of the ledger; see what has been 
done by voluntary arbitration. Six concerted movements in- 
volved 42,000 men, 26,000 men, 100,000 men, etc., all suc- 
cessfully handled by voluntary arbitration or mediation. 
If there were only these six cases of dispute of this nature 
to be set off against the seven strikes that actually occurred. 
what would be your conclusion? Would you conclude that 
we must add compulsion to arbitration? If voluntary arbi- 
tration and mediation have broken down, how is it that 
we find these six great cases successfully handled? How 
do we find only seven cases of strike in the official record, 
and those absolutely trifling in their nature? We believe 
there is no need to add compulsion to arbitration, and let 
me remind you again that that is the proposition under dis- 
cussion, no matter how it may be covered up by other more 
or less attractive propositions. The single thing that is 
being proposed is to add compulsion to arbitration. We are 
not talking about a permanent board, or the Interstate Com- 


104 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


merce Commission, we are talking about compulsory arbi- 
tration. Shall we have compulsory arbitration? 


§120 


Gentlemen, the proposition to enforce compulsory arbi- 
tration, not by fining the men, not by putting them in jail, but 
by taking the funds of the unions, has been put before us. 
I will tell you what will happen under such a plan. The men 
belonging to the union will form a voluntary benefit insur- 
ance society, and every cent of the funds will be transferred 
to this incorporated society, which cannot be touched. How, 
then, are you going to enforce compulsory arbitration? 


First AFFIRMATIVE REBUTTAL 
Samuel Henry Workman, Brown 


$121 


There are two issues in this debate. Is compulsory arbi- 
tration necessary? Can it be enforced? 

Our opponents have entirely ignored statistics. If they 
will consult the United States Labor Bureau Report of 1905 
they will find in 1901, 26 strikes; in 1902, 22 strikes; in 1903, 
24 strikes; in 1904, 9 strikes; in 1905, 22 strikes. But they con- 
sult the Report of 1906, and tell us only seven strikes oc- 
curred, ignoring the fact that this Bulletin records only those 
cases under the Erdman Act, and entirely ignoring the 
strikes outside of that. The Illinois Central lost six million 
dollars in a strike that involved ten thousand men. The 
freight handlers’ strike in New York lasted three days and 
cost $78,000. The Bangor & Aroostook strike lasted a day and 
a half, and cost $16,000; the Illinois Central had a strike in- 
volving nine thounsand men. The Chicago freight handlers’ 
strike involved six thousand men, lasted five months, and 
tied up business completely in Chicago for two weeks, and 
so on and so on. These have been strikes that have oc- 


BROWN VERSUS DARTMOUTH 105 


curred in spite of the existence of the Erdman Act. We 
ask our opponents how they are going to show that the 
Erdman Act has been successful in preventing strikes. 


§122 


They say the railroad employees would be the last to 
strike because they would be the. first to suffer. Why have 
the employees taken the means of striking hitherto? The 
only reason there have not been more strikes—and we 
show that there have been 220 and only two and a half per 
year settled—is that the employees have had their demands 
granted. Chief Stone said if he did not get his demands 
not a wheel would move east of Chicago and by the end of 
a week New York City would not have a pound of food. 
We do not say that their demands are unjust in every case, 
but in a number of cases they have been unjust. And yet 
our opponents see no necessity for compulsory arbitration, 
and claim that the Erdman Act has proved a success. Think 
of entrusting the lives of citizens to voluntary arbitration! 
If they do not agree to arbitrate now they do not have to. 
Let us admit that you cannot make ten thousand men work 
all the time; is not the chance greater at any rate where 
the government says, “You must accept our decision or you 
will be fined for every day you are out”? Our opponents say 
the unions will transfer their money to some other organi- 
zation. But they will still hold their lien or right and we 
can still attack the brotherhood. Our opponents talk of our 
nightmare. This is no nightmare but a serious situation. 
If White River trains were tied up tomorrow Dartmouth 
would not get mail or food. If our opponents tell us there 
is no necessity for compulsory arbitration because seven 
strikes only! have occurred they are ignoring the situation as 
it is. Under our system our chance of preventing strikes is 
greater whether the government has no power or whether 
it has some power. If you cannot make ten thousand men 
work you have to do the best you can toward it, and we con- 
tend that our system offers that possibility. 


106 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


SECOND NEGATIVE REBUTTAL. 
Frederick Pitkin Cranston, Dartmouth 


8123 


The gentleman of the Affirmative who preceded me named 
a great number of strikes, but I call your attention to the 
fact that all occurred before 1905. We are not talking about 
ten years ago, but about the present situation. There are 
seven strikes mentioned in this Bulletin. This Bulletin says 
no strikes have occurred since 1906 that have not been men- 
tioned in the Bulletin. Therefore there have been only seven. 
“Since 1906 there has been no case of a serious strike or of 
danger of a serious strike on the part of those classes of em- 
ployees to whom this law is made applicable in which the 
provisions of this law have not been invoked.” All cases 
are mentioned in this Bulletin. There are only seven cases 
mentioned since 1906. A great many classes of employees 
that have struck are not properly included as railroad em- 
ployees in this debate—freight handlers, for instance, are not 
engaged in train operation. We have established the point 
that since 1906 there have been but seven strikes. We are 
not considering what happened back in the nineteenth cen- 
tury. This is the twentieth century. 


§124 


Our opponents have said that strikes have been averted 
because the employees got their demands. In the last award 
they got less than half of what they demanded. We are 
to judge the situation by what the employees do and not 
by what their leaders say. The leaders have said there was 
danger of strikes, but since 1906 there have been but seven 
strikes, and the whole number of men involved in eight years 
is only about 11,000, We call your attention to the fact that 
railroad disputes are arbitrated. People say they will not 
be arbitrated, but the fact is that up to the present time they 
have been. Actions speak louder than words. We are con- 
cerned with what is done. We enforce our plan by the good 


BROWN VERSUS DARTMOUTH 107 


faith of the parties. Our plan is better than compulsory arbi- 
tration because we rely on the good faith of the parties, and 
in the past since 1906 when unions have said they would 
abide by decisions they have done so in every case. 


§125 


The Affirmative have said that if a railroad union trans- 
ferred its funds to another organization that union would still 
have a lien on the funds. I ask this audience, if the New 
Haven should transfer its funds into the treasury of the New 
York Central, could an action against the New Haven touch 
any property of the New York Central? If you gave money 
to another man would a suit against you bring him to a situ- 
ation where he would be deprived of his property? If a 
union gave its funds to a life insurance society or a work- 
man’s loan association which was a separate corporation 
in the eyes of the law, that society or association could not 
be sued for the debts of the union any more than one man 
can be sued for the debts of another. 


SECOND AFFIRMATIVE REBUTTAL. 


James Joseph McGovern, Brown 


§126 


I wonder if the last speaker on the Negative is so naif 
as to think these brotherhoods are going to transfer their 
funds of millions of dollars to some unknown organization 
which they would have no hold on? Can you imagine any- 
thing much more like a nightmare than that? 

We have spent enough time on the question of the Erd- 
man Act. It applies to only about a third of the strikes. 
This Bulletin deals with railroad employees. When we have 
found a railroad strike we have taken it up and pointed it out. 
The gentlemen of the Negative are looking at about one-third 
and ignoring the others. The Negative cannot deny that 
railroad strikes are so disastrous that they must be prohibited. 


roghoe t RAILROAD ARBITRATION. 


There have been only so many strikes under the Erdman 
Act, and so they say there is no need for arbitration. Our 
argument is that, strike or no strike, these brotherhoods 
have no right to dictate, no right to say to us, “If you refuse 
to grant an increase in wages or a reduction in hours we 
will tie up your traffic and bring untold misery and loss to 
the public.” Do we need another disaster like that in Chi- 
cago in 1894 to show the need of compulsory arbitration? 
When Chief Stone declares that not a wheel will turn east 
of Chicago and New York, and not a pound of food will be 
in New York at the end of a week, unless his demands are 
complied with, when the life, safety and happiness of our 
people is in the hands of a few unscrupulous bosses, can 
we say that there is no need for change? This is a situation 
where only compulsory arbitration will avail. 


§127 

But they assert that employees are opposed to arbitration, 
and they picture to us something like industrial war. Of 
course they are opposed to it. The power of threatening 
strikes has won for them so many unjust demands that it will 
be rather hard for them, but to say there will be warfare or 
industrial disaster as a consequence is out of place. They 
would soon realize that public opinion was against them, 
and that there would be no sympathy for their strikes. 
Further, the brotherhoods would be assessed $25 per day for 
every employee out on strike, and would not that make them 
pretty careful about sending out a hundred thousand men? 
Leaders would not willingly do anything to injure the con- 
fidence of the men in them. 

In the long list of countries, fifteen of them, where there 
has been legal settlement of disputes, not a single railroad 
strike has occurred, but in ten countries where there was 
no compulsory arbitration there have been a number of 
strikes in ten years. 

But, our opponents say, you cannot enforce the award on 
the ten thousand men. Government does not expect to pre- 
vent murders or breach of contract, but it expects the maxi- 


BROWN VERSUS DARTMOUTH 109 


mum efficiency, and certainly we do not expect that the em- 
ployees will violate the conditions we have laid down. 


THIRD NEGATIVE REBUTTAL. 


Chester Bradley Jordan Jr., Dartmouth 
§128 


You will notice that gentlemen of the Affirmative said 
that later on in the debate they were going to prove numer- 
ous cases of injustice. They have not done it. You realize 
that after the next speaker on the Affirmative gets up you 
cannot question his figures because there is no other speech 
left for the Negative, and I have a suspicion that his figures 
are going to be dubious, because I happen to know that 
there is not a single unjust decision that has been handed 
down. We showed you that wages were keeping up with 
the high cost of living, that we were merely paying the men 
a living wage. If the railroads are not making enough money 
to pay that wage that has nothing to do with it; as long as 
you have a man working for you you have to pay what he 
is worth, no matter what you are worth. They are perfectly 
_ just demands. The Affirmative have not shown a single 
definite award where there was a single definite bit of in- 
justice. There is only one way to judge method, and 
that is by results, and the results have been just, there- 
‘fore the method is probably just. Until they get up on 
their feet and prove it they cannot go on crying in- 
justice. I want to tell you something. If in the proof of 
this case of injustice they use a single figure put down by 
a single railroad statistician, it is prejudiced evidence. If 
they use a single figure from an independent statistician 
hired by capital or by labor, it is prejudiced evidence. If 
they put in any figures from a statistician not hired by these 
people he probably does not know anything about it, and 
that evidence must go out. 


IIO RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


§129 


They said they could enforce this measure. But it cannot 
be done. You cannot force men to go back to work. Of’ 
course they can send them back to work, but they cannot 
make them do it. They have talked about the funds. Do 
you suppose they can get hold of their funds? This is a 
great government of ninety-five million people, but there 
are some things that it cannot do. You cannot force five 
hundred thousand men to work with discretion and intelli- 
gence if they do not want to. You cannot enforce involun- 
tary servitude, and that would be the only way. 

They have said that the boards of arbitration are bad, 
because the people on them are people who have never been 
heard of, people of no intelligence or information at all. 
Here is a list of the members of a board: Charles R. Van 
Hise, President of the University of Wisconsin—of course 
he would not be an intelligent man he is just a college presi- 
dent; Oscar Straus, one of the most prominent business men 
—of course he would not be capable of judging such prob- 
lems with intelligence; Frederick N. Judson, of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission that the Affirmative had told us so 
much about—naturally he would not know anything. These 
boards, in fact, are capable, the awards are just and satis- 
factory, and have been made in the settlement of practically | 
every class of industrial decision. Cannot you place the 
word of the United States Gomernment against the gentle- 
men of the Affirmative? 

We have proved therefore that since there is no need for 
any change in the present system, since no change that they 
have suggested could be enforced, the compulsive feature 
should never be introduced in settlement of labor disputes 
in these United States of America. | 


BROWN VERSUS DARTMOUTH si 


TuHIrRD AFFIRMATIVE REBUTTAL. 


James Vincent Giblin, Brown 
§130 


Dr. Charles Van Hise we will regard as the highest au- 
thority on labor disputes, also Professor Dixon of Dartmouth 
as a leading statistician. Dr. Van Hise, on this particular 
commission, says that a compulsory wage commission work- 
ing in cooperation with an interstate commerce commission 
is the only just and competent weapon to meet the situation. 
This same board, having Professor Dixon as statistician, con- 
cluded that under the Erdman Act cases have been settled 
only under press of expedient and not on principles of en- 
during equity, so as to avert strikes for the time being but 
not to secure for employees and railroads what they are 
entitled to. The Erdman Act was awarding decisions ac- 
cording to expediency and not according to justice. There- 
fore we point out the Pennsylvania, the Chicago & Alton 
dispute, where the engineers of the West received increase, 
a dispute in I910 in which conductors and trainmen received 
a total increase of 50 per cent, which the greatest railroad 
experts said was unjust. 

The question comes to two issues. Is there need of 
change? Can our awards be enforced? 

S131 

The gentlemen of the Negative say that there have been 
seven strikes referred to the Erdman Act. But that Act is 
so weak that it does not even bring parties together. There 
have been over fifty since 1906 where they have not consid- 
ered the Act. We conclude that there have been sufficient 
strikes under this Act to warrant change. There have been 
220 to 230 strikes, five settled to fifteen unsettled. Eliminat- 
ing their seven, strikes have occurred right and left since 
1906—New York, New Haven & Hartford trainmen; Bangor 
& Aroostook; Chicago, New Orleans & Texas; Chicago, Mil- 
waukee & St. Paul—strikes right and left, and the fact that 


112 RAILROAD ARBITRATION 


they have only invoked the Erdman Act in seven cases 
proves nothing at all. We have pointed out a list of foreign 
countries in which they have compulsory arbitration, where, 
since the adoption of that system, not a single railroad strike 
has. occurred. We believe our government can meet the 
situation in the same way, with penalty, with public opinion, 
and can keep the men at work. 


§132 


Our opponents say the employee will be the greatest 
loser in striking. That is the point. And if we get a board 
like the Interstate Commerce Commission and give just 
awards we say they will accept those awards, and, in the 
face of public opinion and of penalty will not. reject them. 


Then the proposition is that numerous railroad strikes where 


the Erdman Act was so weak as not to be consulted have 
proved the need of change, and that men will be willing to 
accept decisions because they will be losers if they do not. 
If eighty thousand men decide to reject an award now .there 
is nothing to do but to go out on a strike, but under our 
system they will say, “We had better be careful before we 
strike.’ We believe our system is needed, and we believe 
that it will be enforced more often than any other system that 
could be devised. 


hi 


INDEX 


American Railroad Rates, quotation from, 40. 

Arbitration, analyzed and explained, 2, I09. 

Arbitration board of I912-’13, extract from the report of, 65. 
Australia, experience of, 8, 16, 21, 22, 26, 61, 62, 73. 


Babington, General, on compulsory arbitration, 22. 
Briand, M., on strikes, 38. 
British Board of Trade, Report of I912, 27, 91. 


Canada, experience of, 63, 66. 

Compulsory arbitration arouses public opinion, 90; defined, 12; 
explained, 3, 50, 77, 78, 85; compared with voluntary arbitra- 
tion, 20, 78, 79, 105; in operation, 48; in Great Britain, Hol- 
land, Denmark, Austria, 27; labor opposed to, 54; forces labor 
into politics, 23, 69, 70; and efficiency, 18, 78; increases dis- 
satisfaction, 21, 22, 53, 56, 68, 60, 72, 95; equity of awards, 29, 
32; practicable, 9, 48, 91, 92; impracticable, 16, 19, 100, IOI; 
necessary, 8, 45, 67, 86; unnecessary, 12, 49, 63, 94, 96, 97, 
98, 103; enforceable, 35, 91, 108-10; unenforceable, 17, 28 
58, 63, 100, IOI, 104, IIO. Me 

Compulsory investigation, I5. 


I 


Danbury hatters’ case, II. ; 
Disputes, on Chicago, W. I. & B. lines, So. Pacific, Queen & 
Créscent lines, Burlington R. R., 52. 


Engineering Magazine, editorial from, 29. 
England, experience of, 76, 81. 
Erdman "Act, E3p.329 504 50,.04;.75; O2,/53, 111: 


Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co. vs. No. Pacific R. R. Co., 
France, general strike, 81. 


Gompers, Samuel, on arbitration, 14, 23, 54. 


Injunctions, IT. 
Interstate Commerce Commission, 6, 34, 40, 41, 49, 90. 
Italy, experience of, 73. 


Knapp, Judge, 46. 
Kneeland vs. American Loan Co., 43. 


Le Rossignol, J. E., 
Locomotive aes Brotherhood of, 14, 24, 35. 


114 INDEX 


MacDonald, J. Ramsay, on New Zealand, 17. 

Maine, experience of, 74. 

Mediation explained, 2. 

Mitchell, John, on investigation, 15; on compulsory arbitration, 
19; on enforcement of compulsory arbitration, 27; on neces- 
sity of compulsory arbitration, 45; on Erdman Act, 66; on 
voluntary arbitration, 46, 68. 

Morrisey, P. H., on voluntary arbitration award, 24; on arbitra- 
tion board report (1912), 26. 

Munn vs. Illinois, 41. 


Newlands Act, wage increases under, 6; explained, 51. 
New Zealand Department of Labor, Report of, 8, 26, 60, 65, 71, 73. 


Post office employees’ unions, 28. 
Public and the railroads, 4, 41, 76, 82; and the employees of the 
railroads, 42. 


Railroads and the unions, 6, 7; rates and wages, 39, 40. 
Railroad Trainmen, extract from, 54. 
Roumania, experience of, 73. 


Spain, experience of, 73. 

Stone, Chief, on the demands of the union, 7, 87. 

Strike, general, 37; right to, 43. 

Strikes, 13, 86, 102, 103, 104, 106, 111; on the Delaware & Hud- 
son R. R., I, 24, 92; on the Colorado & Southern R. R., 15, 
92; on the Huntington & Broad Top Mountain R. R., 15, 92; 
on the Chicago Terminal, 15; on the Bangor & Aroostook R. 
R., 74, 84; on the Georgia Central R. R., Harriman lines, New 
York, Susquehanna & Western R. R., Baltimore & Ohio R. 
R., Illinois Pacific R. R., Missouri Pacific R. R., Vermont Cen- 
tral R. R., 84; on the*Gulf' & Ship Island) R..wRaSoe pene 
Chicago switchmen’s strike, 83; of the slaughtermen, 17; of 
ate 1804, 37, 48, 58; avoided, 14; effect and the public 
Boe 8 hs. 

Switchmen, 35. 


Union, funds of, 11; power of, I, 4, 36, 87, 88, Io1, 108. 
USS. Bureau of Labor; 1305: 


Van, Hise Crk’ 26. 

Voluntary arbitration, advantages of, 14, 52; disadvantages of, 
66; compared with compulsory arbitration, 46; defects of, 
39; equity of awards, 80, 96; expediency, 46; in operation, 48. 


Wage increase, cycle in, 6. 
Wages and the price of living, 96. 


As 


